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The important, significance of restructuring in the power industry, is the emergence of 
performance regulatory indices, in the power distribution companies, Reward-Penalty 
Scheme (RPS).  RPS is a direct control, financial tool, designed for power distribution 
regulators, to assure the performance regulatory controls, such as system reliability. 
This tool rewards the distribution company that provides good reliability and penalizes 
those who provide poor reliability. To implement Reward-Penalty Schemes for Power 
Distribution Companies that maintain the appropriate reliability levels, several socio-
technical challenges will need to be addressed. However, in the comprehensive litera-
ture survey of the existing Reward-Penalty Schemes, there are not really any convincing 
Reward-Penalty Schemes that will meet those challenges. This thesis highlights and ex-
plains the importance of developing an effective RPS, to manage the reliabilityof power 
supply, without any interruptions from power distribution companies and investigates 
the main parameters required, for designing and implementing an effective Reward-
Penalty Structure, for power distribution companies.  
To address the solutions to the four key issues, this thesis proposes (i) a generic 
framework of Reward-Penalty Structure for power distribution companies, that defines 
andcharacterizesthe most vital parameters todesign and implement the RPS(ii) two 
novel, linear reward penalty models, where rewards and penalties increase in a linear 
fashion,whichidentifiesby whatmeans the curve reaches the maximum reward or 
penalty quickly, as performance-based reliability moves away from the benchmark (iii) 
two novel quadratic reward penalty models, that provide increasing rewards or 
penalties, more slowly as performance-based reliability deviates from the target, (iv) 
two novel cubic reward penalty models, where the RPS curve reaches the maximum 
reward/ penalty moreslowly ,compared to the quadratic and linear curve, thus showing 
little reward or penalty around the dead band.These RPS models address the problems 
in improving the performance based on reliability for power distribution companies. 
Acapping (thresholding) on the maximum reward and penalties and a dead-band ,is 
introduced in all the proposed RPS models thatThis willallow companies to abstain 
from paying a critical penalty, or getting a huge reward and also considers the 
uncertainty related to the performance related components, that are outside of the 
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distribution company’s control.  The system reliability index, i.e. System Average Inter-
ruption Frequency Index (SAIFI), is chosen as the performance criteria, based on relia-
bility of the proposed models. The theoretical concepts and the proposed solutions are 




It is a great pleasure to thank everyone who helped me write my dissertation success-
fully. 
Firstly, I would like to express my sincere gratitude and thanks to my supervisor Dr. 
Aneesh Krishna, for his continuous support and excellent supervision during this re-
search. His valuable knowledge, guidance, motivation and support helped me through-
out all the many hours spent conducting this research and writing this thesis.  
I would like to express my special appreciation and thanks to my co-supervisor, Dr. 
Vidyasagar for his patience, motivation, enthusiasm, and immense knowledge. His con-
structive guidance, valuable critique, suggestions and continuous support with my re-
search helped me throughout the work done on this thesis. 
I would like to thank my office mates, Megha and Munira for creating a positive, friend-
ly, supportive and enjoyable environment. I am grateful to many of my colleagues, espe-
cially Suneetha and Chithra for their helpful suggestions and peer review of my re-
search. My thanks also extend to staff and students at the department of computing, for 
making it such a friendly and enjoyable work environment. 
I dedicate my thesis to my father Nalinakshan and my mother Remavathy and my par-
ents-in-law, Raveendran and Sudha, for their love and providing me with unfailing sup-
port and continuous encouragement, throughout my years of study and throughout the 
process of researching and writing this thesis. This accomplishment would not have 
been possible without them. 
Moreover, I dedicate this thesis to my husband, Sumesh Raveen and my lovely kids, Om, 
Nama and Shiva, for their understanding. Without my husband’s love and sincere sup-
port, and my son’s inspiration, I would not have been able to tackle the challenges head 
on. I am very fortunate to have my family by my side, who enrich my life with love and 
happiness. 
Lastly, I am thankful to all my friends for their emotional support, companionship, en-
tertainment, love and care. Finally, I thank my God, my God Father, for allowing me to 
get through all the difficulties. I have experienced Your guidance day by day. You are the 
6 
 











1. Sreenithya Sumesh, Vidyasagar Potdar, Aneesh Krishna (2016). Reward-Penalty 
Structure for Power Distribution Companies: A State of The Art. Int. J. Of Grid and 
Utility Computing, IJGUC-154112 (ERA-B )(Under Review).  
 
2. Sreenithya Sumesh, Vidyasagar Potdar, Aneesh Krishna (2016). Clustered 
Prosumer Penalty Framework on Smart Grid. 1st Springer International Confer-
ence on Emerging Trends and Advances in Electrical Engineering and Renewable 




TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1.1 Introduction .......................................................................................................... 62 




















1.2 Performance Based Regulation ...................................................................... 65 


























1.3 Reward Penalty Scheme (Rps)- Quality Control On Continuity Of 
Supply (Reliability) ............................................................................................. 67 
1.4 Research Motivations ......................................................................................... 68 
1.5 Research Objectives ............................................................................................ 70 
11 
 
1.6 Scope Of The Thesis ............................................................................................ 71 
1.7 Significance Of Research ................................................................................... 72 






1.8 Dissertation Structure ....................................................................................... 72 
1.9 Conclusion .............................................................................................................. 74 
Chapter 2 
Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction .......................................................................................................... 75 
2.2 Different Approaches Used To Implement     Reward-Penalty 
Schemes .................................................................................................................. 77 
2.3 Classification Of The Existing Reward-Penalty Approaches ................. 83 
2.4 Parameters Used By Different Approaches Forperformance-Based 
Regulation To Implement Rps ......................................................................... 86 
2.5 Classification Of Existing Literature Based On The Conceptual 
Modules To   Develop A Framework For Rps Design And 
Implementation ................................................................................................... 87 
12 
 




















 2.5.1.3 Critical Evaluation Of The Relevant Literature On Performance Reliability 












































































































2.6 Discussion Of Different Parameters For Managing Performance 
Based On Reliability By Efficient Reward-Penalty Scheme 
Implementation. ............................................................................................... 116 
2.7 Design Requirements For Managing Performance Based On 
Reliability In The Form Of Rps ..................................................................... 119 
2.8 Conclusion ........................................................................................................... 120 
Chapter 3 
Problem Definition 
3.1 Introduction ....................................................................................................... 122 
3.2 Key Concepts ...................................................................................................... 123 
3.3 Problem Definition ........................................................................................... 126 
3.4 Research Issues ................................................................................................. 127 




























3.5 Research Methodology ................................................................................... 130 




















3.6 Conclusion ........................................................................................................... 133 
Chapter 4 
Generic Framework Of Reward-Penalty Scheme 
4.1 Introduction ....................................................................................................... 134 
4.2 An Innovative Generic Framework Of Reward-Penalty Scheme ...... 134 
4.3 Theoretical Foundation .................................................................................. 136 
















































4.4 Conclusion ........................................................................................................... 142 
Chapter 5 
Linear Reward-Penalty Scheme 
5.1 Introduction ....................................................................................................... 143 
5.2 Proposed Linear Reward Penalty Structure (LRPS) ............................. 144 




















5.3 Theoretical Foundation For LRPS ............................................................... 147 




























5.4 Prototype Implementation ............................................................................ 154 
5.5 Experimental Settings ..................................................................................... 154 






5.6 Results And Observations .............................................................................. 155 
5.7 Validation ............................................................................................................ 158 
5.8 Comparative Analysis And Discussion ...................................................... 158 
5.9 Conclusion ........................................................................................................... 165 
Chapter 6 
Quadratic Reward-Penalty Scheme 
6.1 Introduction ....................................................................................................... 166 
6.2 Proposed Quadratic Reward Penalty Structure (QRPS)...................... 167 
29 
 




















6.3 Theoretical Foundation For QRPS .............................................................. 171 












6.4 Prototype Implementation ............................................................................ 177 
6.5 Experimental Settings ..................................................................................... 177 
31 
 






6.6 Results And Observations .............................................................................. 178 
6.7 Validation ............................................................................................................ 182 
6.8 Comparative Analysis And Discussion ...................................................... 182 
6.9 Conclusion ........................................................................................................... 188 
Chapter 7 
Cubic Reward-Penalty Scheme 
7.1 Introduction ....................................................................................................... 189 
7.2 Proposed Cubic Reward Penalty Structure (CRPS) ............................... 190 




















7.3 Theoretical Foundation For CRPS ............................................................... 194 
33 
 












7.4 Prototype Implementation ............................................................................ 199 
7.5 Experimental Settings ..................................................................................... 200 








7.6 Results And Observations .............................................................................. 200 
7.7 Validation ............................................................................................................ 204 
7.8 Comparative Analysis And Discussion ...................................................... 205 
7.9 Conclusion ................................................................................................................ 2 
Chapter 8 
Discussion And Recommendation 
8.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................ 4 
8.2 Discussion ................................................................................................................ 4 






















































8.3 Recommendations ................................................................................................. 7 
8.4 Conclusion ................................................................................................................ 9 
Chapter 9 
Conclusion 
9.1 Introduction .......................................................................................................... 12 
9.2 Problems Addressed By This Thesis ............................................................. 13 
9.3 Dissertation Contributions ............................................................................... 15 
9.4 Future Works ........................................................................................................ 18 















































LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS 
 












Figure 2.5-2 General Reward-Penalty Scheme ............... ERROR! BOOKMARK NOT DEFINED. 
42 
 






Figure 2.5-4 Capped Reward-Penalty Scheme ............... ERROR! BOOKMARK NOT DEFINED. 






Figure 4.2-1 : Generic Framework of a Reward-Penalty Scheme for Power Distribution 































































































































































LIST OF TABLES 
 
































Table 2.5-1 Classification of Conceptual Modules used by Different Existing Reward-Penalty 























































































































































































CHAPTER I  
INTRODUCTION 
This chapter provides: 
 The background information on the traditional regulated and modern deregulat-
ed power industry and the performance-based regulation schemes such as re-
ward penalty schemes. 
 An overview of reward penalty schemes. 
 The significance and importance of managing performance based on reliability in 
reward penalty schemes. 
 The objective and motivation of this research 
 The dissertation structure 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
Traditionally, most power distribution companies worked for a long time as vertically 
coordinated restraining infrastructures in which one company controls the generation, 
transmission and distribution facilities. In this traditional vertically integrated system, 
customers do not have a choice in selecting the company from whom they purchase 
electricity[1] and as such this organization controls all periods of framework arranging, 
system planning,  configuration, and operations. This regulated power industry struc-
ture, has been there for a long time. One of the points of interest this traditionally regu-
lated power industry has, is in the coordination of the considerable number of functions 
required, to give a very highly reliable, solid, power supply. Be that as it may, one of the 
critical drawbacks of the traditionally regulated industry, is the absence of rivalry in the 
created monopoly [1], which frequently prompts debasing framework effectiveness and 
administration quality.  
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As of late, social, financial, political and specialized changes have constrained the con-
trolled force industry to adjust [1]–[7]. The power industry is presently experiencing 
significant changes because of this appropriation. The rivalry has turned into the key 
variable, driving the rebuilding (deregulation) process, in the electric power industry, 
which is designed to benefit both the customers and the participating companies [2], 
[4], [6]–[8]. Customers can now shop around for different service providers and select 
the desired companies according to their economic and technical requirements[2]. The 
key idea driving deregulation, is that no one organization ought to impose the monopoly 
of either the generation, distribution, wholesale or retail sale of power and power-based 
administrations. Figure 1.1-1 delineates a portion of the general contrasts between the 
traditionally managed (vertically coordinated) and the new deregulated, electric force 
industry [1]. 
1.1.1     TRADITIONAL REGULATED POWER INDUSTRY STRUC-
TURE 
Over many years the traditionally regulated power industry structure, has been largely 
dominated by   a central regulatory authority, which had full control . Thus it had often 
been described as a vertically integrated system. They served as the main power suppli-
er within that geographical region and they serviced all consumersin the given region. A 
run of the mill structure, of a vertically coordinated force industry, is presentedin Figure 
1.1-1. In this structure, the cash flow is unidirectional, i.e. payment for the utilities was 
made from the customer to the power industry, and there was no flow of cashto the 
customer. Similarly, the data flow which consists of direct commands, goals, constraints, 
direct measurements, control signals, estimated values, structural designs, etc., only ex-
isted between the generators and the transmission systems. In the vertically coordinat-
ed force industry, it was difficult to isolate the costs required for generation, transmis-
sion or distribution. In this way, frequently, customers are charged a normal tax rate 





Figure 1.1-1 Power Industry Structure: Traditional & Modern Deregulate 
1.1.2 MODERN DEREGULATED POWER INDUSTRY STRUCTURE 
Figure  1.1-1 presents the typical structure of a deregulated power industry, with links 
to data, energy, and cash flow between various entities[1]. The customer carries out its 
transactions through a retailer, or transacts directly with a generating company. 
In the modern deregulated power industry structure, generation organizations are au-
tonomously owned and compete to trade energy with clients. They are not controlled by 
the same bodies that control the transmission framework [1]. Transmission organiza-
tions own high voltage transmission lines and move power in wholesale, from where it 
is created to where it is conveyed [1]. Distribution organizations convey power to retail 
end customers (clients) [1]. A Power Exchange is an association, where the purchasers 
and dealers of wholesale power, are permitted to purchase and offer energy as a com-
modity [1]. Retail energy service administration organizations, are retailers of the 
electric power, who purchase power from a power market and offer this directly to the 
client. Distribution System Operators are endowed with the duty of guaranteeing the 
consistent quality and security of the whole framework. They are an independent au-





1.1.3    PROBLEMS IN THE DEREGULATED POWER INDUSTRY 
The deregulated power industry is confronting numerous issues, including  how to 
operate the new power structure financially and be consistently reliable;how to 
minimize generation costs and how to pull in the new speculation required, to build the 
required generation and transmission services, under the instability of business 
competition[2-6]. The prerequisites of providing minimal cost electrical energy and 
high amounts of consistent reliability, are also important challenges. Adjusting these 
two components is a critical challenge for power system administrators.  
One of the favorable conditions of this recently deregulated power industry is the sub-
sequent competition between power suppliers, to give better administration quality. In 
a focused, competitive business sector, customers are allowed to switch between power 
suppliers if their reliability becomes unsuitable[2]. This hasposed remarkable strain on 
electric power organizations, to decrease costs (the expense of producing and convey-
ing power) and to offer better arrangements to customers. Costs reductions accom-
plished by yielding key projects, decreasing inside skill, and expanding maintenance in-
terim.[4], [6], [7], [8]–[11]. As an immediate result of these activities, the unwavering 
reliability and quality of these structures began to break down. Since these frameworks 
were outlined and kept up to exclusive expectations, this disintegration was not appar-
ent immediately. The reliability quality appeared to be satisfactory for quite a long time, 
yet it then began to break down quickly [12], [13]. At the point of unwavering reliability, 
issues pertaining to quality became apparent as organizations do not regularly have the 
required assets to resolve the issue [1], [10]. In this way, the disintegration of the 
framework of unwavering reliability and quality became one of the most seriousissues 
connected with the deregulation procedure [11] 
1.2 PERFORMANCE BASED REGULATION 
To dodge the cost of reserve funds in maintenance and investment, that will compel the 
decay of system reliability, a method known as, Performance-Based Regulation (PBR), 
has been presented and includes  the objective of maintaining a balance ofservice 
reliability and the utility expenses[10], [11]a key issue in today's energy market. PBR is 
an agreement that rewards a utility for giving great reliability and/or punishes a utility 
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when the inverse happens [10], [14]. This infers the penalties are expanded as the per-
formance deteriorates. PBR bolsters power distribution companies to become more 
economically effective, and in the meantime averts them from reducing service quality 
in the compatibility of budgetary objectives [12]. Since electricpower  distribution sys-
tems constitute the most risk to the interruption of power supply [12], the possibility of 
PBR in the power trade, was presented to power distribution companies [5], [9]–[11], 
[15] and not to power generation and transmission companies. It has been reported in 
the literature [16]–[19], that more than 80% of all customer interruptions happen be-
cause of failures in the distribution system[20]. 
1.2.1 QUALITY CONTROLS 
In the distribution system, performance regulation can be seen as a tool kit of quality 
controls, that the controller can use to acquire satisfactory quality levels, under a 
performance-based regulation plan[21]. Quality control is connected in three distinct 
concepts: commercial quality, continuity of supply (reliability) and voltage quality[14]. 
Amongst these three continuity of supply (reliability) is of significant importance[20], 
[14]. In this chapter, only the impact of quality regulation, on the coherence of supply 
(reliability), will be considered. Quality control is divided into classifications as direct 
and indirect [14]. Aim of indirect quality regulation, is to give data about the perfor-
mance quality of distribution systems for clients [22], [21]. Be that as it may, in direct 
control, the controller specifically applies monetary motivations, for example, rewards 
and punishments.  Punishments often consist of paying compensation to clients on dis-
tribution systems [21]. Three direct controls exist and are explained below: 
1.2.1.1 PREMIUM QUALITY CONTRACTS (PQC) 
Distribution system operators, can approve PQC with clients who characterize the 
buyer's remunerations, if the quality levels settled are not satisfied[21]. Often, these 
agreements are marked with large number of customers who have a requirement for 





1.2.1.2 GUARANTEED STANDARDS FOR WORST-SERVED 
CUSTOMERS (GS): 
Indeed, even a decent, normal quality levels of a distribution company, does not keep 
some customers enduring an unsuitable, lower level of service quality [21]. This is be-
cause, GS are fixed and  utilized in both unplanned and planned interruptions [13] and 
are a concern for clients [13]. These measures can cover both long interferences and 
short intrusions.  
1.2.1.3 REWARD AND PENALTY SCHEMES (RPS): 
The most every now and again, utilized, direct quality control on the system level is 
RPS[21], that helps to  enhance the performance and reliability for extended disrup-
tions. RPS are characterized on the system level of performance, and GS and PQC are 
characterized on the customer service level of performance[21]. The Power distribution 
company regulators use RPS as a system quality indicator, to measure their system reli-
ability level, their performance efficiency, and their customer’s interruption costs. With 
RPS, the regulator specifies the target levels of the performance quality standard and 
the company’s performance quality is related to these quality targets[10]. By direct con-
trols, the regulator specifically provides the distribution systems monetary motivating 
forces as prizes[21], punishments and/or commitments to pay reimbursements to af-
fected customers because of awful service[23].  
1.3 REWARD PENALTY SCHEME (RPS)- QUALITY 
CONTROL ON CONTINUITY OF SUPPLY (RELIA-
BILITY) 
In the literature, the main focus has been on the effect of quality regulation upon the 
continuity of supply (reliability)[14]. PBR [14]depends upon the service remuneration 
costs concerning the competitive method for quality regulation, in light of penalties. 
Subsequently, incorporating RPS into PBR, implements rewards and penalties for 
surpassing or neglecting to individually accomplish the objective levels [5], [10]. It 
urges power distribution companies to maintain the appropriate levels of reliability. 
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RPS combined in a PBR arrangement works like an agreement between an utility and its 
regulatory agency[10][24]. Power distribution company regulators, adopt different re-
ward-penalty schemes, to help guarantee their quality levels. Regulators should pay 
power distribution companies that provide excellent performance and receive money 
from power distribution companies that provide poor performance[4]. This approach 
revises the company’s revenues as per their reliability and rewards companies with 
high-quality levels and penalizes companies with lower-quality levels. It not only em-
powers the companies to enhance their service quality, but  additionally adjusts the to-
tal rewards, awarded and the total granted and aggregates penalties gathered by the 
regulators[10]. 
The key purpose of this research is to develop an approach to control the quality of the 
continuity of supply in the form of Reward-Penalty Schemes. However, it should be 
noted that the current literature highlights some key problems associated with manag-
ing reliability as RPSs; the research gap serves as the motivation for this study. In the 
next section, such research motivations will be discussed 
1.4 RESEARCH MOTIVATIONS 
Power distribution company’s regulatory authorities, are progressively moving to 
performance-based control and using company’s historic performance, as a main con-
sideration in setting specified service reliability standards[25]. A Performance based 
reward penalty scheme is one of the regulatory methods used by regulatory agencies to 
accomplish control and prevent crumbling of power service reliability [6], [16], [26]. 
Keeping in mind that the end goal is to apply such schemes, it is important to construct 
a careful plan. Neglecting to do this may result in the creation of ineffective model put-
ting the company in financial risk. These schemes are generally separated by their 
schemes (symmetrical or non-symmetrical) and the  strength of their motivations (re-
ward or penalty)[26]. Advancement of power distribution systems, depends upon bal-
ancing development costs with the capacity for financial risk because of power outages 
[1], [26]. For the performance-based regulation to emerge and have the ability to 
interact with the proposed Performance based reward penalty structure meaningfully, 
several services have to be in place;some of these are already deployed as a core part of 
the performance-based regulation, and some exist in other contexts (e.g. Data 
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envelopment analysis, Customer interruption cost analysis), while others need to be 
developed. Additionally, integration of all these services must be accomplished, with 
performance based on reliability, being the target focus area. 
The aforementioned existing research studies are associated with several open research 
issues being applied to the area of managing reliability, in the form of RPSs. 
These problems include: 
• Deficiencies in using limited input parameters and in ensuring reasonable magni-
tude in reward- penalty calculation when applied to the context of managing reli-
ability.  
• Complexity in adopting reward penalty formulas and its inconsistencies with the 
desired outcome. 
• Some aspects are notcomprehensively investigated in the existing literature, 
such as considering those outside factors that are outside of the control of the 
regulatory agency whose role is to manage performance based continuity of 
supply, without interruptions in the form of PCGs. 
• Deficiencies in settings are realistic targets that should be able to support and 
monitor the company’s performance behavior,  
• Motivation of inefficient power distribution companies in power markets,  
• Improving the power distribution company’s reliability in power supply, 
• Developing an effective RPS scheme that is more favorable to the regulatory 
agency than the power distribution companies,   
• Developing an effective RPS scheme, that is more favorable to power distribution 
companies, than regulatory agencies,  
• Developing an effective RPS scheme, that is most favorable to power distribution 
companies,  
• Presentation of financial rewards/penalties which are administratively simple. 
 
Based on the preceding issues, it is clear that this area of performance, based on relia-
bility research, necessitates the improvement of the aspects of developing an efficient, 
reward-penalty scheme. As discussed earlier, the impact of the involvement of a large 
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number of parameters, combined with inconsistent value for reward or penalty and dif-
ficulty in adopting reward-penalty formulas that exist in literature, has indicated that 
several deficiencies exist in the management of reliability, leading to the necessity to 
develop a new method. Lack of RPS schemes that are favorable to power distribution 
companies or regulators, also lead to developing a new method. This research investi-
gates the most vital parameters for designing and implementing an effective RPS. This 
study can also assist regulators, specifically those regulators who want to initiate the 
service quality regulation, designing the RPS according to their political and technical 
circumstances. 
1.5 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
The fundamental research goal of this study is to develop an approach to managing 
continuity of supply without interruptions to the power distribution, using Reward-
Penalty Schemes.  This will require a critical review of the related literature, the devel-
opment of solutions for research of particular issues, the development of models for 
these arrangements, and the verification and validation of the model. Theccompanying 
research objectives have been developed from the fundamental objective of this thesis. 
Objective 1: Proposes a framework to define and characterize the parameters for de-
signing and implementing RPS 
Objective 2: Proposes a linear RPS Structure with and without any control features, 
such as dead band and capping, that is more favorable to the regulatory 
agency than the power distribution companies. 
Objective 3: Proposes a quadratic RPS Structure, with and without any control fea-
tures, such as dead band and capping, that is more favorable to power 
distribution companies, than regulatory agencies. 
Objective 4: Proposes a cubic RPS scheme with and without any control features, 
such as dead band and capping that is the most favorable to power dis-
tribution companies.  





1.6 SCOPE OF THE THESIS 
As mentioned earlier, there are a significant number of challenges concerned with the 
development of RPS for power distribution companies, while maintaining excellent re-
liability in electrical power supply. However, it should be noted that we will only ad-
dress four key research  problems in this thesis, that relate purely to the domain of 
managing reliability in the form of RPSs, within the domain of electric power distribu-
tion. The subsequent four research  problem areas, will need to address the following 
issues : 
• how to define and characterize the most vital parameters for designing and 
implementing RPS,  
• how to set a realistic target, that should be able to support and monitor the 
company’s performance,  
• how to ensure a reasonable scale for rewards or penalties,  
• how to reduce the complexity in adopting reward penalty formulas,  
• how to maintain the consistency of the reward penalty formula, to achieve the 
desired outcome, 
• how to include certain external factors in RPS implementation, that affect the 
performance of power distribution companies, that cannot be controlled by the 
regulators,  
• how to motivate the efficient and inefficient power distribution companies within 
power  supply market,  
• how toi mprove the power distribution companies reliability of power supply,  
• how to develop an effective RPS scheme, that is more favorable to the regulatory 
agency, than the power distribution companies,  
• how to develop an effective RPS scheme that is more favorable to power 
distribution companies than the regulatory agencies, 
•  how to develop an effective RPS scheme that is most favorable to power 
distribution companies,  
• how to present financial rewards/penalties that are administratively simple. 
 
In next section, the significance of this research, will be analysed. 
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1.7 SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH 
The significance of the issues addressed in this proposal is two fold and the advantages 
come about, because this research incorporates socio-economic and technical ad-
vantages. 
 
1.7.1 SOCIO-ECONOMIC RESEARCH 
• Reliable energy supply, increases bargaining power in Power distribution mar-
kets. 
•   Creates the motivation for power distribution. 
 
1.72 TECHNICAL RESEARCH 
• Controls performance based on reliability in the form of RPSs 
• Proposes a framework to define and characterize the parameters for designing 
and implementing RPS 
• Proposes a linear RPS scheme that is more favorable to the regulatory agency 
than the power distribution companies. 
• Proposes a quadratic RPS scheme that is more favorable than power distribution 
companies than regulatory agencies. 
• Proposes a cubic RPS scheme that is most favorable to power distribution 
companies.  
1.8 DISSERTATION STRUCTURE 
The remainder of this thesis is structured as follows. 
 
CHAPTER 2 presents a comprehensive review of related, research on, RPSs. This chap-
ter provides a survey and evaluation, of the RPSs–survey. It also assesses the different 
existing approaches within the field of, erformance-based regulation, as, well as other 
contexts, that are possibly adaptable to RPSs and the current research gaps, in the de-
velopment of RPSs. 
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CHAPTER 3 defines four research problems associated with managing performance 
based on reliability,in the,form of RPSs–problems. It defines and characterizes the most 
vital parameters, ma gn i t u de  f or  re w a rd  o r  p e n a l t y ,  dr op p i n g  t he  
complexity in adopting reward penalty formulas and its inconsistencies with the 
desired outcome and the problem of including external factors that are not controlled 
by regulators.These problems are defined, taking into account the fragments of 
knowledge gathered from the literature review in Chapter 2.This chapter also defines a 
few preliminary ideas, that are utilized as a part of characterizing solution require-
ments. Given the plainly characterized issues, problems and needs, it then talks about 
the science and engineering designing methodology, that will be utilized to tackle 
these four issues and address these research issues.  
CHAPTER 4 proposes the conceptual framework that addresses the problems of 
defining and characterizing  parameters used for evaluating the rewards and penalties, 
based on reliability indices, efficiency score and interruption indices. Four conceptual 
models are constructed to illustrate the theoretical framework. 
CHAPTER 5 proposes a linear RPS Structure with and without any control features, 
such as dead band and capping, to proactively analyze the performance of the power 
distribution companies, before assigning the reward and penalty. It also illustrates how 
this scheme is more favorable to the regulatory agency, than the power distribution 
companies. Furthermore, we also simulate the functionality of the proposed structure, 
using of a pre-defined reliability data set. 
CHAPTER 6 proposes a quadratic RPS Structure, with and without any control features, 
such as dead band and capping to proactively analyse the performance of the power 
distribution companies, before assigning rewards and penalties. It also illustrates how 
this scheme is more favorable to the power distribution companies, than the regulatory 
agency. Furthermore, we also simulate the functionality of the proposed structure using 
a pre-defined reliability data set. 
CHAPTER 7 proposes a cubic RPS Structure with and without any control features, such 
as dead band and capping, to proactively analyses the performance of thepower distri-
bution companies before assigning the rewards and penalties. It also illustrates how 
this scheme is most favorable to the power distribution companies than the regulatory 
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agency. Furthermore, we also simulate the functionality of the proposed structure using 
a pre-defined reliability data set.  
CHAPTER 8 presents the discussion and recommendations of the proposed RPS struc-
tures. 
CHAPTER 9 concludes the entire dissertation work, by outlining what has been 
accomplished and its fundamental advantages.  It will, identify the work that remains 
to be done and proposes future work directions for this research direction. 
1.9 CONCLUSION 
An important significance of restructuring in the power industry is the emergence of 
service quality regulation within power distribution. Reward-Penalty Schemes for pow-
er distribution companies is implemented to assure the system and service reliability. It 
is a financial tool designed to prevent the service reliability and efficiency deterioration, 
of power distribution companies. RPS rewards the utility which is providing excellent 
reliability and penalizes the utility which provides poor reliability. The aim of this re-
search is to address the initial research challenges of managing reliability performance, 






This chapter provides: 
 A critical review of existing literature on the Reward-Penalty Schemes, utilized 
to manage performance reliability of the company’s power distribution. 
 A critical evaluation of the parameters used by different existing literature, in 
the field of performance-based regulation, and their adaptability to control pow-
er distribution companies, in the form of RPSs. 
 A classification of existing literature, based on the conceptual modules that are 
used to develop a framework for designing and implementing RPS. 
 A discussion of the most principal aspects that should be considered while de-
signing RPS. 
 RPS design challenges and requirements based on the critical review of the 
existing relevant literature. 
   
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
A significant factor of restructuring in the power industry is the emergence of perfor-
mance regulatory indices in the power distribution company.  The Reward-Penalty 
Scheme (RPS) is a direct control method that regulators use, to assure the performance 
regulatory controls such as system reliability, service efficiency, and customer 
interruption cost. It is a financial tool, designed to prevent the service reliability and 
efficiency deterioration, of power distribution companies. Reward penalty schemes re-
ward the distribution company which provides a reliable service and penalizes those 
companies that provide poor reliability[25]. The objective of this chapter is to conduct a 
comprehensive literature survey of the existing Reward-Penalty Schemes, proposed in 
the literature and those that are used by power distribution companies, to improve 
their reliability and efficiency. This literature review also investigates the main parame-
ters required for designing and implementing an effective, Reward-Penalty Structure, 
for power distribution companies[27]. 
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In the previous chapter, we discussed the background information, associated with 
managing power distribution companies by utilizing RPSs, while providing an 
introduction to the fundamental concepts such as, regulation and deregulation, in 
power distribution companies, performance-based regulations, quality control, 
reliability and reward-penalty schemes. We also highlighted and explained the im-
portance of developing RPSs to manage the reliability of the power supply without any 
interruptions by power distribution companies. 
As mentioned in Chapter 1,the RPS refers to a mechanism, based upon their reliability in 
supplying power, to create a financial rewards or penalties for distribution companies, 
to maintain or change their quality levels [11]. This chapter provides an overview of the 
literature about RPSs. It also povides an evaluation of existing methods, in the area of 
performance-based regulations and in other situations, such as risk-based maintenance 
in the context of RPS and service quality regulation, to address their adaptability to es-
tablish RPSs. Accordingly, this dissertation will cover the study that has been conducted 
of existing literature. This information will be provided in three main sections. 
It is to be noted, that, in this chapter, we comprehensively explain the research work 
which has been conducted on RPSs. However,we do no tdiscuss all aspects of the 
performance-based regulation projects and research studies, as well as the research 
studies in other contexts,(risk based maintenance in the context of RPS, service quality 
regulation ) in detail. This is beause the aim and scope of this thesis is related to the 
management of performance, based on reliability of the power supply, in the form of 
RPSs; thus,we focus on how those relevant approaches of existing research, can be 
adapted to managere liability of power supply  in the form of RPSs.The rest of this chap-
ter is structured as follows: 
• In Section 2.2, we provide the different approaches used to implement RPS 
• In Section 2.3, we provide a classification of different existing approaches in the 
field of performance-based regulation and their adaptability to control power 
distribution companies, in the form of RPSs. 
• In Section 2.4, we discuss the parameters used by different approaches for 
performance-based regulation, to implement RPSs 
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• In Section 2.5, we classify different existing literature, based upon the conceptu-
al modules that are used to develop a framework for designing and 
implementing RPS. 
• In Section 2.6, we discuss the principal aspects that should be considered, while 
designing RPS 
• Section 2.7discusses the RPS design challenges and requirements based on the 
critical review, of the existing relevant literature.  
• Lastly, the concluding statements are given in Section 2.8. 
2.2 DIFFERENT APPROACHES USED TO IMPLE-
MENT REWARD-PENALTY SCHEMES 
In the literature, there is a scant amount of research work that proposes RPSs for man-
aging reliable power supply, in the power market. In this section, we review existing 
literature, in relation to the different approaches used for implementing RPS. 
Abbaspour et al. [28] has designed reward/penalty structures for power distribution 
companies, taking into account the parameters such as AENS and SAIFI. The Fuzzy C-
implies that a calculation has been utilized to classify comparative power distribution 
companies. The average system reliability indices[28], for example, System Average In-
terruption Frequency Index (SAIFI) and Expected Energy Not Supplied (EENS), were 
taken as the comparative analysis standard in RPS design. The proposed RPS in [11], 
[28], is executed in the Iranian electric power distribution sector, to look at the poten-
tials of various companies, in achieving the predetermined objectives. 
Latify et al.[23], assessed the effect of the maintenance proposals on the unwavering 
reliability indices (EENS) and assigned rewards/penalties to the power generation 
companies; to the extent of their commitments to there liability index infringement, at a 
desirable level. In [26], [29] the Sequential Monte Carlo reenactment is utilized, to 
survey the year on year variability of bulk electric, framework reliability, performance 
indices. The outcomes demonstrate that the likelihood dispersions of unwavering 
performance-based reliability indices, have novel attributes that are in a general 
sen,dependent upon the framework topology, working philosophy and framework 
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conditions[29]. The paper[29]showed that the ability to foresee performance-based 
reliability index distribution (SAIDI, SAIFI), could be utilized to give an appreciation of 
the related financial risk connected with an assigned PBR reward/penalty 
structure[29]. Both historic and reproduced performance-based reliability indices, 
actualized in a speculative PBR structure, are delineated in this chapter. Performance-
based reliability index probability distribution analysis, can provide power distribution 
specialists and risk controllers, with ,basic information on bulk electric framework 
adequacy and help them with overseeing and controlling the potential future dangers, 
under a PBR reward/penalty structure[29]. 
Brown and Burke [13] have exhibited a strategy for measuring the system reliability 
and disclosed a method for measuring PBR risk[4]. To adequately deal with the risk of 
PBR's, distribution companies must have mechanisms that can anticipate system 
reliability quality, on both levels of the system and the customers. These mechanisms 
must go past expected values, and should have the capacity to survey the variation in 
reliabile quality from year to year. To make these mechanisms as exact as can be 
expected under the circumstances, it is important that power distribution companies 
should keep up a  credible, chronicled, historyof reliability, information records. It has 
demonstrated a strategy that permits existing reliability, quality evaluation 
mechanisms, to be effectively consumed, to oversee PBR risk.  
Fotuhi et al. [2] created more than one reliability indices (SAIDI and EENS) and 
developed  reward-penalty models for expanding the exactness of PBR. Distinctive 
reward penalty models had been presented utilizing real system reliability information, 
as a part of Tehran Regional Electrical Company (TREC).  
Yahav et al. [26] proposed a technique for evaluating the reliability and performance 
based motivations for power distribution companies, taking into account the Monte-
Carlo simulation utilizing, reliabilty index SAIDI. This methodology is exhibited for a 
case study and amassed to the whole Distribution system of the Israel Electric 
Corporation (IEC)[26].  
Da Silva et al. [30] introduced another strategy to ascertain the penalties and rewards in 
distribution systems, to keep away from an unanticipated disruption in the electric 
system. This strategy penalizes a utility, which has a high level of reliability in its 
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system[30]. The proposed technique urge companies to invest in the improvement of 
their distribution system reliability[30]. 
Billinton and Pan [24] exhibited real reliability information taken from the Canadian 
Electricity Association (CEA) Service Continuity Reports. The financial PBR analyses 
connected with the historic reliability data, are shown by joining reliability index prob-
ability distribution in forced reward/penalty, approaches.  
Billinton, Cui and Pan [31] concentrated on the use of the probability distribution of 
reliable ideas, to find a balance, between reliability improvement and cost saving meth-
ods to power utilities subject to PBR. Often, the reliability indices, for example, SAIFI, 
SAIDI, and ENS are the most widely recognized parameters, utilized as a part of RPS ex-
ecution.  
Li [32] displayed a distributed handling method for Reliability Index Assessment (RIA) 
for distribution companies. Likewise, an appropriate balance to deal with accomplishing 
better effectiveness is proposed. The appropriate preparing of RIA.is applied to the 
reliability based network reconfiguration (NR)[32].  
Saboorideilami and Abdi [14]built up a risk-based technique, to evaluate the related 
financial risks created by quality regulation for DSOs. Moreover, to take the stochastic 
conduct of the distribution system and quality indices variations into account,the time-
consecutive Monte Carlo simulation technique, is utilized. The impact of taking the re-
closing time will be inspected on system quality indicators and the expense of quality 
regulation in Swedish Rura l Reliability Test System (SRRTS)[14] will be taken into ac-
count. The outcomes demonstrate that mulling over reclosing faults, influencing the sys-
tem reliability indicators, especially yearly average interruption frequency indexes of 
the system (SAIFI). In addition, it also influences the quality regulations cost.  
Simab and Haghifam [10] evaluated, recorded past quality levels and the efficiency 
scores from DEA were utilized, to discover target quality level for every company. It de-
pends  up on the recorded past reliability index (average and standard deviation of the 
index), the DEA effectiveness score and the interruption costs for every company[10].  
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In [11], a methodology was generated to get parameters of RPS for every electrical dis-
tribution company who  utilized DEA, in the presence  of some weighted reliability indi-
ces. With their weights. Research work in [1], [33], [34] concentrated on composite, 
generation and transmission framework reliability assessment, using sequential Monte 
Carlo simulation. Sequential simulation can be utilized to sensibly speak to most possi-
bilities and the complex operational attributes in a bulk electric system, furthermore 
giving thorough scope of reliability indices, in both ampleness and consistent state se-
curity, investigations. Two huge points of interest while using sequential simulation are 
the capacity to get precise frequency and duration indices, and the chance to integrate 
the reliability index probability distribution, connected with the mean qualities. The re-
liability index probability distribution of SAIDI and SAIFI and their related expenses are 
applied to manage the bulk power system risk.  
 Mohammadnezhad-Shourkaei et al. [24] decided that the maintenance plan boosts the 
benefits for distribution companies, considering the motivating forces given by regula-
tory authorities. An efficient risk-based maintenance management system is applied in 
RPS. Decision tree and mixed- integer linear programming (MILP) formulation[24], are 
utilized as a part of the proposed approach, to deal with accomplishing aprecise de-
scription of the time-dependent failure rates of equipment within the distribution com-
panies, and to assess the viability of the different maintenance methods. The primary 
commitment of this paper is to consolidate service reliability regulation in the distribu-
tion companies’ maintenance management strategy. This gives a valuable kit to 
optimally allocate maintenance resources in the presence of RPS[24]. 
Lotero and Contreras [35] disclosed the most pertinent reliability indices and their re-
lated expenses. The outcomes demonstrate that huge contrasts can happen in the 
expense caused by a distribution company, when the regulator applies penalties for not 
abiding as far as possible for reliability indices (SAIDI and SAIFI) and the assessed cost 
which the clients will pay to avoid interruption (Interruption Cost). It helps to distin-
guish how clients are influenced, as well as the related effects on expenses  
Božič and Pantoš, [36] introduced a strategy for reliability investment decisions when a 
reward/penalty scheme is applied to the regulation of distribution companies. The 
(Monte Carlo) MC simulation method [36] is used to decide upon the best 
improvements for system reliability. The proposed technique was tried on the Sloveni-
80 
 
an distribution network,where distribution companies were analysed, taking into ac-
count their cost- efficient improvement of SAIDI[36].  
Alvehag and Awodele [12] developed a strategy to establish the effects that different 
RPS designs have on the distribution company’s financial risk and incentives/penalties. 
The regulator can utilize this technique before implementing a regulation, to attain an 
understanding of the effect of various RPS design solutions has on the power distribu-
tion companies’ financial risk along with the incentives to invest in reliability. The pro-
posed strategy in [12] additionally incorporates a sensitivity analysis to recognize 
which are the most critical parameters in an RPS implementation. The interruption cost 
indices (IC), System Based Reliability Indices (SAIDI and SAIFI), and load based indices 
(AENS) were applied in [5] to survey the power distribution companies’ incentive rate. 
This technique is applied to three regulatory challenges in order to assess their RPS de-
sign solutions; these are: (a) Reconstruction of Customer's Interruption Costs, (b) De-
crease the Variation in the Distribution System's Financial Risk and (c) Limit the Distri-
bution System's Financial Risk. This system is proposed to persuade the power distribu-
tion companies to enhance their service reliabilityand to level the aggregate rewards 
paid and the aggregate penaltiesreceived regulators.  
Moradkhani et al. [15] built up a risk-based maintenance management, in RPS. It al-
lowed distribution system operators to consider budgetary risk, which emerges from 
RPS, in the maintenance scheduling. To estimate the financial risk of actualizing the 
given reliability of reinforcement projects, eg preventive maintenance projects, the 
probability distribution of financial outcomes,derived from implementing given 
preventive maintenance, requires computing of the instability of system reliability. This 
is normally expressed using the probability distribution of SAIDI. Therefore, the paper 
[15] presents the outage time generation algorithm, to determine the probable distribu-
tion of outage frequency and extracts the probability distribution of SAIDI, from the 
probability distribution of outage frequency. Having the probability distribution of 
SAIDI, the probability distribution of the financial result is computed. It then character-
izes the risk-based target function and finds the ideal solution, i.e. the best preventive 
maintenance action, using the generic algorithm[15].  
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Alvehag and Söder [9] built up a risk based technique for reliability investment deci-
sions, whenthe DSO is presented financial risks characterized by quality regulation. This 
study is conducted for two diverse quality regulation designs. The outcomes demon-
strate that essentially the quality regulation designs, as well as the risk model detailing 
and risk technique, majorly affect which reinvestment project is chosen.  
Mohammadnezhad-Shourkaei and Fotuhi-Firuzabad [4] achieved an extensive numeri-
cal study to inspect the relevance of their proposed approach. The outcomes demon-
strated that executing the proposed technique can viably enhance the service reliability 
and eliminated the implementation expense of PBR.  
Xu et al. [27]developed a numerical parametric, enhancing models used for ideally as-
signing the parameters of the PBR inside a reward/penalty structure. It minimizes the 
expenses  associated with the PBR implementation in RPS. Subsequently, the model ac-
quired the required quality level for the distribution system operation. 
The Reward-Penalty Scheme in [10], [11] depends on the historical reliability index (av-
erage and standard deviation (SD) of the reliability index), Data Envelopment Analysis 
(DEA) efficiency score, slack investigation and interruption cost for every company. The 
length of the distribution network (km), the quantity of feeders and number of trans-
formers were considered as yields and SAIDI were considered as a contribution for 
characterizing a model of DEA to quantify the efficiency of electric distribution compa-
nies.  
The relevant literature surveyed in this paper in the area of PBR with an RPS structure 
for distribution companies, emphasized the risk and management issues that the distri-
bution companies face under this quality regulation mechanism. What is missing in the 
literature is a classification of different existing RPS implementation tomaintainthe re-
quired reliability level, while minimizing the related expenses. We have reviewed most 





2.3 CLASSIFICATION OF THE EXISTING REWARD-
PENALTY APPROACHES 
Table 2.3.1 Classification of the Existing Reward-PenaltyApproaches 
Performance reliability module 
Brown and Burke  [13] 
(2000) 
Designed a risk assessment methodology capable 
of quantifying the uncertainty of system reliabil-
ity and individual customer reliability 
Billinton, Cui, and Pan [31] 
(2002) 
Focused on the application of index probability 
distribution concepts to establish an appropriate 
balance between reliability improvement and 
cost saving strategies to power utilities subject to 
PBR 
Billinton and Pan [25] 
(2004) 
Conducted financial risk analyzes associated with 
the historic reliability data by incorporating reli-
ability index probability distributions of SAIDI 
and SAIFI in penalty policies. 
Li[32] 
(2005) 
Presented a distributed processing approach of 
reliability index assessment (RIA) for distribu-
tion systems 
Billinton and Wangdee [29] 
(2006) 
Proposed a sequential Monte Carlo simulation to 
assess the annual variability of bulk electric sys-
tem reliability performance indices.  
Fotuhi et al. [2] 
(2006) 
Examined multi reliability indices and multi-
steps reward-penalty model. 
Yahav, Oron, and Young[26] 
(2008) 
Proposed reliability estimation based on a Mon-
te-Carlo simulation of the SAIDI. 
da Silva et al. [30] 
(2010) 
Discussed how reliability indices could be fully 
used through performance-based mechanisms to 
establish contracts that penalize for poor ser-
vices in electric power distribution systems. 
Latify et al.  [23] 
(2013) 
Evaluated the impact of the maintenance pro-
posals on the reliability indices (EENS) and as-
signed rewards/penalties to the generating com-
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panies; in proportion to their contributions in 
reliability index violation at a desirable level. 
Saboorideilami and Abdi [14] 
(2014) 
Developed a risk-based method to assess the fi-
nancial risks and examined system reliability 
indicators (SAIFI, SAIDI, and CAIDI) 
Jooshaki et al. [28] 
(2014) 
Designed RPS using System Average Interruption 
Frequency Index (SAIFI) and Expected Energy Not 
Supplied (EENS). 
Wang et al. [37] 
(2014) 
Proposed a maintenance scheduling model based 
on distribution system reliability assessment to 
determine the optimal implementation time of 
maintenance activities to minimize distribution 




Performance reliability and efficiency module 
Simab and Haghifam [10] 
(2012)            
Two reliability indices (SAIDI and SAIFI) and DES 
efficiency score were used to design RPS. 
 
 
Performance reliability and Interruption Cost Module 
W. Wangdee [1] 
(2005) 
Used the concept of applying reliability index 
probability distributions  Customer interruption cost 
to assess bulk electric system risk 
Mohammadnezhad-Shourkaei et al. [8] 
(2011) 
Proposed a maintenance plan that maximizes the 
profit of Distribution companies.  
Lotero and Contreras[35] 
(2011) 
Evaluated a multistage optimization model for distri-
bution systems expansion planning that takes into 
account: investment, maintenance, and operational 
(losses) costs. In addition to the optimization prob-
lem, reliability indices, and associated costs are 
computed. 
Božič and Pantoš [36] Presented a method for reliability investment deci-
sions to facilitate the transition from (cost-based reg-
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(2013) ulation) CBR to (performance-based regulation) PBR 
for distribution utilities. 
Alvehag and Awodele [5] 
(2014) 
Designed Reward penalty structures using regulatory 
indices like SAIDI, SAIFI, AENS, and IC. 
Moradkhani et al. [15] 
(2015) 
Presented the risk-based maintenance management 
method that allowed DSOs to consider financial risk, 
which arises from RPS, in the maintenance schedul-
ing. Calculated the uncertainty of system reliability, 




Accomplished a comprehensive numerical study to 
examine the applicability of their proposed approach. 
Alvehag Söder [9] 
(2011) 
Developed a risk-based method for reliability invest-
ment decisions when the DSO is exposed to financial 
risks defined by a quality regulation 
 
 
Performance reliability, efficiency, and Interruption cost module 
Xu et al. [27] 
(2011) 
Developed a mathematical parameterized 
optimization model for optimally setting the parame-
ters of the PBR with a reward/penalty structure is 
presented, with the minimization of the costs associ-
ated with the enforcement of the PBR as the objective 
and the required reliability level for the distribution 
system operation as the constraint. 
Simab et al.  [11]  
(2012) 
The proposed algorithm creates financial incentives 
for distribution companies to improve or maintain 
their reliability levels. The parameters of RPS are 
based on the historical reliability index (average and 
SD of the index), DEA efficiency score, slack analysis 
and interruption cost for each company.  
 
 
What is missing in this section is a thorough review of the different parameters used for 
different RPS implementations, while maintaining the required reliability level, and re-
ducing the related overheads. We have evaluated all the relevant parameters used in the 
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RPS schemes and analyzed them in detail. This is explained in the next section of this 
chapter.  
2.4 PARAMETERS USED BY DIFFERENT AP-
PROACHES FOR PERFORMANCE-BASED REGULA-
TION TO IMPLEMENT RPS 
Power distribution company regulators use different parameters for assessing the re-
ward-penalty of power distribution companies. Most researchers have used 
performance-based reliability parameters,for assessing the reward/penalty of 
distribution companies.These parameters include outage duration, the frequency of 
outage, response time, restoration time, the total number of customers served, and the 
total number of customers interrupted for measuring the reliability indices(SAIDI, 
SAIFI, CAIDI, ENS, AENS).Some researchers have applied both the system based perfor-
mance reliability parameters and Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) efficiency score, for 
assessing the reward/penalty of distribution companies. Numerous researchers have 
related both system based performance reliability parameters and customer interrup-
tion costs for assessing the reward/penalty of distribution companies[1], [31], [36]. A 
few researchers have worked on system based performance reliability parameters, Data 
Envelopment Analysis Efficiency(DEA)  scores and customer interruption costs for as-
sessing the reward/penalty of distribution companies[11], [27]. 





[22] (2002) SAIDI, SAIFI, EENS 
[23] (2004) SAIDI, SAIFI, CAIDI, MDZSD(RI)1, DZW 1 
SD(RI) 
[24] (2005) SAIDI, SAIFI, CAIDI 
[25] (2006) SAIDI, SAIFI 
[2] SAIDI, SAIFI 
                                                          




[26] (2008) SAIDI 
[27] (2010) SAIDI 
[28] (2013) SAIDI, EENS 
[18] (2014) SAIDI, SAIFI 
[11] (2014) SAIFI, EENS 
[29] (2014) SAIDI, SAIFI, CAIDI, EENS 
Research Indices 
[1](2005) SAIDI, SAIFI, IC 
[7]2011) SAIDI, SAIFI, IC 
[31] (2011) SAIDI, SAIFI, IC 
[32] (2011) SAIDI, SAIFI, IC 
[30] (2011) SAIDI, SAIFI, IC 
[12] (2014) SAIDI, SAIFI, IC 
[8](2015) SAIDI, IC, MDZRI, DEA, DZW  SD(RI), 
RPR2 SD(RI)/2 
Research Indices 
[9](2012) SAIDI, SAIFI, DEA  
Research Indices 
[10] (2012) SAIDI, DEA, IC 
2.5 CLASSIFICATION OF EXISTING LITERATURE 
BASED ON THE CONCEPTUAL MODULES TO   DE-
VELOP A FRAMEWORK FOR RPS DESIGN AND IM-
PLEMENTATION 
Based on the critical review of the different approaches used by existing literature for 
implementing RPS in section 2.2, we classify the literature based on their approaches. 
This classification is donefor developing a framework which assists in designing and 
implementing RPS. The detailed description of this frameworkis explained in the next 
chapter. 
                                                          
2 RPR – Reward Penalty Ramp 
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In the next three subsections, we discuss these methods in detail, while referring to 
relevant existing research contributions. 
2.5.1 PERFORMANCE RELIABILITY BASED APPROACH 
Electricity plays a necessary role in modern society. Our expanded reliance on electric 
power, implies increased interest on the power system, which puts weight on the sys-
tem’s reliability. Power system performance reliability, quality assessment, is an 
imperative movement, in a recently deregulated power industry. The simplest meaning 
of reliability is that power is accessible when it is required. To present an arrangement 
of terms and definitions to encourage consistency, in 1998, the Institute of Electrical 
and Electronic Engineers (IEEE), characterized the accepted reliability indices in its 
standard number, P1366, "Guide for Electric Distribution Reliability Indices" [33]. IEEE-
P1366 established the common definitions and terminology for the industry and de-
fined key reliability indices such as SAIDI, SAIFI, CAIDI, EENS and AENS (Table 2.4-2). 
These lists are discussed in detail in Section 3.1.1 to 3.1.2. To guide new personnel and 
tools for comparison, IEEE tightened the definitions in 2003 [62].  
 
The Reliability Index, is a parameter, that measures the performance reliability of a 
power system. System performance reliability indicators are isolated into two classifica-
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tions: system reliability indices and load reliability indices[38]. The most important sys-
tem reliability indices include System Average Interruption Duration Index (SAIDI), Sys-
tem Average Interruption Frequency Index (SAIFI) and Customer Average Interruption 
Duration Index (CAIDI). The most important load-based quality indicators are Expected 
Energy Not Supplied (EENS) and Average Energy Not Supplied (AENS)[39], [21]. In the 
literature, the term load is interchangeably used to refer to energy [23]. We now de-
scribe system reliability indices and load based reliability indices in detail. 
2.5.1.1 SYSTEM RELIABILITY INDICES 
The Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers (IEEE) illustrates the accepted relia-
bility indices in its standard number P1366 [62]. These indices consider the effects of 
the number of outages, the duration of each outage, and are usually calculated from his-
torical utility data[41]. These indices aim to assess the level of customer satisfaction, 
which is based upon the total length of outages (interruptions)[41].  In the chapter, 
three different system reliability indices (i.e. SAIDI, SAIFI, and CAIDI) are discussed. 
These indices rely on a number of parameters such as outage duration, and the 
frequency of outage. These parameters are  
1. System topology 
2. Outage duration  
3. Frequency of interruptions  
4. System availability  
5. Response time 
6. Total number of customers served  
7. Number of customers interrupted 
8. Protection mechanism 
9. Restoration time 
1. System topology refers to different approaches to portraying the reliability of a sys-
tem, including fault trees, reliability block diagrams, and failure mode effects analy-
sis. Each topology has different strengths and weaknesses regarding reliability. 
Brown et al. (1998) illustrated that distribution system reliability assessment, can 




2. Outage duration (or duration of the interruption) refers to the period from the start 
of an interruption until the service has been restored to the affected customers. It 
can be measured in seconds, minutes, hours, or days. One of the objectives of the 
power distribution system reliability assessment, is to reduce the duration of 
outages. Reducing outage duration, as measured by SAIDI and CAIDI, is related to 
the implementation of distribution automation and outage detection technologies 
and more efficiently operating and restoration practices for those customers experi-
encing sustained outages. 
3. The frequency of outages (Frequency of interruptions) refers to the number of times 
that outages have occurred in a given period and is measured in seconds, minutes, 
hours, or days. The reliability of the power distribution system can be improved by 
reducing the frequency of outages.  Reducing the frequency of outages, as measured 
by SAIFI, is related to a mix of component factors, including undergrounding, storm 
hardening, infrastructure improvements, and the use of automated distribution sys-
tems.  
4. System availability refers to the probability that a repairable system is operational at 
a given point in time, taken after a given set of ecological conditions[42]. Reliability 
can be characterized as the likelihood  that a device or a system will play out a given 
task condition for a particular timeframe, while availability is that, a system will 
have the capacity to play out its required capacity, over a particular timeframe, un-
der specified environmental conditions[43]. 
5. Response time: Response time refers to the time that takes an operator to character-
ize a solution during contingencies. Response time during service restoration influ-
ences the reliability indices that are identified with the lengths of the failure, demon-
strating that a fast decision straightforwardly adds to the system performance. 
6. A total number of customers served, refers to the number of customers served within 
the reporting time frame (N)[44]. This parameter is used in the estimation of per-
formance reliability indices such as SAIDI, SAIFI, and CAIDI.  
7. A number of customers interrupted, refers to the number of interrupted customers 
for each sustained interruption event within the reporting time frame (Ni) and is 
used in the calculation of the reliability index, such as SAIFI[45]. 
8. Protection mechanism: With the development of advanced technology-based protec-
tion mechanisms for power distribution, outage events have become less frequent in 
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the modern power systems. Thus, protection mechanism has a critical part in the re-
liability of distribution systems. 
9. Restoration time refers to the duration of time which begins when a fault is identi-
fied and ends, when services have been restored back to normal.  New devices and 
systems make it possible for utilities to know when customers lose power and to 
pinpoint outage areas more decisively. This capacity enhances restoration times and 
abbreviates outage durations. Once an outage occurs the average time to re-
establish the service is found from the Customer Average Interruption Duration In-
dex (CAIDI).  
We now describe the three indices SAIFI, SAIDI, and CAIDI, which use some of these pa-
rameters in computing the respective index. 
SAIFI (System Average Interruption Frequency Index)[62], is the average number of 
times, that a customer experiences interruptions, during a given period and is designed 
to provide information about the average frequency of sustained interruptions[62], [46] 
per customer in a predefined region [35]. It is calculated by dividing the total number of 
customers interrupted (𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖) by the total number of customers served (𝑁𝑁).  
SAIFI=∑ (𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖
𝑁𝑁
)𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖=1                                                                                                                            Equation 1 
Industrial customers are very concerned about the frequent outages since after each in-
terruption; they may have to turn on their factory[4], which may have expensive start-
up costs and could cause a loss of production time in the process, resulting in significant 
losses [6]. 
SAIDI (System Average Interruption Duration Index)[62], [47] is the average dura-
tion of outage for customers who experience an interruption during the year. To calcu-
late SAIDI, each interruption during the period is multiplied by the duration of the inter-
ruption, to find the customer minutes of interruption. The customer minutes of all inter-
ruptions are then summed to determine the total customer minutes. To find the SAIDI 
value, the customer minutes are divided by the total customers.  
 SAIDI=∑ (𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖×𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖
𝑁𝑁
)𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖=1                                                                                                                Equation 2 
Where, 𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖 is the duration of each interruption. 
 
From Table 2.4-3 we can see from the literature that SAIDI is used more than SAIFI. Re-
sults in [10] show that the number of interruption (SAIFI) is less important, than the 
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duration of the interruption (SAIDI). For example, customers residing in the rural areas 
may live with frequent outages but may be concerned with the duration of the out-
age[6], [47]. 
 
For the regulators who want to use the RPS, applying one index may be sufficient, to 
motivate the distribution system operators to perform better. The selection of two or 
more indices can satisfy all customer concerns (both industrial and rural). When apply-
ing multiple indices, the weighting of  the individual index, based on the customer’s 
type, is a significant approach that perfectly follows the customers’ interest [4]. For ex-
ample, in the rural area, the weight of SAIFI should be less than that of SAIDI, from the 
point of view of the RPS. The SAIDI and SAIFI measures discussed in this literature, are 
widely used, both in Australia [46]and internationally. 
CAIDI (Customer Average Interruption Duration Index )represents the average time 
required to restore services to the average customer per sustained interruption. CAIDI 
is calculated similarly to SAIDI, except that the denominator is the number of customers 







                                                                                                        Equation 3 
CAIDI is typically preferable to SAIDI, in the Canadian Energy Research Institute (CERI) 
study [51], because it is the duration of single (average) customer interruptions. It usu-
ally proves most intuitive and useful to evaluate the cost effectiveness of restoration 
and automation functions. 
However, as pointed out in  [62], as CAIDI is the ratio of SAIDI/SAIFI, a disproportionate 
improvement in one measure may lead to a misleading CAIDI result. For example, rela-
tively higher improvements in outage frequencies, compared to outage durations, could 
translate to a higher CAIDI value. We will now describe the second type of performance 
reliability index known as the Load Reliability Index.  
 
2.5.1.2 LOAD (ENERGY) RELIABILITY INDICES 
Although power distribution system reliability and power (energy or load) quality are 
related, they are two distinct issues.  Power quality describes the characteristics, such as 
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continuity of voltage, voltage fluctuations, unusual waveforms, and harmonic distor-
tions of the supplied electric power, under typical working conditions. Lacking power 
quality can be described by (a) failures and different operations in the system, which 
results in voltage reduction bringing about interruptions (b) and network disturbances 
from loads that outcome in flicker, harmonics, and phase imbalance.  
 
The applied SAIDI and SAIFI measures indicate the average duration and frequency of 
the sustained interruptions, by weighting the impact of the interruptions, by the num-
ber of customers affected. These measures implicitly give equal weight to all customers, 
irrespective of their size. An alternative approach to measuring the average duration 
and frequency of the sustained interruptions involves weighing the impact of the inter-
ruptions, by the size of customers affected. That is, instead of scaling the impact of an 
interruption by the number of affected customers, divided by the total number of cus-
tomers, the impact is scaled by the kVA of the load affected, divided by the total kVA of 
the load connected to the network. However, these measures are not so commonly used 
internationally, which would limit the ability to make international comparisons[46].  
These indices rely on a number of parameters, which are now discussed 
1. Average load connected to load point 𝑖𝑖  (𝐿𝐿𝑎𝑎(𝑖𝑖)) 
2. Average annual outage time (𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖) 
3. 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑟𝑟𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴 𝑓𝑓𝑜𝑜𝑟𝑟 𝑜𝑜ℎ𝐴𝐴 𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜𝐴𝐴𝑙𝑙 𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜 𝑖𝑖 (𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖) 
4. Total energy not supplied by the system(kWh/y) 
5. Total number of customers served(N) 
6. Total connected kVA load(energy) served  
We now describe the two indices EENS and AENS, which use some of these parameters 
in computing the respective index.  
Expected Energy Not Supplied (EENS): By using the load characteristics by industrial 
customer type in the load point, the amount of expected energy not supplied is 
calculated[52] as 
EENS = Total energy not supplied by the system or Unserved Energy (UE) 
           = ∑(𝐿𝐿𝑎𝑎(𝑖𝑖)×𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖)  kWh/y                                                                                                   Equation 4 
    
Where  𝐿𝐿𝑎𝑎(𝑖𝑖) = Average load connected to load point 𝑖𝑖 
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𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖 =Average annual outage time =∑ 𝜆𝜆𝑗𝑗 𝑟𝑟𝑗𝑗𝑛𝑛𝑗𝑗=1                                                         Equation 5 
𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖 = Average outage time for the load point 𝑖𝑖 =
𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖
𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖
                                          Equation 6 
Average Energy Not Supplied (AENS): Average Energy Not Supplied (AENS) is a 
measure of the average non-delivered energy per customer. AENS is a reliability in-
dex, used for electrical power distribution systems and usually, have unit kWh per cus-
tomer.  
 AENS = Total energy not supplied / Total number of customers served.  
           =�
∑(𝐿𝐿𝑎𝑎(𝑖𝑖)×𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖)  
∑ (𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖)𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖=1
� ( kWh/y ) 
N
                                                                                                   Equation 7 
 Where  𝐿𝐿𝑎𝑎(𝑖𝑖) = Average load connected to load point 𝑖𝑖 
𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖 =Average annual outage time=∑ 𝜆𝜆𝑗𝑗 𝑟𝑟𝑗𝑗𝑛𝑛𝑗𝑗=1                                                             Equation 8 




These measures also have a relatively weak relationship to the economic value of relia-
bility, because they measure the durations of interruptions, and so, do not capture the 
scale of the interruption. On the other hand, the EENS measures, are specifically de-
signed to aid capacity planning and other decision processes. Due to this, they inherent-
ly provide a statistical measure of the reliability that customers may be provided. They 
can also be defined to provide a good correlation with the economic value of reliability 
and provide good visibility, of the factors driving reliability.  
 
Many stakeholders, however, will not be familiar with the EENS measure. Moreover, 
reporting actual reliability is still likely to be important for reasons other than capacity 
planning. Therefore, the EENS measure would most likely need to be supported by re-
porting other measures that are based directly upon actual interruption events. Conse-






2.5.1.3 CRITICAL EVALUATION OF THE RELEVANT LITERA-
TURE ON PERFORMANCE RELIABILITY APPROACH 
 
In all, we reviewed 22 relevant research works. When we refer to Table 2.3-4, we ob-
serve that 19 of the 22 pieces of researches used SAIDI, fifteen used SAIFI and only two 
used CAIDI.  Most of the work has focused on managing financial risks [25],[29], [14], 
[12] maintenance risks[37], [8], [15] performance risks [13], [31], [1], [8] and manage-
ment problems, that the distribution companies face in relation to performance-based 
regulation methods[27] [2], [4], [9], [32]. We now discuss the relevant literature.  
 
Brown and Burke [13] has introduced a method for evaluating the uncertainty of system 
reliability, to manage the PBR based risk on their system reliability indices like SAIDI 
and SAIFI, to establish fair performance-based rates, to implement optimal RPS design 
solutions that maximize profits while minimizing risk. Compared to [13], which focused 
on evaluating the uncertainty in system reliability to manage PBR risk, the work done 
by Billinton, Cui and Pan [31]focussed on establishing a balance between improving 
reliability and saving cost, by applying probability distribution index concepts to 
implement optimal RPS design solutions, using the reliability indices[24] such as SAIFI, 
SAIDI and ENS, which maximize profits while minimizing risk.As related to the PBR 
based implementation of RPS in [31], Billinton and Pan [25] demonstratedthe use of the 
time sequential Monte Carlo simulation. They implemented the probability distribution 
reliability index, from the actual performance records, for designing the expected 
system reward/ penalty (ERP) payment method, that uses  both SAIFI and SAIDI 
information from the Canadian Electricity Association (CEA) Service Continuity 
Reports[25]. As corresponded to the Monte Carlo simulation by [25], Li[32]proposed a 
stable task partition (distributed processing) method, to attain improved efficiency of 
the Reliability Index Assessment (RIA), for distribution companies to maximize their 
system reliability. Associated with[25], Billinton and Wangdee [29] also used 
thesequential Monte Carlo simulation, to determine the annual inconsistency of bulk 
electric system reliability performance indices. They alsoobserved thatthe skills to 
foresee performance index distributions based reliability(SAIDI, SAIFI)  would offer a 
financial risk related to a given PBR based reward/penalty scheme. Past, simulated reli-
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ability performance indices, are illustrated in it. Instead of single reliability indices used 
by most researchers for assessing the distribution companies performance, Fotuhi et al. 
[2], used multi-reliability indices (SAIDI and EENS) and developed a multi-steps Re-
ward-Penalty scheme for improving the accuracy of PBR. This model had been 
introduced in the Tehran Regional Electrical Company (TREC).Similar to [25] and [29], 
Kobi Yahav [26] proposed a method of assessing the reliability and performance-based 
incentives for power distribution companies, based on a Monte-Carlo simulation using 
SAIDI. This method is proved in a case study and applied to the Israel Electric Corpora-
tion (IEC) Distribution system andoffers numerous benefits which are related to the 
conventional methods [53], [54]. 
 
Da Silva et al. [30] presented a method based upon the chronologicalMonte Carlo simu-
lation to compute the penalties and rewards for distribution companies, through per-
formance-based rate (PBR) mechanisms, in resemblance to[31], to penalize the compa-
ny and inspire companies to invest in reliability improvement. Later on, in comparison 
to the performance-based regulation, Latify et al. [23]used the energy based reliability 
index (EIR) such as EENS, instead of the common system reliability indices, for evaluat-
ing the reliability and assigned rewards/penalties to the distribution companies. 
Saboorideilami and Abdi [14]introduced a risk-based method using the time-sequential 
Monte Carlo simulation method, to determine the risks brought on by quality regulation 
for power distribution companies, to consider the variation of distribution network 
behavior and the reliability indices(SAIFI, SAIDI, and CAIDI) variations. Based on the 
concept of the Yardstick theory,in comparison to the Monte Carlo simulation method, 
used in [14], Jooshaki et al. [28] designed reward/penalty structure, that has been 
implemented in the Iranian electric power distribution sector, based on AENS and SAIFI 
for power distribution companies, using Fuzzy C-means algorithm, which ensure 
regulators to improve the service reliability, by creating a perfect competition between 
distribution systems. 
 
To identify the ideal usage time of maintenance activities used to reduce the power dis-
tribution company’s total costs, whilst fulfilling reliability necessities, Wang et al. [37] 
proposed a hybrid maintenance scheduling model, based on system reliability assess-
ment, using SAIFI and SAIDI. Similarly to the sequential Monte Carlo simulation method 
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used in [25], [29], [26],  research work in Wangdee [1] also used the same method of 
probability distributions of SAIDI and SAIFI and their related costs for system reliability 
evaluation, using sequential simulation, but focused on the bulk electric system. In the 
literature[4], a methodwas introducedto balance the collective rewards awarded and 
the penalties received by the regulator.  This method does not just eliminate the per-
formance-based regulation (PBR) implementation costs, it also eliminates further doubt 
among distribution companies, that the regulator can use PBR for profiting. As 
compared to the reliability evaluation and their related costs to manage the risk of bulk 
electric system[1], Mohammadnezhad-Shourkaei et al. [8] has developed an effective 
risk-based repair management plan in RPS,  that maximizes the profit of distribution 
companies, using decision tree and mixed- integer linear programming (MILP) 
formulas.In addition to the associated impacts on costs while managing the 
performance-based regulation risk [1], [8], Lotero [35] identified how customers are 
affected by the reliability of  information.  This was done by computing the most 
relevant reliability indices (SAIDI and SAIFI) and their associated costs and comparing  
the impact of these costs to the distribution company,(when the regulator introduces 
penalties for noncompliance of reliability indices)withthe impact of customer’s losses, 
when they experienced interruptions tothe system.As related to the above-described 
literature, Alvehag and Awodele [12] have studied the impact that various RPS designs 
have had on the distribution companies financial risk and incentives/penalties and done 
a sensitivity analysis, to find the critical parameters in an RPS design.As compared to 
[1], [8], Moradkhani et al. [15], developed a risk-based maintenance management objec-
tive function in the RPS, using a generic algorithm, to compute the financial risk of im-
plementing reliability reinforcement projects, to analyze the ambiguity of system 
reliability. Xu et al. [27]developed a mathematical parametric optimizing model, for op-
timally minimizing the costs (loss caused by interruption to customers and re-
ward/penalty costs), connected with the implementation of the PBR in the RPS, to ob-
tain the requisite reliability standards for the distribution system operation.  As com-
pared to Xu et al. [27], Simab et al. [11], [10]presented an algorithm, to develop the re-
ward-penalty schemeusing weighted reliability indices.  
 
The literature reviewed in this paper discusses the implementation of the PBR with an 
RPS structure for distribution companies, placing emphasis on the financial risks, 
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maintenance risks, performance risks and management difficulties, that the power dis-
tribution companies face when using this regulation mechanism. What is missing in the 
literature, is a thorough review of the different parameters used in RPS, for power dis-
tribution companies, in keeping the essential reliability range, but diminishing the re-
lated costs.  
 
We now describe the second module presented. This is the Efficiency Module, where we 
describe the Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) and the DEA Score.  
2.5.2 EFFICIENCY BASED APPROACH 
Before providing the mathematical aspects, the idea of production efficiency is clarified, 
with the assistance of a straightforward diagram [40] presented in Figure 2.5-1. To illus-
trate, consider seven distribution companies, which each have one input and one out-
put: L1 = (2,3), L2 = (3,4), L3 = (7,7), L4 = (10,8), L5 = (4,3), L6 = (5,1), L7 = (11,7).  
Thus, the distribution company that requires fewer costs to do the same job, would be 
more productive in contrast with another distribution company that requires more 
costs. In any case, the extent of which the distribution company uses these inputs, can 
be totally distinctive, yet still productive. Such a conclusion can be drawn from consid-
ering the production frontier (best performance graph)) [40] presented in Figure 2.5-1. 
Production Frontier (or envelopment surface, because it envelops all the cases), in this 
circumstance, is a concave graph joining L1, L2, L3, and L4.  Thus, if a distribution com-
pany is on the production frontier, it is regarded as efficient. Hence, L1, L2, L3, and L4 
are efficient, and L5, L6 and L7 are inefficient. The inefficiency can be explained in two 
ways. Firstly, for example, L5 (comparing with L1 and L2) produces as much output, but 
with less input; Secondly, it could produce more output with the same input (comparing 
with L2 and L3).  By moving their new operating point on the production frontier by 

































Figure 2.5-1 Best performance graph 
2.5.2.1 DATA ENVELOPMENT ANALYSIS (DEA) METHOD 
DEA strategy is perfect and capable of assessing the feasibility of multi-input and multi-
output decision-making unit. In this way, DEA technique is utilized as a part of the as-
sessment of business endeavors, healing centers, schools, open organizations and tour-
ism ventures. As of late, DEA strategy has started to analyze the performance of the 
power industry. The first application of the DEA method in the power system, is the 
power field [44]. Dataenvelopment analysis [45] is an investigation technique, used to 
measure the relative effectiveness of a comparative number of organizations that play 
out the same actions. In this case, they are companies that distribute electricity.  
 
The assets utilized by distribution companies is considered as inputs, and major prod-
ucts as outputs[55]. It represented a performance-based evaluation. It is implemented 
for the public and private electric distribution centers (DCs) of Nepal. Some of the in-
puts and outputs commonly applied for the DEA efficiency analysis of distribution com-
panies are: 
Inputs: 
1. Distribution line (DLine)  
2. A total number of employees (NE)  
3. Distribution line transformer capacity (DTrans)  
4. Distribution systems losses (DLosses)  
5. Distribution operation and maintenance cost (DO&M)  
6. Distribution capital expenses (DCapEx)  
Outputs: 
1. Sale of energy (SE)  






This method is focused on determining the most efficient companies and is used as a 
reference, with which the efficiency of the rest of the companies is compared. Thus, it is 
defined as a non-parametric method, for the estimation of productive efficiency of pow-
er distribution companies. The resources used by distribution companies, have been 
taken as inputs, whereas major products have been considered as outputs.  
 
Efficiency based on DEA [28], is characterized as the proportion of weighted output to 
weighted input. More production per unit of input, reflects more prominent efficiency. 
On the off chance that the distribution companies’ productive technology is displayed as 
a correspondence between input-output (supplies-products) variables, the 
establishment of the DEA system can be exhibited as a linear programming problem: 
If x1j, x2j,…………xmj are the m inputs and y1j, y2j, ………, ysj are the s outputs of the unit j, 
then its efficiency, 𝜃𝜃, is defined as 
   𝜃𝜃=∑ �𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗
𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗
�𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖=1                                                                                                           Equa-
tion 9 
The consideration of excessively numerous variables likewise, makes the analysis trou-
blesome; accordingly, just the most significant variables must be incorporated. DEA 
technique is exceptionally adaptable and permits the expert to choose inputs and out-
puts. The distribution companies’ efficiency scores, depend upon their performance, 
and the best one is approved as one of the targets, for other companies. 
2.5.2.2 SLACK ANALYSIS 
The slack analysis gives an approach to infer improvement directions for inefficient 
companies. Slack, with regards to input, implies the needed drops of the relating input 
components, for inefficient companies, to become efficient. Slack, with regards to out-
put, implies a few outputs should be augmented, for inefficient companies, to end up as 
productive. In this manner, it is utilized to assess the quality level for every power com-
pany.  
Chien, lo [46] dissected the slack variables of those inefficient companies, to recognize 
improvement directions and become productive. The slack analysis in [46] demon-
strates that the measure of the outputs (number of customers and transformer capaci-
ty) ought to be increased for an inefficient service center to become effective, overall.  
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Zhang and Kim [47] introduced a successive slack-based effectiveness measure (SSBM) 
application to model the Total-factor energy efficiency with undesirable outputs. They 
directed an observational investigation of energy efficiency, incorporating greenhouse 
gas emissions for the Korean power companies during 2007–2011. The results in [47] 
indicate that most power companies are not performing at the high end of energy effi-
ciency, and therefore, can enhance their energy efficiency. 
In the next Section, we critically evaluate the relevant literature on efficiency using DEA. 
2.5.2.3 CRITICAL EVALUATION OF THE RELEVANT LITER-
ATURES ON EFFICIENCY USING DEA 
 
In this section, we critically evaluate the relevant literature, which investigates the 
power distribution company’s efficiency, using DEA. Haghifam et al. [10] and Simab et 
al. [11]developed a reward-penalty scheme, based on DEA and weighted reliability indi-
ces, by estimating the past reliability values and the DEA efficiency scores, for calculat-
ing each companies minimum quality standards. They considered SAIDI as input, for 
explaining a model of DEA, to analyze the effectiveness of electric distribution compa-
nies [11].  
We now review the literature from six countries including Greece [56], U.S.A[57], Fin-
land[58], Iran[11], Nepal[56] and Taiwan[31, 32]. In all of these cases, DEA was used to 
achieve different objectives, including evaluation of efficiency measures (Greece, Nepal), 
benchmarking of electric distribution utilities (U.S.A and Finland), finding quality tar-
gets for each distribution company (Iran) and measuring relative efficiencies of service 
centers (Taiwan). Pahwa [57]did the benchmarking of power distribution companies, 
based on DEA methods, used to evaluate the comparative efficiencies of fifty popular 
power distribution companies in the U.S.A. [4]. Pahwa also presented the details of effi-
ciency benchmarking methods, of electricity distribution businesses in Finland. In [56], 
to analyze the efficiency methods for the 45 distribution districts of the Greek Public 
Power Corporation.The DEA method was used and compared used DEA method and are 
compared with simple indices, with efficiency measures produced by econometric 
methods and it also described the cause for the low efficiencies. Chien, Lo [31, 32] pre-
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sented a DEA research which compared the efficiencies of 17 distribution centers of the 
Taiwan Power Company and provided specific directions to improve their operation 
efficiencies. Originally, it was imagined that non-profit companies, could only imple-
ment DEA, but later its advantages have increased to cover all types of industries and 
markets [57]. In this section, reference to Table 2.3-5, the efficiency module will be made 
in order to illustrate the relevant literature that deomonstrates which company used 
the DEA Score including the objectives of their research and the findings of their inves-
tigations into the efficiency of the power distribution companies who used DEA.  
We now describe the critical review on the third module, referred to as the Interruption 
Cost Module.  Here we will describe Interruption Cost (IC) and the associated input pa-
rameters. 
2.5.3 INTERRUPTION COST-BASED APPROACH 
It has been evaluated that the vast majority of the interruptions in the power supply to 
customers are because of failures in the distribution networks [59], [19].Some distribu-
tion companies have used interruption cost indices (calculated from the power inter-
ruptions encountered by its customers), as a regulatory indicator in their RPS imple-
mentation. 
Three most frequently used Interruption cost indices are: 
1. IEAR (Interruption Energy Assessment Rate), refers to the system interruption 
cost index represented in $/kWh.  
2. VOLL (Value of Lost Load), refers to the value an average customer puts on an 
unsupplied kWh of energy  
3. WTP (Willingness to Pay), refers to the customers’ willingness to pay for im-
provements to its continuity of supply.  
Interruption cost indices[59], [19] depends upon three main factors: 
1. Type of customer, such as industrial, residential and commercial. 
2. Features of interruption, such as time of occurrence, duration, etc. 
 
The interruption cost is related to the economic consequences incurred by customers, 
when an electricity shortage occurs. Suitable approaches and techniques have been de-
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veloped to evaluate interruption cost indices and are used for regulatory purposes and 
planning purposes. The distinctive strategies used to assess interruption cost indices, 
can be organized into four ways: 
2.5.3.1 REVEALED PREFERENCES 
This strategy is based on observations and customers market behaviour analysis. The 
main advantage is that relatively accurate data can be collected, while the main disad-
vantage is that only large customers can provide proper signals. 
2.5.3.2 STATED PREFERENCES 
This strategy is based on customer surveys. It has two main advantages: 
a. It provides distribution companies with interruption cost data, suitable for plan-
ning purposes, and  
b. It is customer based / bottom-up, and therefore it directly incorporates custom-
ers’ preferences.  
The main disadvantage is that it is expensive to implement. 
2.5.3.3 PROXY METHODS 
This strategy is basedupon the production task approach. The key preferred standpoint 
is that they are quite easy to apply, making use of easily available data, such as Gross 
National Product, total energy consumption, sector production functions, etc., and 
moreover, they are practically inexpensive to implement. The main disadvantage is that 
they are based on limiting and sometimes unrealistic assumptions. 
 
2.5.3.4 CASE STUDIES 
This strategy is based on the collection of as much data as possible, immediately after 
the occurrence of large-scale power supply interruptions. The main advantage is that 
interruption cost values, are directly related to customers’ experiences of real 
interruptions, rather than hypothetical scenarios. The main disadvantage is that the 
number of case studies and relevant data sets are very small, and therefore the comput-




Customer interruption costs, are a portion of societies of power interruptions, and they 
are the most challenging part for regulators to estimate, because of the uncertainties 
with the customer survey method. A key challenge for estimating the power 
interruption cost, is the information collection on the frequency and type of power qual-
ity events experienced by customers, as well as on the vulnerability of customers’ 
equipment to these events.  It is hard to develop such systematic information on either 
type of information. Another challenge is the limited information available. Along these 
lines, not all regulators need to utilize customer interruption costs, as an input, when 
outlining an RPS[19]. However, many regulators have used customer interruption costs, 
while developing RPS[1], [4], [5], [8], [9], [15], [27], [35]. According to Customer 
national surveys, companies collect cost data for each interruption type and duration. 
 
The following three computing steps[60], [19], are taken as a means of assessing the in-
terruption costs: 
a) Processing of raw collected data,which mainly includes normalization of individ-
ual customer data, either by annually used energy (MWh), or by peak load demand 
(MW). Customer surveys always create some "awful" data, for example, unreasonably 
high expenses. In this manner, statistical analysis (e.g. normalization) of the raw data, 
ought to be directed before the data are utilized as a part of RPS.  
b) Setting up of customer interruption cost models.  These are based on Customer 
Damage Functions (CDF) that signifies the normalized interruption rate, as a function of 
interruption features. 
c) Computing interruption cost indices, that include the use of the normalized data to 
construct CDF, for each customer sector that shows how the expense relies upon outage 
duration [39]. The customer's damage function is explained in detail in Section 4.4. In-
terruption Cost indices can be used as one of the inputs for computing the Midpoint of 
Dead Zone (MDZ). MDZ is described later in 4.6.3.  
2.5.3.5 COMPOSITE CUSTOMER DAMAGE FUNCTION (CCDF) 
The data caught from customer survey prompts the detailing of the individual customer 
damage function (CDF). It gives the interruption cost versus the  interruption duration 
for a particularized group of customers, in different sectors such as industrial, commer-
cial, government & institutions, residential and agricultural [11].  
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The CCDF [11], [19], [48], [50], [61]conveys the total interruption cost, as an element of 
the interference length, for the combined customers in a specific service area. For a 
service area [10] it is computed by weighting the sector CDF, by the customer load com-
position for that area. 
All the CDFs of a given division (i.e. commercial, industrial, residential, and so on.) are 
joined into the Sector Customer Damage Function (SCDF). At that point, the CCDF [16], 
[37], [39], [53] is acquired by weighting the SCDFs with the electrical energy used by 
every customer group. CCDF is characterized as the summed interruption cost for a 
composite of customer sectors, in a locality and is done by weighting the customer 
damage function, for the distinctive zones. The results of the distinctive SCDF and CCDF 
cost functions, give the numerical information required to expressly consider the relia-
bility worth, in the economic assessment of the power distribution company. CCDF pro-
vides regulators with the valuable information needed to balance the economic and re-
liability aspects of the distribution company. The CCDF used in the assessment of the 
reliability worth, might directly influence the decision-making process. 
The meaning of SCDF is similar to the CCDF, however, it refers to an area, as opposed to 
a whole customer mix. Interestingly, the CCDF is used to describe mixed customer inter-
ruption cost. Only CCDF [19], [48] is usually proposed for RPS implementation. 
CCDF (t) =∑ SCDFs (t)×Ws𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠=1                                                                                    Equation 10 
   
where   SCDFS (t) = 1𝑚𝑚∑ 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖(𝑜𝑜)
𝑚𝑚
𝑖𝑖=1                                                                                          Equation 11 
       
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖(𝑜𝑜) is the Interruption cost for respondent i at duration of t,  
M is the number of respondents in sector s,  
Ws is the weighting ratio of electrical consumption in each sector, and  






2.5.3.6 CRITICAL EVALUATION OF THE RELEVANT LITER-
ATURE ON INTERRUPTION COST INDICES 
 
The vast majority of the customer interruptions in power, are a direct result of the fail-
ures of the distribution system. In this section, we critically evaluate the relevant litera-
ture that investigates interruption cost indices of power distribution companies. When 
we refer to Table 2.3-6, we observe that 8 of the 22 sections of researches[1], [4], [5], 
[8], [9], [15], [27], [35], used interruption cost as a parameter for designing RPS. Inter-
ruption cost indices, are used in the literature for managing bulk electricity system risk, 
proposing a maintenance plan, planning distribution system expansion, presenting risk-
based maintenance management methods and developing a mathematical model for 
setting the incentive rates. 
In Wangdee [1] the reliability index probability distributions of SAIDI and SAIFI and 
their related costs are applied to manage bulk electricity system risk, using sequential 
Monte Carlo simulation. As compared to [1], Mohammadnezhad-Shourkaei et al. [8], 
maximized the maintenance project efficiency in the presence of RPS and the cost of 
planned and unplanned interruption costs. Fotuhi-Firuzabad [4]determined the per-
formance-based regulation implementation cost, related to each system reliability index 
and weighted it based on its effect on the customers’ interruption cost. Alvehag Söder 
[9], have shown a valuation of the customer interruption costs including duration of in-
terruption, customer region in designing RPS. In addition to [1], [8], Lotero and Contre-
ras [35] calculated the related costs of the most significant reliability indices and esti-
mated the rate that customers are willing to pay so as  to receive redundancy in the sys-
tem and evade interruption cost. Hence identified how customers are affected, as well 
as the related effects of costs. As compared to the analysis of the impact of cost to the 
distribution system, Xu et al. [27] developed a mathematical parametric optimizing 
model for designing reward/penalty structure and minimized the customer interrup-
tion costs and reward/penalty payments, thus accomplished the required quality level 
of the distribution system. 
As related to the above-described literature, Awodele[12] applied the interruption cost 
as one of the parameters to assess the power distribution companies’ incentive rate. As 
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compared to [1], [8], [12], Moradkhani et al. [15], developed a risk-based maintenance 
management plan in the presence of  the RPS, using a generic algorithm, introduced the 
interruption cost generation algorithm to evaluate the probability distribution of 
interruption frequency, and extracted the probability distribution of SAIDI. Some coun-
tries have used customer interruption costs provided by customer surveys, to fix the 
incentive rates[62]. The Council of European Energy Regulators (CEER) has developed 
rules for customer interruption data collection and normalization [49]. Dzobo[50]  iden-
tified different customer segments of electricity customers for different customer sec-
tors, taking various forms of customer interruption cost summaries within the 
customersectors to generate the customer segmentation model. In this section, we illus-
trate the relevant literature that shows who used these indices and the objectives of this 
research.  
In the next section, we describe the reward-penalty module to show how the different 
modules and parameters work together to generate a reward or penalty for the power 
distribution companies. 
2.5.4 DIFFERENT REWARD-PENALTY SCHEMES 
Reward penalty schemes, are monetary mechanisms, which encourage power distribu-
tion companies to improve their performance reliability. The Regulator predefines a 
performance target for the distribution companies. If the company performs better than 
the target, they will be rewarded. Otherwise they will be penalized. If distribution com-
panies hit the target, there is neither a penalty nor a reward. This area is referred to as 
dead zone, as shown in figure 6, because there is neither a penalty nor a reward [11]. 
The purpose behind utilizing the dead zone is to dampen unintended penalties and re-
wards, inferable from stochastic changes in quality [22]. The choice of the regulated in-
dicators (system based reliability indicators such as, SAIDI, SAIFI or CAIDI, Load based 
reliability indicators such as EENS or AENS and Interruption cost indicators such as IE-
AR, VOLL, and WTP) has an important role in calculating the different financial incen-
tives (reward or penalty).  
A general form of RPS is shown in Figure 2.5-2. It contains three zones [11]: reward zone, 
dead zone, and penalty zones. The x-axis represents the reliability dimension, whereas 






























In the literature, there are several different variations of the reward-penalty schemes 
(shown in above figures), and it changes according to the requirements and the range of 
data used. The different types of reward penalty structures are now discussed.  
 
The regulator specifies performance standards as shown in the above figures, which is 
defined as the level of performance reliability, which the company is relied upon to sup-
ply. There is a minimum level of service reliability that a company is required to deliver 
to its customers. Opposition with these levels of quality may involve penalty payments. 
2.5.4.1 LINEAR REWARD-PENALTY SCHEME 
In this scheme, there is a linear relationship between reliability and reward/penalty, as 
presented in figure 2.5-4. In most reward penalty schemes the relationships amongst 
quality and revenues are fundamentally linear: the same separation from the perfor-
mance standard prompts to the same change in the revenues, of the distribution com-
pany. The performance measures are not fixed over time. They typically change starting 
with one year, then onto the next, obliging companies to meet continuously stricter per-
formance standards [62].  
2.5.4.2 CAPPED REWARD-PENALTY SCHEME 
Motivating plans (Incentive schemes) in many nations [54] (counting Ireland, UK, and 
The Netherlands), have a lower and an upper bound (caps) for penalties and rewards 
(Figure 2.5-5). In the ideal case, when money related motivating forces, exactly reflect 
customer costs and benefits for performance reliability changes, the presentation of up-
per and lower limits ought not to be essential: the company will achieve the needed re-
liability level and stay there. Be that as it may, as may be normal, the presumption of 
sound data on marginal customer valuation of reliabilityis not verified in practice. In 
this manner, the risk of giving motivational incentives for improperly high-reliability 
levels, legitimizes the presentation of an upper limit on rewards. So also, there is a risk 
of penalizing the company to the point where it will have unbearable monetary losses. 
This backing the introduction, in applied mechanisms, of a lower limit on penalties. In 
this incentive plan as shown in figure 2.5-5 and figure 2.5-6, these upper and lower 
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boundaries are set to guard the customers and distribution company regulators against 
adverse effects of poorly designing the RPS. Capping of reward penalty scheme [22], is 
essential when on one considers that the regulator has faulty information about cus-
tomer interruption costs and willingness to pay.  Since there is no perfect information 
about the customer judgmentfrom the reliability point of view, for reducing the risk of 
high rewards, a cap for reward called Reward cap point, is introduced. Similarly, a cap 
for the penalty, called, Penalty cap point, is also introduced and used to reduce the risk 
of high penalty pay. Thus, Reward Cap or Penalty Cap is defined for eliminating unac-
ceptable monetary losses for distribution companies and customers. As for reliability 
increases, the reward rises, and it stops at the Reward Cap Point. There is no linear rela-
tionship between reliability and reward/penalty, as shown in linear RPS. 
 
There are additionally two increasing and decreasing slopes in penalty and reward 
zones as shown in figure 2.5-5. The state of the reward-penalty curve changes for vari-
ous conditions relying upon the range of data, kind of reliability index utilized, objective 
of the regulators and so on 
Reward/Penalty ramp is related to the performance reliability of the power distribu-
tion company as shown in figure 2.5-5. The Penalty Ramp is higher for companies with 
lower performance reliability levels and makes money related incentives for distribu-
tion companies to increase their reliability level, so as to abstain from paying high pen-
alties. Therefore, the Reward Ramp is higher for companies with higher performance 
reliability levels and rewards them. Both reward ramps and penalty ramps stops at 
their cap point, as shown in figure2.5-5, to reduce the financial risks to the company and 
its customers. 
2.5.4.3 DEAD BAND REWARD-PENALTY SCHEME 
Along with upper and lower limits, RPS structures can likewise incorporate dead bands 
(Figure 2.5-6). Dead- bands present an interval, whereas rewards and penalties do not 
have any significant bearing and are intended to maintain a strategic distance, to avoid 
tariff variations for little deviations from the baseline. Indeed, such deviations won't 
signify a structural variation in reliability in the case of capped RPS, but simply a sto-
chastic effect. Compared to the linear RPS scheme, there is no linear relationship be-
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tween reliability and reward/penalty. For each level of reliability, a reward or penalty 
can be devised, such that it is about the gap between the real level and the target as 
shown in figure 2.5-6. The bigger gap causes, the higher reward/penalty. The explana-
tion behind utilizing a dead zone is to dampen  unintended penalties and rewards infer-
able from stochastic changes in quality [17], [11], [10].  
If the performance reliability is worse than the right side of the dead zone (dead zone 
boundary), a penalty is charged (penalty zone). As reliability deteriorates, penalty gets 
raised (Penalty Ramp) as shown in figure 2.5-6 and is stopped at the Penalty Cap 
Point (Maximum Penalty). Most RPS schemes used Standard Deviation of reliability 
index, for calculating Reward/Penalty Points. Similarly, if the performance reliability is 
better than the left side of the dead zone (dead zone boundary), the reward is applied 
(reward zone)  [23]. Reward caps or penalty caps are also defined for eliminating un-
acceptable monetary losses for distribution companies and customers. As for reliability 
increases, the reward rises (Reward Ramp), and it stops at the Reward Cap Point 
(Maximum Reward) as shown in figure 2.5-6. This point of the cap is to guarantee that 
the maximum reward and penalty are capped. The capping is used to decrease the fi-
nancial risks to the company and customers. In Most RPS schemes, Reward/Penalty 
Cap Point is considered to be based upon customer interruption costs and the percent-
age of annual revenue from companies. 
The midpoint of Dead Zone(MDZ): RPS will not bring about the regulated company to 
particularly deliver an ideal level of service reliability [15]. MDZ is the improvement 
target value for each company, which equals the dead zone center [11], [29],[25] and is 
based on the different parameters, such as its reliability indices, its DEA efficiency score, 
customer Interruption costs and the maximum reliability improvement.   
 
The width of Dead Zone: The Width of Dead Zone is defined as the gap between the 
penalty point and reward point as shown in Figure 2.5-6. The width of the dead zone 
defines the target range that shows the start point of penalty and end of reward [7, 22]. 
If the performance of the company is enhanced more than the target, it will be rewarde, 
and if it is inferior to the target, it will be penalized. The dead zone width is equal to the 
average standard deviation of the reliability index. The space between the Penalty and 




Possibilities for reducing the performance-based risk while designing RPS [24]include:  
• Make the reward and penalty incline less steep  
• Broaden the dead zone limits  
• Move the dead zone to one side (right) 
• Drop the reward and penalty caps 
Penalty point: The penalty point is determined by the Midpoint of Dead Zone subtract-
ed by a half the SD of the regulatory index. 
Reward point: The Reward point is determined by the Midpoint of Dead Zone added by 
a half the SD of the regulatory index. 
 
A Dead band Reward-Penalty scheme is introduced in [4], [28], for balancing the total 
rewards granted and penalties received, by the regulator. Diverse models of reward-
penalty curves are applied in [2], with various dead-zone, penalty increasing slopes, re-
ward diminishing ramps; distinctive Maximum Penalty Levels and Maximum Reward 
Levels, utilizing a practical data and additionally, presenting their properties and appli-
cations. Sections 2.5.1 to 2.5.4 described the main modules that form part of any reward 
penalty scheme implemented by power distribution companies. The discussion of all the 
input parameters for RPS implementation, is covered in the next section. 
2.6 DISCUSSION OF DIFFERENT PARAMETERS 
FOR MANAGING PERFORMANCE BASED ON RELI-
ABILITY BY EFFICIENT REWARD-PENALTY 
SCHEME IMPLEMENTATION 
So far, we have reviewed the different parameters for reward penalty schemes (RPS). 
For estimating the power distribution companies performance reliability, efficiency, and 
interruption cost to implement RPS; apparently a  large number of parameters could be 
applied. The first step in implementing RPS is the handling and gathering of data for cal-
culating the different reliability, efficiency, and interruption cost parameters. This move 
is very time and money consuming. Also, the data verifying and the setting relationship 
between those parameters and RPS are very complicated for the regulator. On the other 
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hand, providing a few precise parameters, can promote RPS implementation. Thus, it 
can easily be managed by the regulators [37]. While selecting those precise parameters, 
we should consider whether they are quantifiable, independent and their dependency 
on the customer type (Industrial or Residential). Usually, the reliability indices such as 
SAIFI, SAIDI, and EENS, are the most commonly used parameters. in RPS implementa-
tion [30].  
 
The second step is the calculation of regulatory indicators, such as reliability indices, 
efficiency indices (DEA Score) and Interruption cost indices. Certain factors should be 
considered while performing this step. Identifying the interruption reasons are the core 
points of the regulatory indices calculations. Interruptions can occur based on two fac-
tors, such as external and internal factors. The interruptions due to generation and 
transmission failures and weather conditions can be grouped into external factors. 
Management of these factors is out of regulatory control. Regulators cannot reduce the 
duration and frequency of these interruptions, in the short term. The interruptions due 
to distribution equipment’s failure, human failures, and equipment’s maintenance can 
be classedas the internal factors. Regulators can manage these internal changes. 
. 
Determining the target for calculating reward or penalty, is the major and the third step 
in RPS implementation. Target calculation (benchmarking), shows the start point of re-
ward or penalty. If the distribution company’s performance is better than the target, 
they will be rewarded, and if it is worse than the target, they will be penalized. Regula-
tors use different ways to set targets. Based on the average of the yearly performance of 
previous years, (usually the past three years) [4], the target can be fixed. This approach 
is called the historical performance method. It can motivate the power distribution 
company to keep the same performance. Another method is the initially targeted value 
method. In this method, the target is fixed and based on the initial value followed by a 
yearly improvement [18]. The target can also be fixed and based on the average perfor-
mance of distribution companies grouped in one cluster. This method is called the com-
petition method. In this approach, the reliability provided by the distribution companies 





The fourth step after reward/penalty determination, is the tariff regulation process. The 
regulator can choose different modes for executing the calculated penalty and reward. 
One method is the distribution company’s tariff regulation method, where the electricity 
rate varies in each distribution company based on their performance reliability. With 
country tariff regulation methods, all distribution companies apply the same tariff. 
However, with direct reward and penalty tariff methods only the well-performing dis-
tribution company may get a direct reward from the regulator's fund, and the weaker 
distribution company may put a penalty to the same fund. With a balanced reward and 
penalty tariff method, the regulator may not have the funds to reward well-performing 
distribution companies. The regulator establishes balance between the reward granted, 
and the penalty received, such that the net difference tends to be nil [8]. In some coun-
tries, the distribution companies are under government control and a specified budget 
is set by the government. This method is called the budget regulated tariff method. In 
this approach, a share of the distribution company’s budget, can be directly associated 
with performance reliability. 
 
Recently [63] investigated a relationship between output based incentives for service 
quality and the utilization of capital and non-capital resources, to meet regulatory 
benchmarks in the power industry. They illustrated that physical assets and operational 
expenditures, do have an impact on service quality. For this empirical analysis, they 
have used a dataset from the Italian energy regulatory authority containing financial 
incentives and physical assets for the largest electricity distribution operator in Italy 
(86 % of the market). 
 
The latest research work on RPS structure, is the impact of the demand response pro-
grams on the power distribution system, operations [64]. This approach can be used to 
improve load profile characteristics as well as customer satisfaction and can be used by 
the regulator to simulate the customer's behavior for diverse prices, incentives, and 
penalties. Besides the demand response program, there are many different alternatives, 
including direct load control, which can be considered as a future work direction. In the 
next section, we present the design requirements for managing performance, based on 
reliability in the form of RPSs. 
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2.7 DESIGN REQUIREMENTS FOR MANAGING 
PERFORMANCE BASED ON RELIABILITY IN THE 
FORM OF RPS 
In the previous sections, we have conducted an in-depth literature survey related to the 
different approaches, to implementing RPS, used by different researchers, to maintain a 
consistent reliability on the power supply. Following this survey, we have identified the 
following technical challenges which still need significant attention from the research-
ers. It should benoted that, in this chapter, we do not discuss the technical challenges of 
designing or implementing RPS, however we do focus on the challenges associated with 
managing performance, based on reliability in the form of RPS. Some of the general 
challenges and issues associated with PBR reliability for managing power distribution 
companies are: 
1. How to define and characterize the most vital parameters for designing and im-
plementing RPS. 
2. How to set a realistic target that should be able to support and monitor the com-
pany’s performance behavior. 
3. How to ensure a reasonable magnitude for the reward or penalty 
4. How to reduce the complexity of adopting reward penalty formulas. 
5. How to maintain the consistency of reward penalty formulas with the desired 
outcome. 
6. How to include certain external factors in RPS implementation, that affect the 
performance of power distribution companies,  that cannot be controlled by the 
regulators. 
7. How to motivate the efficient and inefficient power distribution companiesin the 
power market. 
8. How to improve the power distribution companies’ reliability ofpower supply. 
9. How to develop an effective RPS scheme that is more favorable to the regulatory 
agency, than the power distribution companies. 
10. How to develop an effective RPS scheme, that is more favorable to power distri-
bution companies than regulatory agencies. 
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11. How to develop an effective RPS scheme, that is most favorable to power distri-
bution companies. 
12. How to present financial rewards/penalties, in a way which is administratively 
simple. 
 
These challenges are generally solved after finding solutions for the specific challeng-
es that this thesis focuses on. The specific challenges associated with managing perfor-
mance based on reliability in the form of RPS are: 
 
1. Identifying the most vital parameters for designing and implementing RPS, fo-
cusing on PBR based, reliability. 
2. Developing aneffective RPS scheme that is simple and easy to understand and 
administer; that increases rewards and penalties in a linear fashion, as the per-
formance fluctuates from the normal and considers certain performance 
variations, in light of elements outside of the distribution company’s control.  
3. Developing an effective RPS scheme that reaches maximum reward/ penalty 
slowly, that provides very little incentive near the central target and considers 
the uncertainty related to those performance related components, that are 
outside of the distribution company’s control.   
4. Developing an effective RPS scheme, that will act like a dead band RPS structure 
by considering the uncertainties due to external factors and provide no reward 
or penalty around the central target.  
2.8 CONCLUSION 
This chapter has offered a state-of-the-art review,of managing performance based on 
reliability, in the form of RPSs,as well as the literature in the field of performance-based 
regulation,and the literature in other contexts, such as Data Envelopment Analysis and 
Customer Interruption Cost analysis, that might be adaptable to manage power 
distribution systems in the form of RPSs.The existing work evidently indicates that 
slight progress has been made in managing power distribution systems in the form of 
RPSs in the performance-based regulation process. However, plenty of key research 
issues related to this context, haves not been comprehensively addressed by the current 
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research and requires further development. This then focuses on some of the key 
challenges of managing power distribution companies in the form of RPSs. Furthe 
attention to this issue is needed by th eresearchers concentrating on how to identify the 
most vital parameters for designing and implementing RPS, focusing on  PBR based on 
reliability andhow to develop an effectiveRPS scheme, that is simple, easy to understand 
and administer andincreases rewards and penalties in a linear fashion as the 
performance fluctuates from the normal.  Researchcould also consider certain 
performance variations in light of elements outside of the distribution company’s 
control, how to develop an effectiveRPS scheme that reaches maximum reward/ 
penalty, slowly andprovides very little incentive near the central target and considers 
the uncertainty related to those performance related components, that are outside of 
the distribution company’s control.  Research could then coverissues concerned with 
how to develop an effectiveRPS scheme that acts like a dead band RPS structure, by 
considering the uncertainties which can be due to external factors and provide no 
reward or penalty around the central target. It has also explained most of the principal 
aspects that should be considered, while designing RPS. Based on this review, the next 







This chapter provides: 
 Formal definition for the problems that we address in this research 
 The research issues that should be addressed 
 The research methodology that will be adopted in this research methodically ad-
dresses the identified research problems 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
Reward-Penalty Schemes are adopted for Power Distribution Companies to guarantee 
their quality levels. Regulators ought to pay money to Power Distribution Companies 
that give great performance and get money from Power Distribution Companies that 
give poor performance[5]. This methodology updates the company’s incomes as indi-
cated by their performance and penalizes companies with lower-quality levels[10]. It 
not just stimulates the companies to enhance their service quality but also adjust the 
aggregate rewards paid, and the aggregate penalties got by regulators[11].  
 
A comprehensive state-of-the-art review of performance-based regulation literature in 
th e power distribution market was discussed in Chapter 2. Accordingly, there has been 
considerable research and commercial projects in PBR, that aim to build high perfor-
mance in power distribution., However, a limited number of PBR approaches have im-
plemented reliability involvement in the power distribution process. In Chapter2, we 
particularly placed emphasis on the literature relating to RPS and analyzed how existing 
literature on performance-based regulation through reliability. We also discussed how 
the existing approaches toperformance-based regulation in other contexts, such as data 
envelopment analysis and customer interruption cost, might be adapted to address the 
challenges of RPS. From the surveyed literature, we identified a series of weaknesses in 





The main contribution of this chapter, includes a clear identification of the key problems 
that we expect to address in this dissertation. In Section 3.2, we propose an arrangement 
of definitions of those terminologies that will be used when characterizing the issues, as 
well as in subsequent chapters. Section 3.3 emphasizes the key problems to be ad-
dressed in this thesis to resolve the issues so as to implement sustainable RPS. Finally, 
this chapter closes with a brief discussion of research methodologies and a conclusion. 
3.2 KEY CONCEPTS 
In this segment, we display a formal definition of terminologies and concepts, which will 
be used to present, explain and formally characterize the problems intended to be ad-
dressed in this dissertation. Table.3.2-1 concisely illustrates the definitions. The same 
definitions will be adopted in proceeding chapters, as required. 




System topology Refers to different approaches to portraying the relia-
bility of a system, including fault trees, reliability block 
diagrams, and failure mode effect analysis. Each topol-
ogy has different strengths and weaknesses regarding 
reliability. [13]illustrated distribution system reliability 
assessment can predict the interruption profile of a dis-
tribution system based on system topology. 
Outage duration (or 
duration of the inter-
ruption) 
Refers to the period from the start of an interruption 
until the service has been restored to the affected cus-
tomers. It can be measured in seconds, minutes, hours, 
or days. One of the objectives of the power distribution 
system reliability assessmen,t is to reduce the duration 
of outages. Reducing outage duration, as determined by 
SAIDI and CAIDI, is related to the execution of distribu-
tion automation and outage discovery technologies and 
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more efficiently operating and refurbishment performs 
for those customers suffering continued outages[44]. 
Frequency of outages 
(Frequency of inter-
ruptions) 
Refers to the number of times outages occurred, in a 
given period and is measured in seconds, minutes, 
hours, or days. The reliability of power distribution 
company, can be enhanced by dropping the frequency 
of outages.  Decreasing the frequency of outages, as is 
related to a number of factors including underground-
ing, storm hardening, infrastructure improvements, 
and the use of automated distribution systems.  
System availability Refers to the chance that a repairable service is func-
tioning at a defined point in time, taking after a defined 
set of ecological factors. It can be characterized as the 
likelihood that, a device or a system will play out a giv-
en task condition for a particular timeframe, while 
availability is that, a system will have the capacity to 
play out its required capacity over a particular 
timeframe, under a specified environment [43], [59]. 
Response time: Refers to the time that it takes an operator to charac-
terize a solution during contingencies. Response time 
during service restoration, influences the reliability in-
dices that are identified with the lengths of the failure, 
demonstrating that a fast decision straightforwardly 
adds to the system performance. 
Total number of cus-
tomers served 
Refers to the number of customers served amid the re-
porting time frame (N). This parameter is used in the 
estimation of performance reliability indices such as 
SAIDI, SAIFI, and CAIDI.  
 Number of customers 
interrupted 
Refers to the number of interrupted customers for each 
sustained interruption event, amid the reporting time 
frame (Ni) and is used in the calculation of reliability 





With the development of advanced technology-based 
protection mechanisms for power distribution, outage 
events have become less frequent in the modern power 
systems. Thus, protection mechanisms have a critical 
part in the reliability of distribution systems. 
Restoration time Refers to the duration of time which begins when a 
fault is identified and ends when services have been 
restored back to normal.  New devices and systems 
make it possible for utilities to know when customers 
lose power and to pinpoint outage areas all the more 
decisively. This capacity enhances restoration times 
and abbreviated outage durations. Once an outage oc-
curs the average duration to re-establish services is 
found from the Customer Average Interruption Dura-
tion Index (CAIDI).  
Distribution line 
(DLine) 
Refers to the span of the power distribution sys-
tem[55].   
Total number of em-
ployees (NE) 





Refers to the total capacity in MVA of distribution 




Refer to total loss in energy within a zone[55].  
Distribution opera-
tion and maintenance 
cost (DO&M) 
Refers to the yearly expenses of both labor and non-
labor inputs[55].  
Distribution capital 
expenses (DCapEx) 
Refers to the total capital expenditure of the 
distribution system. 
Sale of energy (SE) Refers to the yearly sale of energy in MWh[55]. 
Number of customers 
(N) 
Refers to the total distribution points which is to be 






Refers to the system interruption cost index 
represented in $/kWh. 
VOLL (ValueoOf Lost 
Load) 
Refers to the value an average customer puts on an un-
supplied kWh of energy  
WWTP (Willingness 
to Pay) 
Refers to the customer willingness to pay to improve its 
continuity of supply.  
 
3.3 PROBLEM DEFINITION 
The general problems and challenges that are addressed in this thesis are as follows: 
1. Problems with defining and characterizing most vital parameters for design-
ing and implementing RPS 
2. Problems with setting a realistic target that should be able to support and 
monitor company’s performance behavior. 
3. Problems with ensuring a reasonable magnitude for reward or penalty 
4. Problems with reducing the complexity in adopting reward penalty formulas 
5. Problems with maintaining the consistency of reward penalty formula with 
the desired outcome 
6. Problems with the inclusion of certain external factors in RPS implementation 
that affect the performance of power distribution companies that cannot be 
controlled by the regulators 
7. Problems with motivating the efficient and inefficient power distribution 
companiesin power market 
8. Problems with improving the power distribution company’s reliability in 
power supply 
9. Problems with developing an effective RPS scheme that is more favorable to 
the regulatory agency than the power distribution companies 
10. Problems with developing an effective RPS scheme that is more favorable to 
power distribution companies than regulatory agencies  
11. Problems with developing an effective RPS scheme that is most favorable to 
power distribution companies 
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12. Problems with presenting financial rewards/penalties that are administra-
tively simple. 
 
These problems are solved by finding solutions to the specific problems that this the-
sis focuses on. The specific problems associated with managing performance based on 
reliability in the form of RPS are: 
1. Problems with identifying the most vital parameters for designing and im-
plementing RPS focusing on PBR based on reliability 
2. Problems with developing an effective RPS scheme that is simple and easy to 
understand and administer, that increase rewards and penalties in a linear 
fashion as the performance fluctuates from the normal and should considers 
certain performance variations in light of elements outside of the distribution 
company’s control.  
3. Problems with developing an effective RPS scheme that reaches maximum 
reward/ penalty slowly, that provide very little incentive near the central 
target and should consider the uncertainty related to those performance 
related components that are outside of the distribution company’s control.   
4. Problems with developing an effective RPS scheme that should act like a dead 
band RPS structure by considering the uncertainties due to external factors 
and provide no reward or penalty around the central target.  
 
For each of these issues, the discussion is carried out from two alternate perspectives: 
the existing solutions and the technical problems innate in these solutions. The 
specialized concerns connected with the issues that will frame the research issues for 
the development of the new solution. 
3.4 RESEARCH ISSUES 
Using the above understanding and key ideas, we examined three ranges of problem def-
initions. For all, we characterized the currently available solutions and the existing tech-
nical problems inherent in these solutions. These specialized problems frame the prem-
ise of our research problems: how would we be able to address them and what are the 
prerequisites for the new solution? In this section, we address the research issues that 
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should be tended to in any new solution development. We then seek the solutions from 
Chapter 4 onwards to focus on the research issues characterized in this chapter and to 
meet the objectives delineated in Chapter 1.  
3.4.1 RESEARCH ISSUE 1 
How to identify the most vital parameters for designing and implementing RPS 
focusing on PBR based on reliability?  
Based on the survey of current approaches for PBR based on reliability that has been 
discussed in Chapter2 and problem definitions for definition and characterization of the 
most vital parameters for designing and implementing RPS, it is clear that the concepts 
of defining and characterizing the most vital parameters are not well understood. More-
over, the literature contains no approaches particularly addressing the vital parameter 
definition and characterization, and the approaches discussed in other contexts such as 
PBR based on data envelopment analysis and PBR based on customer interruption cost 
are difficult to adapt to RPS s and may require major revision. 
Research Question 1: What are the aspects of setting a target for designing RPS? 
Research Question 2: What are the factors related to the performance target? 
To address this problem with defining and characterizing the most vital parameters, we 
design a framework, which is extensively presented in Chapter5. 
3.4.2 RESEARCH ISSUE 2 
How to develop an effective RPS scheme that is simple and easy to understand and 
administer, that increase rewards and penalties as the performance fluctuates 
from the normal and should considers certain performance variations in light of 
elements outside of the distribution company’s control? 
According to the survey in Chapter2, the literature has heavily overlooked the aspects of 
setting a target to analyze the company’s behavior. In the previous section, the problem 
definitions for setting a realistic target and the associated technical problems are 
discussed. Those technical problems result in some research questions. To overcome 
the problems, the following research questions need to be considered: 
1. Research Question 1: How to implement an RPS scheme without any dead 
band and capping of maximum reward and the maximum penalty for improving 
the performance based on reliability for Power Distribution Companies? 
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2. Research Question 2: How to implement an RPS scheme with a dead band to 
control the normal fluctuations in performance and with a capping of maximum 
reward and maximum penalty. 
The above research questions need to be addressed so as to build an effective RPS. The 
answer to this question will be presented in Chapter 5. 
3.4.3 RESEARCH ISSUE 3 
How to develop an effective RPS scheme that reaches maximum reward/ penalty 
slowly, that provides very  little incentive near the central target and should 
consider the uncertainty related to those performance related components, that 
are outside of the distribution company’s control? 
As,mentioned,in,Research,Problem,3,the,existing,literature,has,not,shown any focus on 
managing diverse performance goals based on reliability inthepower distribution 
market,thus defining an effectiveRPS scheme that reaches maximum reward/ penalty 
slowly, that provide very little incentive near the central target and have considered the 
uncertainty related to those performance related components that are outside of the 
distribution company’s control to achieve the performance goals based on reliability. 
To address this problem of managingp erformance goals based on reliability within the 
power distribution market, the following research questions need to be considered: 
1. Research Question 1: How to calculate reward/penalty by using limited var-
iables? 
2. Research Question 2: How to ensure a resealable magnitude for re-
ward/penalty? 
3. Research Question 3: How can we efficiently achieve performance goals 
based on reliability within the power distribution market? 
4. Research Question 4: What are the factors affecting the performance 
reliability of power distribution companies? 
5. Research Question 5: How can we develop an approach that is more 
favorable to power distribution companies by considering the performance 
inconsistency factors that are out of the regulator’s control? 
6. Research Question 6: How can we accommodate the uncertainty factors 
that deviate the distribution company’s performance-based reliability level in 
achieving the defined performance goal? 
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In this research, we propose an algorithm that addresses all the above questions, and 
this is comprehensively illustrated in Chapter 6. 
3.4.4 RESEARCH ISSUE 4 
How to develop an effective RPS scheme that should act like a dead band RPS 
structure by considering the uncertainties due to external factors and provide no 
reward or penalty around the central target.  
The Reward-Penalty formula which portrays the shape and slope of the curves decides 
how rapidly the curve[66] achieves the maximum reward or penalty as performance 
goes astray from the performance target. To address this issue, the following research 
questions need to be considered:  
1.  Research Question 4.1 : How to define an RPS that increases rewards and penal-
ties in a fashion as the performance moves away from the normal, without apply-
ing the dead band, that acts as a dead band structure by considering the uncer-
tainties due to external factors? 
2.  Research Question 4.2: How to introduce a capping (thresholding) on the max-
imum reward and penalties that allow companies to abstain from paying a critical 
penalty or getting a huge reward? 
3.  Research Question 4.3: How can we evaluate the reward/ penalty based on 
performance-based reliability by including a neutral zone around the target which 
represents the vulnerability in regards to the ideal performance level? 
In this research,to address this issue, we introduced a model where  the minimum 
standard (performance target)  level is set taking into account of the moving average of 
historical performance which helps to measure the company’s behaviour whether the 
company is well-performed that would result in reward or under-performed that would 
lead to a penalty and it is comprehensively illustrated in Chapter8. 
 
3.5 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
The science and engineering-based research methodology takes on this research in or-
der to solve the underlying research problem. Science and engineering research 
prompt the advancement of new procedures, design, techniques, gadgets or a setof 
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ideas, which can be consolidated to shape a new hypothetical system. All the more 
particularly, the science research technique is embraced that comprehends the prob-
lem area and plans a solution by making an application or some configuration arti-
facts[67], [68], [69]. To accomplish our research objectives, we plan to design algorithms 
and a model framework to affirm to the spirit of "making something work" [70].  
This technique comprises of issue definition, theoretical solution, implementation, ex-
perimentation and testing and validation of models against existing solutions. The 
previously mentioned undertaking shave been partitioned into three primary stag-
es[70]:  
Issue definition  
Theoretical solution 
Implementation, testing and validation of models 
3.5.1 ISSUE DEFINITION 
In the Issue definition phase, the objective is to legitimize the criticalness of the research 
questions. It includes the examination, analysis, understanding, interpretation, discussion 
and assessment gave criteria and viewpoint. This issue definition stage has been covered in 
this chapter. General issues forRPS implementation are namely:problemswithdefining 
and characterizing theRPSs,setting a realistic target that should be able to support and 
monitor company’s performance behavior, ensuring a reasonable magnitude for 
reward or penalty, reducing the complexity in adopting reward penalty formulas, 
maintaining the consistency of reward penalty formula with the desired outcome, 
inclusion of certain external factors in RPS implementation that affect the performance 
of power distribution companies that cannot be controlled by the regulators, 
motivation of inefficient power distribution companies in power market, improvingthe 
power distribution companiesreliability in power supply, developing an effectiveRPS 
scheme, presenting financial rewards/penalties administratively simple.The specific 
problemsforRPS implementation that we are focusing in this thesis are namely: 
problems with identifying the most vital parameters for designing and implementing 
RPS focusing on PBR based on reliability, problems with developing  an effectiveRPS 
scheme that is simple and easy to understand and administer, that increase rewards 
and penalties in a linear fashion as the performance fluctuates from the normal and 
should considers certain performance    variations in light of elements outside of the 
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distribution company’s control, problems with developing an effectiveRPS scheme that 
reaches maximum reward/ penalty slowly, that provide very little incentive near the 
central target and should consider the uncertainty related to those performance related 
components that are outside of the distribution company’s control, problems with 
developing an effectiveRPS scheme that should acts like a dead band RPS structure by 
considering the uncertainties due to external factors and provide no reward or penalty 
around central target. For every issue, the discussion is done utilizing a formal defini-
tion of the classification, and the technical concerns. The issues connected with the 
technical concerns prompted the research problems for the new solution development. 
3.5.2 THEORETICAL SOLUTION 
The theoretical solution focuses on planning a new strategy and methodology through 
the configuration, design and developing of tools, environment or framework through 
implementation[44]. In this stage, a theoretical framework is intended for the proposed 
solution. A framework's theoretical structure and system architecture are the key re-
quirements which give a research guide to the whole development of a framework or 
system development process. This includes the decomposition of the whole system into 
leaf or essential functional modules and to plainly determine the relations between 
these functional modules, whose collaboration, all in all, gives a far complete image of 
the whole system framework. Here, the configuration specification is utilized as an out-
line for the implementation of the framework. 
3.5.3     IMPLEMENTATION, TESTING AND VALIDATION OF 
MODELS 
In this stage, testing and validation of models are brought out through, implementation 
with real-life cases and field testing. The way toward testing and validating a working 
framework gives one of a kind experience into the advantages of the proposed ideas, 
frameworks and choices. By building a model framework, implementing, testing and as-
sessing, a superior understanding of the achievability and usefulness of the theoretical 
structure and also the entire solution is given.  
 
In this thesis, Chapter 4 gives a theoretical framework to the proposed solution, and Chap-




This chapter provides a problem definition for the problems associated with managing power 
distribution companies in the form of RPSs in performance based on reliability. Taking into 
account of the socio-economic and technica lissues of existing solutions, certain research prob-
lems have been characterized. For every research problem, the research questions came up 
should be tended to in the advancement of RPSs. To address every research problem, a theoret-
ical framework has been proposed. Besides, the research approach for this research has been 
discussed.  
In the following chapter, a review of the proposed solution alongside its theoretical framework 
will be given. The theoretical framework is intended to address each problem that have been 







GENERIC FRAMEWORK OF REWARD-
PENALTY SCHEME  
The chapter provides: 
 An introduction to the Generic Framework of Reward-Penalty Scheme 
 An innovative generic framework of the Reward-Penalty Scheme 
 A study of theoretical framework of the proposed framework for RPS design and imple-
mentation 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
As mentioned earlier in this dissertation, the current literature for improving performance lacks 
a comprehensive understanding of the different parameters available for designing and imple-
menting RPS. Moreover, the literature contains no approaches which particularly address 
the vital parameter definition and characterization ,and the approaches discussed in 
other contexts such as PBR based, that is based on data envelopment analysis and PBR 
that is based on customer interruption cost. These are difficult to adapt to RPSs and may 
require major revision. This chapter addresses those problems and whilst defining and 
characterizing the most vital parameters, we design a framework to design and implement 
RPS. 
4.2 AN INNOVATIVE GENERIC FRAMEWORK OF 
REWARD-PENALTY SCHEME 
In this section, we develop a generic framework of a Reward-Penalty structure, for 
power distribution companies (Figure7). This is done by integrating the methodological 
characteristics and purposes of related current research works. The generic framework 
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is divided into three key modules: (i) Performance Reliability module, (ii) Efficiency 
module, and (iii) Interruption Cost module.  In the next three subsections, we examine 









As illustrated in Chapter 2, not all existing research uses these three modules in their 
penalty function but, use a combination of different parameters in their penalty func-
tion. 
4.3 THEORETICAL FOUNDATION 
In the next three subsections, we discuss these modules in detail, while referring 
relevant existing research contributions. 
4.3.1 PERFORMANCE RELIABILITY MODULE 
Reliability index is a parameter that measures the performance reliability of a power 
system. System performance reliability indicators are classified into two groups: system 
reliability indices and load reliability indices. We now describe system reliability indices 
and load based reliability indices, in detail. 
4.3.1.1 SYSTEM RELIABILITY INDICES 
 
Standard P1366 of the IEEE, illustrates the accepted reliability indices [33], [62]. These 
indices aim to assess the level of customer satisfaction, which is based upon the total 
length of outages (interruptions) and thenumber of outages. In the literature, three dif-
ferent system reliability indices (i.e. SAIDI, SAIFI, CAIDI) are discussed, which rely on a 
number of parameters (Figure 4.2-1). 
 
SAIFI (SYSTEM AVERAGE INTERRUPTION FREQUENCY INDEX)[62] is the average 
number of times that a customer experiences interruptions during a given period [62], 
[46], [35]. SAIFI is computed by dividing the total number of customers interrupted (𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖) 
by the total number of customers served (𝑁𝑁).   
  SAIFI=∑ (𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖
𝑁𝑁
)𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖=1                                                                                                                                   Equa-
tion 12 
SAIDI (SYSTEM AVERAGE INTERRUPTION DURATION INDEX)[62], [47] is the aver-
age duration of outage for customers who experience an interruption during the year. 
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The SAIDI valueis computed by dividing the customer minutes by the total number of 
customers.  
 
  SAIDI=∑ (𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖×𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖
𝑁𝑁
)𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖=1                                                                                                                         Equa-
tion 13 
where, 𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖 is the duration of each interruption, number of customers interrupted (𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖), the 
total number of customers served (𝑁𝑁). 
 
CAIDI (CUSTOMER AVERAGE INTERRUPTION DURATION INDEX)explains the aver-







                                                                                                             Equa-
tion 14 
where, 𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖 is the duration of each interruption, number of customers interrupted (𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖), the 
total number of customers served (𝑁𝑁). 
4.3.1.2 LOAD (ENERGY) RELIABILITY INDICES 
Instead of scaling the impact of interruption to the affected customers divided by the 
total number of customers[71], this index value, is scaled by the Kilovolt- ampere (kVA), 
of the load affected, divided by the total kVA of the load connected to the network. 
These indices rely on a number of parameters (Figure 4.2-1). We now describe the two 
load reliability indices EENS and AENS.  
EXPECTED ENERGY NOT SUPPLIED (EENS): By utilizing the load characteristics by 
industrial customer type in the load point, the measure of expected energy not supplied 
is figured [52] as EENS = Total energy not supplied by the company or Unserved Energy 
(UE)   
  EENS = ∑(𝐿𝐿𝑎𝑎(𝑖𝑖)×𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖)  kWh/y                                                                                             Equation 15 
Where  𝐿𝐿𝑎𝑎(𝑖𝑖) = Average load attached to load point 𝑖𝑖,  
𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖 =Average annual outage time  
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            =∑ 𝜆𝜆𝑗𝑗 𝑟𝑟𝑗𝑗𝑛𝑛𝑗𝑗=1 ,                                                                                                     Equation 16 








AVERAGE ENERGY NOT SUPPLIED (AENS): Average Energy Not Supplied (AENS) is a 
measure of the average non-delivered energy per customer. AENS is a reliability in-
dex used for electrical power distribution systems and usually, has unit kWh per cus-
tomer.  AENS = Total energy not supplied / a total number of customers served [31].  
 
  AENS =�
∑(𝐿𝐿𝑎𝑎(𝑖𝑖)×𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖)  
∑ (𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖)𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖=1
� ( kWh/y ) 
N
                                   Equation 17 
Where  𝐿𝐿𝑎𝑎(𝑖𝑖) = Average load attached to load point𝑖𝑖,  
𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖      =Average annual interruption time 
          =∑ 𝜆𝜆𝑗𝑗 𝑟𝑟𝑗𝑗𝑛𝑛𝑗𝑗=1 ,                                             Equation 18 








𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖 = Number of customers interrupted out of the total number of customers 
served (𝑁𝑁). 
4.3.2 EFFICIENCY MODULE 
There are various elements impacting the behaviors and attitude towards energy profi-
ciency because of the growing cost of energy and rising social ethics. This section pre-
sents an efficiency analysis model, called the Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) model. 
Applying DEA is a worth analysis method in this context over different other methodol-
ogies because of its nonparametric nature. 
4.3.2.1 DATA ENVELOPMENT ANALYSIS (DEA) METHOD 
The DEA method is the best and most powerful method used to analyze the relative 
efficiency of the power companies [72], [73] and hence determining the most efficient 
companies. It is also used as a reference, with which the efficiency of the rest of the 
companies is compared. Thus, it is defined as a non-parametric method for the estima-
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tion of productive efficiency of power distribution companies [45]. The amounts of in-
puts and outputs are estimated based on physical terms or financial terms. Efficiency 
based on DEA [28] is well-defined as the proportion of weighted yield to weighted 
inputs (supplies-products). The inputs are the resources used by distribution compa-
nies whereas primaryyields as output[55].  It is represented as a linear programming 
problem.  The presence of much data also makes the process difficult; so, only the signif-
icant data must be incorporated. The DEA method is very flexible and allows the analyst 
to select inputs and outputs. 
4.3.3 INTERRUPTION COST MODULE 
It has been evaluated, that a greater part of the power supply interruptions, is due to 
failures of the distribution companies [20], [15], [16]. Some distribution companies 
have used interruption cost indices (calculated from the power interruptions encoun-
tered by its customers), as a regulatory indicator, in their RPS implementation. Three 
most frequently used interruption cost indices are: 1) IEAR (Interruption Energy As-
sessment Rate) which refers to the system interruption cost index represented in 
$/kWh. 2) VOLL (Value of Lost Load) refers to the value an average customer puts on an 
unsupplied kWh of energy. 3) WTP (Willingness to Pay) refersto the customer 
willingness to pay to improve its continuity of supply.  
By national customer surveys, companies collect cost data for each interruption type 
and duration. Three computing steps[60], [19], are required to assess the interruption 
costs: a) processing of raw collected data, b) setting up of customer interruption cost 
models, based on Customer Damage Functions (CDF), that signifies the normalized 
interruption cost c) computing interruption cost indices, that include the use of the 
normalized data to construct CDF for each customer area, that illustrates how this 
interruption cost maybe determined by on outage duration [39]. 
4.3.4 REWARD-PENALTY MODULE 
Reward-Penalty schemes are monetary mechanisms which encourage power distribu-
tion companies to improve their performance reliability. Regulator predefines a per-
formance target for the distribution companies. If it performs better than the target, 
they will be rewarded. Otherwise, they will be penalized. If distribution companies hit 
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the target, there is neither a penalty nor a reward. A general form of RPS is shown in 
Figure 4.3.1. It is comprised of three regions [11]: reward zone, dead zone, and penalty 
zones. In the literature, there are several different variations of the reward-penalty 
schemes, and it changes according to the requirements and data used. The choice of the 
regulated indicators (SAIDI, SAIFI, CAIDI, EENS, AENS, IEAR, VOLL and WTP) plays a 
major role in calculating financial incentives (reward or penalty).  
 
The regulator specifies performance standards as shown in Figure 4.3.1, which is 
defined as the level of performance reliability, that the company hasanticipated would 
supply, or the minimum reliability that a company is supposed to supply to its custom-
ers[62]. Rebelliousness to base standards of reliability, might involve penalty payment. 
The structure of reward-penalty changes for various conditions, relies upon the scope of 
information, kind of reliability index utilized, the objective of the regulators, etc. The 
Reward/Penalty ramp is related to the performance reliability of the distribution com-
pany, as shown in Figure 8. 
 
RPS schemes in few nations [62], [74] (including Ireland, UK, and The Netherlands), have 
a maximum and a minimum limit (caps) for rewards and penalties. In a perfect world, 
when monetary motivating forces effectively reflect customer expenses and advantages 
for performance reliability changes, the presentation of maximum and minimum limits 
ought not to be vital: the company will achieve the anticipated range of reliability and 
stay there. In any case, as may be normal, the presumption of customer marginal valua-
tion faultless information on reliability, is not confirmed in practice. Consequently, the 
risk for awarding the company for improper high-reliability levels, legitimizes the 
presentation of a maximum limit on rewards. A risk of punishing the company, is also 
there, whenever it will have deplorable monetary misfortunes. It offers the presentation 
of a minimum limit on penalties. The scheme, as shown in Figure 4.3.1, indicates that 
these maximum and minimumboundaries are set to guard the customers and distribu-
tion company regulators, against adverse effects of poorly designed RPS.  
 
Capping of the Reward-Penalty scheme [22], [62] is essential to consider, because the 
controller may have faulty data about customer interruption expenses and their will-
ingness to pay.  Reward Cap or Penalty Cap is defined for eliminating unacceptable 
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monetary losses for distribution companies and customers alike. As reliability increases, 
the reward rises, and it stops at the Reward Cap Point. Similarly, as reliability decreas-
es, the penalty rises, and it stops at the Penalty Cap Point. In Figure 4.3.1, two rising 
and sinking ramps are present in the  penalty and reward zones[2]. For companies with 
lower performance reliability levels, the Penalty Ramp is higher than Reward Ramp, 
which forces the distribution companies to improve their reliability level [11]. Similarly, 
for companies with higher performance reliability level, the Reward Ramp is placed 
higher as an incentive to maintain/ improve their reliability. Both the reward ramp and 
the penalty ramp stops at their cap point to reduce the financial risks to the company 
and customers. Notwithstanding the maximum and minimum limits[62], RPS structure 
includes the dead band. Dead-bands are presented at an interim, where financial incen-
tives do not make a difference. They are intended to keep away from tariff variations, 
for little deviations from the baseline[62]. Thosedifferences would not speak to a basic 
alteration in reliability, in the case of capped RPS, but simply create a stochastic effect. 
To dampen unplanned penalties and rewards attributable to merely changes in quality 
[17], [11], [10], it is essential to use a dead band. The midpoint of Dead Zone(MDZ): 
MDZ is the improvement target value for each company, which equals the middle of the 
dead zone[75][11], [29],[25]. The width of Dead Zone(DZW): The Dead Zone Width [4], 
[75]is defined as the gap between the penalty point and the reward point as shown in 
Figure below. The width of the dead zone represents the target range, that shows the 
start point of penalty and end of reward [7, 22]. Penalty point and Reward point are 
the endpoints of the dead zone.  
 





In this chapter, an innovative framework is presented for designing and implementing 
RPS. The proposed framework presents the different parameters and has shown how to 
implement RPS, using those parameters as well as  its stability, and accordingly shows 
which scheme is appropriate for the corresponding power distribution company. The 
methodology that we propose in this chapter, will assist the regulator to determine the 
suitable RPSs. The preliminary point for achieving this methodology would be the 







LINEAR REWARD PENALTY STRUCTURE 
This chapter provides: 
 The Requirements and design rationale for the proposed linear reward penalty 
structure 
 The theoretical foundation and prototype of implementation within Experi-
mental settings 
 Results and observations 
 Validation 
 Comparative analysis and discussion for the linear reward penalty structure. 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter, we describe how regulators can guide the Power Distribution Compa-
ny’s performance, using performance reward penalty mechanisms. We specifically con-
sider the effect of quality regulation on continuity of supply (reliability). We present a 
newmodel that is based upon a cost of service remuneration[11]towards establishing 
an economical way of regulating quality [10]using rewards and penalties. This model 
encourages Power Distribution Companies to maintain the appropriate reliability levels. 
The novelty of this reward penalty scheme lies in the use of a linear reward penalty 
formula, whereby rewards and penalties increase in a linear fashion that is definedby 
what means the curve reaches the maximum reward or penalty quickly,while 
performance-based reliability, moves away from the benchmark(or the ends of the dead 
band, in the case of linear reward-penalty dead band structure).Hence this scheme is 
termed the Linear Reward-Penalty Scheme(LRPS). The proposed LRPS implements re-
wards and penalties for exceeding or failing to achieve the targeted performance levels, 
respectively. This chapter provides detailed theoretical foundation for the LRPS. By con-
sidering all of the requirements laid out in this section, it also clarifies the algorithm 
design. A flowchart is given to bring clarity to this explanation. It clarifies how the algo-
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rithm is applied in order to complete the various analyses. It also tests the validity of 
performance-based reliability. Additionally, we contrast the proposed scheme as well as 
the existing Reward-Penalty Schemes [4], [5], [10], [11], [28], [66], [76], [77] to show the rel-
evance of the LRPS for practical incentive calculations. This chapter formerly concludes 
with  results that offer validation to this proposal. Now we outline the fundamental 
prerequisites and the design rationale for LRPS. 
5.2 PROPOSED LINEAR REWARD PENALTY 
STRUCTURE (LRPS) 
This section provides an overall outline of LRPS followed by an explanation of the re-
quirements needed to address the issue of the linear reward penalty structure. This 
then leads to the design rationale, where we examine the vital design decisions for the 
LRPS.  
We now provide a general overview of LRPS. 
 
5.2.1 GENERAL OVERVIEW OF LRPS 
 
Power System Distribution Company Regulators, have utilized the reward penalty 
methods for a long time, to address traditional performance areas, for example, reliabil-
ity, energy efficiency, interruption duration, and safety. Lately, these methods have been 
given greater consideration because of regulatory concerns over flexibility and the 
power distribution company’s capacity  to respond to technological change[78]. Many 
RPS models previously proposed, were surveyed in Chapter 2. However, most of the ex-
isting RPS mechanisms, cannot simultaneously address the following issues: 
 
The proposed QRPS scheme addresses all of the following issues: 
 
• Use oflimited variables to calculate the reward or the penalty. 
• Ensuringa reasonable magnitude for the reward or the penalty. 
• The uncertainty concerning the best performance based reliability level and the 




The main objectives of this proposed scheme areto: 
 
• Introduce a set of well-defined goals for the LRPS scheme 
• Present two novel linear reward penalty schemes, which provide an efficient way for 
improving the performance; based on reliability for Power Distribution Companies. 
• Demonstrate a linear RPS scheme, without any dead band and capping of the maxi-
mum reward and the maximum penalty. 
• Demonstrate a linear RPS scheme with a dead band being used to control the normal 
fluctuations in performance and a capping of maximum rewards and maximum 
penalties. 
• Provide a comparative study of the strengths and limitations of both the proposed 
approach and other existing approaches, that are proposed in existing literature. 
5.2.2 REQUIREMENTS 
 
To address the issues of reward penalty schemes, the following prerequisites have been 
established for the proposed LRPS algorithm. These requirements are as follows: 
1. Define a specific performance metric that measures reliability 
2. Set a realistic target that support and monitor the company’s performance 
behaviour. 
3. The Reward-Penalty formula, which defines the shape and slope of the curve, 
should be easy to understand and administer, and consistent with the desired 
outcome. 
4. The algorithm should have the capacity to control typical performance fluctua-
tions due to external elements, which cannot be managed by the power distribu-
tion company’s’ regulator. 
5. The algorithm should provide a reasonable scale for reward/penalty, ensuring  
that the magnitude of the reward/penalty, should remain within reasonable 
boundaries. 




5.2.3 DESIGN RATIONALE 
 
To fulfill the requirements laid out in 5.2.2, the hypothetical foundation for LRPS is pro-
posed and addressed all of the prerequisites by settling the design decisions. The design 
decisions proposed in this framework are as follows: 
 
1. To assess thePower Distribution Company’s performance, so as to indicate the 
extent to which the service is reliable and to measure how fast interruptionsare 
resolved quickly. The parameter performance reliability index, plays a central 
role in enabling regulators. In the proposed approach, the metric, System Aver-
age Interruption Duration Index (SAIDI)[79], is used for measuring this perfor-
mance reliability. It shows the sustained interruptions experienced by custom-
ers. The data required for calculating this index includes the average number of 
customers and the number of sustained interruptions[78]. 
 
2. The minimum standard (performance target) defined, should be made possible 
by a well-managed distribution company. In the event that the performance of 
the company is now acceptable, then the performance target could be fixed so 
as to set the standard for work performance , thus ensuringthese targets are 
consistently met. On the off chance that companies need to meet higher stand-
ards of performance, a sensible target can be set, in light of past recorded per-
formance levels. In this proposed model, the minimum standard (performance 
target) level is set by taking into account the changing average of historical per-
formance, which assists in measuring the company’s behavior, whether the 
company is performing well and will receive rewards or under-performing, that 
would lead to penalties. 
3. The Reward-Penalty formula, which portrays the shape and slope of the curves, 
decides how rapidly the curve achieves the maximum reward or penalty, as per-
formance goes off course from the performance target. Here we have presented 
a linear reward penalty formula, simple and easy to understand and administer. 
It increases rewards and penalties in a linear fashion as the performance fluctu-
ates from the normal, on either side of the performance target. 
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4. We have introduced a dead band called the neutral zone around the target 
performance level, where the company does not get a reward or penalty. It rep-
resents vulnerability in regards to the ideal performance level and additionally 
considers certain performance variations, in light of elements outside of the dis-
tribution company’s control.  
5. We have introduced a capping (thresholding) on the maximum reward and 
penalties that allow companies to abstain from paying a critical penalty or get-
ting a huge reward. 
6. During the reward-penalty calculation process, it is valuable to display financial 
rewards or penalties in numerous units. Be that as it may, management of these 
rewards/penalties calculations are, in the most part, simplest when defined in 
dollars rather than as different units, such as pennies per share, basis points of 
return on equity(ROE), percentage of base incomes, percentage of aggregate in-
come and so on. Consequently, here, we have utilized dollars for showing finan-
cial rewards or penalties. 
5.3 THEORETICAL FOUNDATION FOR LRPS 
The theoretical foundation for LRPS is proposed in this section. The proposed scheme 
offers performance-based regulation which is based on reliability. In contrast to the 
scheme proposed in [25], [24], [4], [80], [81], [11],which favours the power distribution 
company, while implementing the reward-penalty scheme, our proposed scheme is de-
scribed after carefully analysing the design decisions and is favourable to both regulator 
and power distribution companies.A novel feature of our scheme is the use of the linear 
reward/penalty formula, which varies in a linear fashion, based on the behaviour of the 
performance-based reliability. 
 
Our LRPS scheme comprises two methods: 
• LRPS with no dead band and no reward/penalty capping(LRPS-NC) 
• LRPS with dead band and reward/penalty capping(LRPS-C) 
 
5.3.1 ALGORITHM FOR LRPS 
In this section, we explain the two algorithms of LRPS.  
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5.3.1.1 ALGORITHM FOR LRPS-NC 
Input: 
• Multiyear historical SAIDI values (4 years) 
• Current actual SAIDI value 
Output: 
• Reward or Penalties in Dollars 
 
Step 1: Evaluate the reliability index, SAIDI 
To calculate SAIDI, each interruption during the period, is multiplied by the duration of 
the interruption, to find the customer minutes of interruption. The customer minutes of 
all interruptions are then calculated to determine the total of customer minutes. To find 
the SAIDI value[79], the customer minutes are divided by the total of customers.                
SAIDI=∑ (𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖×𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖 ÷ 𝑁𝑁)𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖=1 (Eq. 1) 
Where, ri is the duration of each interruption 
Step 2: Establish Performance targets 
In this step, the company’s previous performance reliability index (SAIDI)  calculated 
over a set period (for example, the past five years) is used to establish the target. This 
process presumes that the data has been collected in the past, is readily available and 
indicates that the historical performance was satisfactory.   
Step 3: Designing the Linear RPS curve as shown in figure. 5.3-2, without using dead 
band and capping for each distribution company, is based on the SAIDI. 
Step 4: Evaluate the rewards and penalties for each distribution company based on its 
reliability level as needed. The formula for calculating reward or penalty for the distri-
bution company is based on their performance and assessed using the reliability index 





Figure 5.3-1 LRPS NC structure 
 
𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑟𝑟𝑙𝑙/𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑃𝑃(𝑥𝑥,𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑟𝑟𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑜𝑜) = �
𝑆𝑆𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴 ∗ (𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑟𝑟𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑜𝑜 − 𝑥𝑥), 𝑥𝑥 < 𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑟𝑟𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑜𝑜
0,                                            𝑥𝑥 = 𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑟𝑟𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑜𝑜
𝑆𝑆𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴 ∗ (𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑟𝑟𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑜𝑜 − 𝑥𝑥), 𝑥𝑥 > 𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑟𝑟𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑜𝑜
 
Where x=Reliability Index SAIDI, 𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑟𝑟𝑙𝑙/𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑃𝑃(𝑥𝑥,𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑟𝑟𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑜𝑜) is the reward/penalty 
payment of the distribution company for x. 
When x is smaller than the target, a reward payment is awarded to the distribution 
company. Similarly, when x is larger than the target, a penalty payment is charged to the 
distribution company. The reward payment increases as x decreases. 
5.3.1.2 ALGORITHM FOR LRPS-C 
Secondly, we explain the algorithm of LRPS-C. 
Input: 
• Historical (Multi-year) SAIDI values (e.g.: 4 years) 
• Current actual reliability index, based on SAIDI value 
• Annual Revenue 
Output: 
• Reward or Penalties in Dollars 
•  
Step 1: Assess the current year SAIDI value, i.e., the company’s current, actual perfor-
mance score. 
Step 2: Establish Performance targets 
In this step, the company’s previous performance re liability index (SAIDI) during a set 
period (for example, the past five years) is used to set the target. This process presumes 
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that the data has been collected in the past and is readily available and indicates that the 
historical performance was satisfactory.   
Step 3: Establish the Dead Zone 
Step 4: Establish the Midpoint of the Dead Zone(MDZ) 
MDZ=Historical Average SAIDI Values, for the past four years 
Step 5: Establish the Dead Zone width 
Standard Deviation (SD) of the pastfive years SAIDI values 
Step 6: Establish the Reward Point (RP) and the Penalty Point(PP) 
RP=MDZ-SD/2 
PP=MDZ+SD/2 
Step 7: Establish the Reward Cap point (RCP) and the Penalty Cap point (PCP) 
RCP=MDZ-SD 
PCP=MDZ+SD 
Step 8: Establish the Max. Reward Cap (Max. R) and the Max. Penalty (Max. P) Cap 
Capping is introduced to the proposed scheme, with the assumption that the aggregate 
reward or penalty is based upon the reliability indices being lower than five percent of 
the yearly income of each distribution company. Here we assume that the reward cap 
value and the penalty cap value are the same. Consequently, it is defined as: 
Max.reward=0.05*Rev 
Max.Penalty=0.05*Rev 
WhereRevis the annual revenue of thedistribution company. 
Step 9: Establish Reward Ramp (RR) and Penalty Ramp (PR) 
RR=Max.Reward/ (RP-RCP) 
PR=Max.Penalty/ (PCP-PP) 
Step 10: Design the Linear RPS curve with dead band and capping for each distribution 





Figure 5.3-2 LRPS C Structure 
Step 11: Evaluate rewards and penalties based on the performance of the power dis-
tribution company using the reliability index, SAIDI. 






𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴𝑥𝑥.𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑟𝑟𝑙𝑙                   𝑥𝑥 ≤  𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃 
𝑀𝑀𝑎𝑎𝑀𝑀.𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑅𝑅
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅−𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅
𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑟𝑟𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑜𝑜 − 𝑥𝑥            𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃 <  𝑥𝑥 <  𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃
0                                                   𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃 ≤  𝑥𝑥 ≤   𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃
𝑀𝑀𝑎𝑎𝑀𝑀.𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑛𝑛𝑎𝑎𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑢𝑢
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅−𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅
𝑥𝑥 − 𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑟𝑟𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑜𝑜           𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 <  𝑥𝑥 <  𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃
𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴𝑥𝑥.𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑃𝑃  𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃 ≤ 𝑥𝑥
        Equa-
tion 19 
 
The RPS is explained using a flowchart for easier understanding. This is given in the 
next section. 
 
5.3.2 FLOWCHART FOR LRPS  
In this section, we explain the Linear RPS process, using a flowchart. The flowchart is 















5.4 PROTOTYPE IMPLEMENTATION 
To test the feasibility of the proposed algorithm, we implemented the algorithm in sec-
tion 5.3 using the given pseudo code in Appendix 1.  
 
5.5 EXPERIMENTAL SETTINGS 
In the experiments that we conducted, we used the following parameter specifications. 
We also discussed the obtained results using existing literature. 
5.5.1 PARAMETER SPECIFICATION 
All the parameters used for gathering the results from the algorithm are listed in Table6 
Table 5.5-1 Parameter Specification 
Parameter Description 
x Actual SAIDI value 
SD Standard Deviation of a set of historical (Past 5 years) reliability indices 
(SAIDI values) 
Avg Average of a set of historical (Past 5 years) reliability indices(SAIDI values) 
MDZ Midpoint of Dead Zone 
DZW Dead Zone Width 
PP Penalty Point 
RP Reward Point 
RCP Reward Cap Point 
PCP Penalty Cap Point 
RR Reward Ramp (slope in the reward zone) 
PR Penalty Ramp (slope in the penalty zone) 
Max.Rew Maximum Reward Cap 
Max.Pen Maximum Penalty Cap 




5.6 RESULTS AND OBSERVATIONS 
In this section, we examine the experiments that we carried out and the outcomes that 
we observed, in the wake of running our model. Perceptions are made by examining 
these outcomes which were accumulated from the model. Table 5.6-1 shows the the 
summary statistics of the 42  Iranian distribution companies’ variables which is availa-
ble at : www. tavanir.org. Applying these parameters to LRPS NC algorithm and LRPS C 
algorithm helps to identify the inefficient companies that need to improve their service 
reliability to maintain the target performance reliability level. It also contributes to 
estimate the corresponding reward or penalty payment based on their performance 
based reliability index. 
For example, Consider the application of LRPS-NC model on a power distribution com-
pany D16 which has an average SAIDI of 712 min, which is fixed as the target perfor-
mance reliability level. It can be seen from the table 5.6-2 that current reliability index 
for D16 using SAIDI is found as 820min, which is higher than the target performance 
reliability level, as this company is inefficient. 
Consider the case LRPS-C application on the same inefficient power distribution compa-
ny D16 which has an average SAIDI of 712 min. This value (712 min) is defined as the 
target performance reliability level and sets as MDZ in LRPS C structure. The average SD 
of historical reliability index for D16 are 106 min, and the width of the dead zone is equal 
to this value. The penalty and reward points for D16 are 765 and 606 respectively which 
are defined by ‘mean - SD/2’ and ‘mean + SD/2’, respectively. It can be seen from Table 
5.6.1 that current reliability index using SAIDI is found as 820min which is higher than 
the target performance reliability level, as this company is inefficient. Since it is greater 
than the penalty cap point, it can expect to receive a penalty payment  which is set as the 
maximum penalty cap for D16, from the regulator. 
 









































































































D1 1.37 0.02 208 287 158 366 445 524 0.02 -1.82 410 -1.01 0.00 
D2 2.87 0.04 218 297 158 376 455 534 0.08 -5.93 376 0.00 0.00 
D3 0.14 0.00 46 125 158 204 283 362 0.01 -0.85 224 -0.22 0.00 
D4 1.50 0.02 414 493 158 572 651 730 0.02 -1.50 657 -1.61 -1.50 
D5 2.27 0.03 2457 2536 158 2615 2694 2773 0.03 -2.28 3077 -13.33 -2.28 
D6 1.97 0.02 470 549 158 628 707 786 0.05 -3.88 653 -1.23 0.00 
D7 1.76 0.02 209 288 158 367 446 525 0.03 -2.75 392 -0.87 0.00 
D8 0.27 0.00 285 364 158 443 522 601 0.04 -2.85 460 -0.61 0.00 
D9 3.88 0.05 1571 1650 158 1729 1808 1887 0.05 -3.88 1954 -11.05 -3.88 
D10 2.79 0.04 307 386 158 465 544 623 0.04 -2.79 518 -1.87 0.00 
D11 3.27 0.04 234 313 158 392 471 550 0.06 -4.54 426 -1.95 0.00 
D12 5.35 0.07 697 776 158 855 934 1013 0.10 -7.77 889 -3.35 0.00 
D13 2.61 0.03 960 1039 158 1118 1197 1276 0.03 -2.61 1267 -4.93 -2.61 
D14 2.35 0.04 743 797 108 851 905 959 0.04 -2.35 986 -5.86 -2.35 
D15 0.97 0.02 399 453 108 507 561 615 0.02 -0.97 551 -0.79 0.00 
D16 1.02 0.02 606 659 106 712 765 818 0.02 -1.02 820 -2.08 -1.02 
D17 2.85 0.05 589 643 108 697 751 805 0.06 -2.97 735 -2.09 0.00 
D18 1.02 0.02 409 462 106 515 568 621 0.04 -2.31 527 -0.52 0.00 
D19 1.49 0.03 685 738 106 791 844 897 0.03 -1.49 886 -2.67 -1.49 
D20 0.17 0.00 135 188 106 241 294 347 0.02 -0.91 243 -0.03 0.00 
D21 0.72 0.01 587 641 108 695 749 803 0.01 -0.72 812 -1.56 -0.72 
D22 0.94 0.02 216 270 108 324 378 432 0.03 -1.42 324 0.00 0.00 
D23 1.38 0.03 441 495 108 549 603 657 0.05 -2.52 575 -1.21 0.00 
D24 1.95 0.04 663 716 106 769 822 875 0.04 -1.95 846 -2.83 -1.95 
D25 0.86 0.02 464 517 106 570 623 676 0.02 -1.32 618 -1.19 0.00 
D26 0.68 0.01 527 581 108 635 689 743 0.01 -0.68 742 -1.36 -0.68 
D27 2.93 0.05 896 950 108 1004 1058 1112 0.05 -2.93 1078 -4.01 -2.93 
D28 1.68 0.03 451 504 106 557 610 663 0.06 -3.14 557 0.00 0.00 
D29 1.08 0.02 959 1012 106 1065 1118 1171 0.02 -1.08 1253 -3.83 -1.08 
D30 1.73 0.03 473 527 108 581 635 689 0.03 -1.73 639 -1.86 -1.73 
D31 1.68 0.05 414 446 64 478 510 542 0.08 -2.68 507 -2.43 0.00 
D32 0.72 0.02 349 381 64 413 445 477 0.05 -1.71 438 -1.34 0.00 
D33 0.80 0.02 309 341 64 373 405 437 0.16 -5.17 384 -1.78 0.00 
D34 1.09 0.03 90 122 64 154 186 218 0.11 -3.55 156 -0.22 0.00 
D35 1.72 0.05 101 133 64 165 197 229 0.16 -4.98 165 0.00 0.00 
D36 0.91 0.03 142 174 64 206 238 270 0.11 -3.36 207 -0.11 0.00 
D37 1.38 0.04 95 127 64 159 191 223 0.13 -4.19 159 0.00 0.00 
D38 1.66 0.05 161 193 64 225 257 289 0.14 -4.38 225 0.00 0.00 
D39 3.78 0.12 428 460 64 492 524 556 0.13 -4.28 579 -11.64 -4.28 
D40 0.87 0.03 127 159 64 191 223 255 0.11 -3.53 192 -0.11 0.00 
D41 0.83 0.03 443 475 64 507 539 571 0.17 -5.51 507 0.00 0.00 




Figure 5.6-1 LRPS Structure 
 
Figure 5.6-2 LRPS NC Structure 
 
Figure 5.6-3 LRPS C Structure 
 
 












































































In this Chapter, we proposed a Linear Reward-Penalty Scheme, termed LRPS, in two dif-
ferent ways- without a deadband and capping and with the dead band and capping. 
 
From the experiments that we conducted, we made the following observations: 
• By Using limited variables, we can calculate reward/penalty. 
• Reward/penalty values are significant, if we are not setting the dead band and 
capping(LRPS-NC) 
• Ensured a reasonable magnitude for reward /penalty,by setting the 
capping(LRPS-C) 
• By setting the dead band, the proposed scheme considered the vulnerability of 
the ideal performance level, and additionally took into account, certain perfor-
mance variations occurring in light of elements outside of the distribution com-
pany’s’ control(LRPS-C). 
• When compared to the existing algorithms, this linear algorithm is more 
favourable to regulatory authorities. 
5.8 COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
In this section, the proposed solution is compared with the existing schemes by imple-
menting the same dataset. A comparative study is depicted in the table 5.8-1, which 
shows our algorithm (LRPS) and its comparison with the existing schemes in [25], [24], 
[4], [80], [81], [11]. The parameters for LRPS design implementation largely affect the 
financial risk of electric distribution companies and in this way setting these parameters 
is a basic issue in the reward and penalty payment. It is very reliant on the goal of the 
regulator. There are various elements that ought to be considered which influence the 
reliability and the behavior of individual companies when setting the parameters of 
LRPS. The nature and assortment of customer effects, coming about because of duration 
and recurrence of interruptions, ought to be considered while selecting the distinctive 




The reward–penalty schemes do not have a steady structure in all conditions and change 
as per necessities. Structures of these models rely on upon scope of data, kind of reliabil-
ity index, the objective of system regulators, RPS execution time and so forth. If RPS is 
mainly designed using performance-based reliability, then the type of reliability index 
used in designing RPS has a significant impact on the reward and penalty payment. 
There are distinctive structures of RPS, be that as it may, Dead-Band RPS for reliability is 
the most proficient one since it incorporates the uncertainty about the optimal perfor-
mance level and the performance related components that are outside of the distribution 
company’s control. We implemented two approaches mainly intended for those regula-
tors who concern more to customers that are affected by outage duration factor, the first 
approach is for those regulators who want to apply RPS for the first time, and they can 
apply RPS for money making. In the second method, we designed a dead-band RPS, 
which achieve an effective RPS for enhancing service reliability. The performance of the 
proposed approaches is illustrated by reliability data of various electric distribution 
companies. A comparison between existing algorithms is provided in Table  5.8.1. 
 
Mid-Point of Dead-Zone is the point where we set the performance target on an RPS 
curve which determines whether a company gets reward or penalty, so it has a vital im-
portance in designing RPS curve.  Billinton and Pan[24], [25]  utilized both reliability in-
dices SAIDI and SAIFI, with every index is weighted in light of the customer's concern, 
for determining this point. In [4], they utilized an Equivalent Probability Distribution of 
reliability indices for designing the RPS. A mix of cluster analysis and DEA is utilized by 
[80] for ascertaining MDZ while [81] utilized a mix of Historical normal Reliability Index, 
density area, and improvement target.  In [11], MDZ is computed in light of the estima-
tions of Historical Average Reliability Index, DEA efficiency score and the maximum reli-
ability improvement. Even though the results have shown to be better, [4], [11], [24], 
[25], [80], [81] have used too many parameters and takes longer computation time. 
 
 In the proposed LRPS approach, we set MDZ as the average of the last five years’ relia-
bility indices. Since the characteristic of the customers who are more concern towards 
the outage duration is taken into account in the LRPS design, so we applied SAIDI as the 
reliability index for determining the performance target(MDZ). In our design, only one 
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parameter, SAIDI, is used, the results have proven to be fairly robust and take lesser 
computation time. 
 
The parameter width of the dead zone(DZW) is highly subject to parameters of probabil-
ity distribution measures, for example, mode, mean, range, variance, standard deviation, 
and skewness. Picking a bigger dead zone size estimate makes the LRPS design inade-
quate as many data might be situated in this fair-minded zone. Then again, a smaller 
dead zone size estimate brings about a high hazard for a distribution company as little 
change in the reliability index may shift the incentive payment from the reward zone to 
the penalty one or the other way around. Applying a dead zone with the mean of the his-
torical reliability data as the center of the zone was recommended in [24], [25]. In view 
of this strategy, the dead zone size is two times the standard division with the end goal 
that the 'mean + SD' is the reward point and the 'mean - S.D.' is the penalty point. Apply-
ing this strategy may locate many data in the dead zone. A wide dead zone may lose the 
primary idea behind the RPS execution with the end goal that a large number of the in-
formation is situated in this zone and there is no any inspiration for distribution compa-
ny to enhance the reliability. 
 
This thesis considers the midpoint of the dead zone(MDZ) as the mean of historical data. 
The penalty and reward points are defined by 'mean - SD/2' and 'mean + SD/2', respec-
tively. This model prompts to a narrower dead zone than the one proposed in [24], [25] 
and normally reduced data are situated in this zone. A regulator can utilize this model 
when the performance-based reliability index is near the average of historical reliability 
data. Additionally, we proposed one standard deviation as DZW when contrasted with 
Billinton and Pan [24], [25], who proposed two standard deviations. This delineates that 
the regulator needs distribution companies to keep up their future performance reliabil-
ity in view of the average values. This procedure presumes that the information has been 
gathered in the past and is promptly accessible furthermore that the historical perfor-
mance was satisfactory. Utilizing these methodologies, the regulator can ensure that ser-
vice reliability has not been weakened after privatization.  
 
The regulator does not always have impeccable and correct data about customer inter-
ruption costs.  Thus, a cap value as a rate of the company’s yearly income ought to be 
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considered by the regulator to legitimize the risk of giving high rewards or penalties for 
improperly high-quality or low-quality reliability levels [62]. In UK and Ireland, maxi-
mum reward and maximum penalty are capped and are set at 3 and 4% of price control 
incomes [62]. In Netherlands, the adjustment in revenues is capped at 5% [62]. The re-
ward and penalty payments are also related to interruption cost. In [5], the maximum 
cap values are set in light of rate of average yearly earnings by each distribution compa-
nies. In [11], CCDF and cap value are utilized to decide the maximum reward. In Norway 
and Italy[62], the consequences of customer interruption cost surveys are utilized as a 
part of setting the capping limits. In this paper, a few rates of aggregate revenue of a dis-
tribution company is fixed as the maximum reward and maximum penalty caps. The 
maximum reward cap is same as maximum penalty cap, and it depends on the regulatory 
goal. Maximum reward and maximum penalty are set as a rate of yearly revenue and is 
controlled by the regulator. In our method for RPS design, we set the maximum reward 
and maximum penalty caps for each company as five percentage of their yearly revenue. 
We conducted lots of experiments for comparing the proposed ranking outcomes with 
the existing outcomes. From the results, we made the following observations which 
shows our proposed scheme does outperforms than others. The inclusion of deadband 
and capping in our RPS design shows that our ranking results are more reasonable. 
• Using limited variables, we can calculate reward/penalty efficiently with less 
computation time than the existing schemes.  
• The Linear formula is easy to understand and administer 
• As performance moves, away from the pre-defined performance target, the curve 
quickly achieves the maximum reward and maximum penalty 
• This scheme is more favourable to regulatory authorities than distribution 
companies 
• Ensures a reasonable scale for reward/penalty 
• Considers those performance related components that are outside of the 
distribution company’s control, which causes uncertainty regarding the variations 
from the optimal performance level. 
• By setting the dead band, the proposed scheme considered vulnerability in regards 
to the ideal performance level, and additionally took into account certain perfor-
mance variations in light of elements outside of the distribution company’s control  
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• The simulation results of LRPS model show that those companies with very low re-
liability received the maximum penalty. 
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In the first case (LRPS-NC), from the experiments that we conducted, we created the fol-
lowing advantages and disadvantages: 
Advantages: 
• The Linear formula is easy to understand and administer 
• As performance moves, away from the pre-defined performance target, the curve 
quickly achieves the maximum reward and maximum penalty 
• Limited parameters for defining the reward/penalty 
• This scheme is more favourable to regulatory authorities 
Disadvantages: 
• Does not ensure a reasonable scale for reward/penalty 
• Does not consider thoseperformance related components that are outside of the 
distribution company’s control. 
 
In the second case (LRPS-C), from the experiments that we conducted, we created the 
following advantages and disadvantages: 
Advantages: 
• The Linear formula is easy to understand and administer 
• As performance-based reliability strays away from the target, the curve quickly 
achieves the maximum reward and maximum penalty 
• Limited parameters for finding reward/penalty 
• Ensures a reasonable scale for reward/penalty 
• Considers those performance related components that are outside of the 
distribution company’s control, which causes uncertainty regarding the 
variations from the optimal performance level. 





• The Curve reaches maximum reward/ penalty quickly. For instance, the de-
creasing slope shows that this algorithm provides a significant reward or penal-
ty around the dead band. 
5.9 CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, we introduced and formulated the problem of LRPS. We proposed a 
novel LRPS scheme, for power distribution companies. The fundamental advantage of 
our approach, is that it ensures a reasonable scale for the reward/penalty and has also 
taken out the vulnerability ofthe variations from the optimal performance level,caused 
by thoseperformance related factors, that are outside of the distribution company’s 
control. A comparative study of our technique with previously proposed techniques 













QUADRATIC REWARD PENALTY 
STRUCTURE 
This chapter provides: 
• Requirements and design rationale of the proposed quadratic reward penalty 
structure, 
• The theoretical foundation and the prototype implementation 
• Experimental settings, 
• Results and observations, 
• Validation, 
• Comparative analysis and discussion for quadratic reward penalty structure. 
6.1    INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter, we describe how regulators can guide Power Distribution Company’s 
performance through the use of performance reward penalty mechanisms, by consider-
ing the disadvantages that are mentioned in the previous chapter. Here we also specifi-
cally consider the effect of quality regulation on continuity of supply (reliability). We 
present a novel model that is basedon a cost of service remuneration[10], [11] thus 
moving  towards the competitive approach to quality regulation, that is based on re-
wards and penalties and encourages Power Distribution Companies to maintain the ap-
propriate reliability levels. The novelty of this reward penalty scheme, lies in the use of 
the quadratic reward penalty formula, where rewards and penalties increase in a 
quadratic fashion that defines, by what means,that the curve reaches the maximum 
reward or penalty quickly.  This is because performance-based reliability moves away 
from the benchmark(or the ends of the dead band in the case of Quadratic Reward-
Penalty dead band structure); Hence this scheme is termed the Quadratic Reward-
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Penalty Scheme(QRPS). The proposed QRPS implements rewards and penalties for ex-
ceeding or failing to achieve the targeted performance levels, respectively. The 
quadratic function is designed to provide increasing rewards or penalties as 
performance-based reliability deviates from the target, but the rewards or penalties in-
crease more slowly. The chapter provides a detailed theoretical foundation for the 
QRPS. By considering all the requirements laid out in this part, it also clarifies the algo-
rithm design. A flowchart is given to bolster the clarification. It clarifies how the algo-
rithm is applied for completing the various analyses. It also tests to validate the 
performance-based reliability. Additionally, we contrast the proposed conspire and ex-
isting Reward-Penalty Schemes [4], [5], [10], [11], [28], [66], [76], [77] to show the advantage 
of QRPS, for practical incentive calculations. This chapter formerly concludes with a val-
idation of results. Now we sketch the fundamental prerequisites and the design ra-
tionale for QRPS. 
6.2 PROPOSED QUADRATIC REWARD PENALTY 
STRUCTURE (QRPS) 
This section gives an overall outline of QRPS and after that explains the requirements to 
address the issue of the quadratic reward penalty structure. It is then followed by the 
design rationale, where we examine the vital  design decisions for QRPS.  
 
We now provide a general overview of QRPS. 
 
6.2.1 GENERAL OVERVIEW OF QRPS 
Power System Distribution Company Regulators, have utilized reward penalty methods 
for a long time to address traditional performance areas, for example, reliability, energy 
efficiency, interruption duration, and safety. Lately, these methods have be given great-
er consideration because of regulatory concerns over flexibility and the power distribu-
tion company’s capacity to respond to technological change[78]. Many RPS models pre-
viously proposed, were surveyed in Chapter 2. However, most of the existing RPS mech-




The proposed QRPS scheme addresses all these issues.  
• By using limited variables, we can calculate reward/penalty. 
• Ensuringa reasonable magnitude for reward /penalty  
• Consideringthe uncertainty concerning the best performance, based on the 
reliability level and the performance inconsistency factor ,that are outside of the 
regulator’s control.  
• As compared to the linear algorithm, described in the previous chapter, this 
quadratic algorithm is more favourable to power distribution companies. 
 
The main objective of this research is to: 
1. Introduce a set of well-defined goals for the QRPS scheme 
2. Present two novel quadratic reward penalty schemes, which provide an efficient 
way for improving the quality of performance based on reliability, for Power Dis-
tribution Companies. 
3. Demonstrate a quadratic RPS scheme, without any dead band and capping to 
maximum rewards and maximum penalties. 
4. Demonstrate a quadratic RPS scheme, with a dead band to control the normal 
fluctuations in performance and with a capping of maximum rewards and maxi-
mum penalties. 
5. Provide a comparative study of the strengths and limitations, of both the pro-
posed approach with other existing approaches, proposed in the literature. 
 
6.2.2 REQUIREMENTS 
To address the issues of reward penalty schemes, the followingprerequisites are set 
down for the proposed QRPS algorithm. These requirements are as follows: 
1. Define a specific performance parameter that measures reliability 
2. Set a realistic target, that should be able to support and monitor the company’s 
performance behavior. 
3. The Reward-Penalty formula, which defines the shape and slope of the curve, 
should be simple to understand and administer and as well as consistent with 
the desired outcome. 
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4. The algorithm should be able to control the typical performance fluctuations be-
cause of the external elements, which cannot be managed by the power distribu-
tion company regulator. 
5. The algorithm should ensure a reasonable value for reward/penalty, that is the 
magnitude of the reward/penalty scale should remain within reasonable bounds. 
6. Presentation of financial rewards/penalties- should be administratively simple. 
7. Should consider a little incentive near the central target. 
 
6.2.3 DESIGN RATIONALE 
To fulfill the requirements laid out in 6.2.2, the hypothetical foundation for QRPS is pro-
posed and addresses all of the prerequisites by settling the design decisions. The design 
decisions proposed in this framework are as follows: 
 
1. To assess the Power Distribution Company’s performance, to indicate the ex-
tent to which the service is reliable and to measure how fast interruptionsare 
resolved quickly. The parameter performance of the reliability index plays a 
central role in enabling regulators. In the proposed approach, the metric, Sys-
tem Average Interruption Duration Index (SAIDI)[79], is used for measuring 
this performance reliability. It shows the sustained interruptions, experienced 
by customers. The data required for calculating this metric includes the average 
number of customers and the number of sustained interruptions[78]. 
2. The minimum standard (performance target) defined, should be made possible 
by a well-managed distribution company. In the event that the performance of 
the company is now acceptable, then the performance target could be fixed to 
keep up these performance levels, by defining the expected outcomes. On the 
off chance that they need to provide a higher performance levels, a sensible tar-
get can be set in light of the past recorded performance levels. In this proposed 
model, the minimum standard (performance target) level, is set, taking into ac-
count of the moving average of historical performance, which assists in measur-
ing the company’s behavior and performance. With high performance resulting 
in a reward and low performance leading to apenalty. 
3. The Reward-Penalty formula, which portrays the shape and slope of the curves, 
decides how rapidly the curve achieves the maximum reward or penalty if the 
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performance goes off course from the performance target. Here we have intro-
duced a quadratic reward penalty formula, simple and easy to understand and 
administer, that increase rewards and penalties in a quadratic fashion, as the 
performance fluctuates from the normal, on either side of the target. Without 
applying the dead band, due to the nature of the quadratic curve, it acts as a 
dead band structure, thus considering the uncertainties which are due to the 
external factors and provide alittle amount of reward or penalty, as compared 
to the linear curve, that provides a certain amount of reward or penalty, around 
the central target. 
4. We have introduced a dead band called the neutral zone, around the target 
performance level, where the company does not get a reward or penalty. It rep-
resents vulnerability in regards to the ideal performance level and additionally 
considers certain performance variations, in light of elements outside of the dis-
tribution company’s control. Thus, provides no reward or penalty within the 
dead band. As compared to the linear curve that gives certain re-
wards/penalties around the dead band, this curve provides only small amounts 
of rewards/penalties around the dead band. 
5. We have introduced a capping (thresholding) on the maximum reward and 
penalties that allow companies to abstain from paying a critical penalty or get-
ting a huge reward. 
6. During the reward-penalty calculation process, it is valuable to display financial 
rewards or penalties in numerous units. Be that as it may, management of these 
reward/penalty calculations, are in the most part simplest when defined as dol-
lars than as different units like pennies per share, basis points of return on eq-
uity(ROE), percent of base incomes, percent of aggregate income ,and so on. 
Consequently, here we have utilised dollars for showing financial rewards or 
penalties. 
7. In the case of the linear reward/ penalty, due to the increasing slope, the re-
ward/penalty near to the target (dead band) is significant. So we introduced the 
quadratic reward/penalty formula. Due to the decreasing slope of a quadratic 





The above design decisions should be considered by any RPS scheme, when developing 
a new RPS algorithm. All these design decisions are incorporated in the QRPS approach, 
to improving the accuracy of the proposed scheme, which in turn significantly regulates 
and improves the performance-based reliability of power distribution companies. We 
now discuss the theoretical foundation for QRPS. 
6.3 THEORETICAL FOUNDATION FOR QRPS 
The theoretical foundation for QRPS ,is proposed in this section. The proposed scheme 
offers performance-based regulation, based on reliability. In contrast to the scheme 
proposed in [25], [24], [6], [80], [81], [11], which favors the power distribution compa-
ny while implementing the reward-penalty scheme, our scheme is proposed after care-
fully analyzing the design decisions and is favorable to both the regulator and power 
distribution companies. A novel feature of our scheme is the use of the quadratic re-
ward/penalty formula which varies in a quadratic fashion based on the behavior of the 
performance-based reliability. 
Our QRPS scheme is comprises of two methods: 
QRPS with no dead band and no reward/penalty capping (QRPS-NC) 
QRPS with dead band and reward/penalty capping (QRPS-C) 
In this section, we explain the two algorithms of QRPS.  
 
 
6.3.1 ALGORITHM FOR QRPS NC 
 
Firstly, we explain the algorithm to determine the parameters for QRPS-NC. 
Input: 
Multiyear historical SAIDI values (4 years) 
Current actual SAIDI value 
Output: 
Reward or Penalties in Dollars 
Step 1:  Evaluate the reliability index, SAIDI 
To calculate SAIDI, each interruption during the period is multiplied by the duration of 
the interruption to find the customer minutes of interruption. The customer minutes of 
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all interruptions are then summed, to determine the total customer minutes. To find the 
SAIDI value, the customer minutes are divided by the total customers.                
SAIDI=∑ (𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖×𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖 ÷ 𝑁𝑁)𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖=1                                                                                                                    Equation 
20 
Where, ri is the duration of each interruption 
Step 2:  Establish Performance targets 
In this step, the company’s previous performance reliability index (SAIDI) is recorded 
over a set period (for example, the past five years) is used to set the target. This process 
presumes that the data has been collected in the past and is readily available and also 
that the historical performance was satisfactory.   
Step 3: Designing the Quadratic RPS curve, without dead band and capping for each dis-
tribution company ,based on the SAIDI 
 
Figure 6.3-1 QRPS NC Structure 
 
Step 4: Evaluate the rewards and penalties for each distribution company based on its 
reliability level. Equation 1 is the functional form of the curve in Fig.16. 







� ∗ (Target − SAIDI)2 ,        𝑥𝑥 <  𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑟𝑟𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑜𝑜
0,                                                                           𝑥𝑥 = 𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑟𝑟𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑜𝑜
−�Max.Penalty
𝑇𝑇𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃2
� ∗ (Target − SAIDI)2,    𝑥𝑥 > 𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑟𝑟𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑜𝑜
  Equation 
21 
 
where x=Reliability Index SAIDI, SD=standard deviation of a set of 4 historical SAIDI 
values,𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑟𝑟𝑙𝑙 𝑜𝑜𝑟𝑟 𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑃𝑃 is the reward/penalty payment of the distribution company 
for x. When x is smaller than the target, a reward payment is awarded to the distribu-
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tion company. Similarly, when x is larger than the target, a penalty payment is charged 
to the distribution company. The reward payment increases as x decreases. 
6.3.2 ALGORITHM FOR QRPS C 
 
Secondly, we explain the algorithm of QRPS-C. 
Input: 
Historical (Multi-year) SAIDI values (e.g.: 4 years) 
Current actual reliability index based on SAIDI value 
Annual Revenue 
Output: 
Reward or Penalties in Dollars 
Step 1: Assess the current year SAIDI, i.e., the company’s actual performance score 
Step 2: Establish Performance targets 
In this step, the company’s previous performance reliability index (SAIDI) calculated 
over a set period (for example, the past five years) is used to set the target. This process 
presumes that the data has been collected in the past and is readily available and also 
that the historical performance was satisfactory.   
Step 3: Establish Dead Zone 
Step 4: Establish Midpoint of Dead Zone(MDZ) 
MDZ=Historical Average SAIDI Values for the past five years 
Step 5: Establish Dead Zone width 
Standard Deviation(SD) of the pastfive years SAIDI values 
Step 6: Establish Reward Point (RP) and Penalty Point(PP) 
RP=MDZ-SD/2 
PP=MDZ+SD/2 
Step 7: Establish Reward Cap point (RCP) and Penalty Cap point (PCP) 
RCP=MDZ-SD 
PCP=MDZ+SD 
Step 8: Establish Max. Reward (Max. R) and Max. Penalty (Max. P) 
Capping is introduced in the proposed scheme in a manner that the aggregate reward or 
penalty is based on reliability indices that would be lower than fivepercent of the yearly 
income of each distribution company. Here we consider that both the reward cap value 





where REV is the annual revenue of thedistribution company. 
Step 9: Establish Reward Ramp (RR) and Penalty Ramp (PR) 
RR=Max.Reward/ (RP-RCP) 
PR=Max.Penalty/ (PCP-PP) 
Step 10: Designing the Quadratic RPS curve with dead band and capping for each distri-
bution company based on the SAIDI 
  
Figure 6.3-2 QRPS C Structure 








𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴𝑥𝑥.𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑟𝑟𝑙𝑙                   𝑥𝑥 ≤  𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃 
𝑀𝑀𝑎𝑎𝑀𝑀.𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑅𝑅
𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀2
(𝑥𝑥 − 𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑟𝑟𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑜𝑜)2            𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃 <  𝑥𝑥 <  𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃
0                                                          𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃 ≤  𝑥𝑥 ≤   𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃
𝑀𝑀𝑎𝑎𝑀𝑀.𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑛𝑛𝑎𝑎𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑢𝑢
𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀2
(𝑥𝑥 − 𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑟𝑟𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑜𝑜)2           𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 <  𝑥𝑥 <  𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃
𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴𝑥𝑥.𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑃𝑃  𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃 ≤ 𝑥𝑥
      Equa-
tion 22 
 The RPS is explained using a flowchart for easier understanding. This is given in the 
next section. 
6.3.3 FLOWCHART FOR QRPS  
In this section, we explain the RPS process using a flowchart. The flowchart is shown in 














6.4 PROTOTYPE IMPLEMENTATION 
To test the feasibility of the proposed algorithm, we implemented the algorithm in sec-
tion 6.3 using the given pseudo code in Appendix 1.  
6.5 EXPERIMENTAL SETTINGS 
In the experiments that we conducted, we used the following parameter specification. 
The description of all parameters with values and their results and observations are 
discussed in this sections. 
6.5.1 PARAMETER SPECIFICATION 
All the parameters and their associated values, used for gathering the results from the 
algorithm, are listed in Table 6.5-1. 




X Actual SAIDI value 
SD Standard Deviation of a set of Historical (Past 6 years) Relia-
bility Indices (SAIDI values) 
Mean, A Average of a set of Historical (Past 6 years) Reliability Indices 
(SAIDI values) 
MDZ Middle point of Dead Zone 
DZW Width of Dead Zone 
PP Penalty Point 
RP Reward Point 
RCP Reward Cap Point 
PCP Penalty Cap Point 
RR Reward Ramp 
PR Penalty Ramp 
Max.R Maximum Reward Cap 
Max.P Maximum Penalty Cap 
Rev Annual Revenue of Distribution Companies 
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6.6 RESULTS AND OBSERVATIONS 
In this section, we examine the experiments that we carried out and the outcomes that 
we observed, in the wake of running our model. Perceptions are made by examining 
these outcomes which were accumulated from the model. Table 6.6-1 shows the the 
summary statistics of the 42  Iranian distribution companies’ variables which is availa-
ble at : www. tavanir.org. Applying these parameters to QRPS NC algorithm and QRPS C 
algorithm helps to identify the inefficient companies that need to improve their service 
reliability to maintain the target performance reliability level. It also contributes to 
estimate the corresponding reward or penalty payment based on their performance 
based reliability index. 
For example, Consider the application of QRPS-NC model on a power distribution com-
pany D16 which has an average SAIDI of 712 min, which is fixed as the target perfor-
mance reliability level. It can be seen from the table 6.6-2 that current reliability index 
for D16 using SAIDI is found as 820min, which is higher than the target performance 
reliability level, as this company is inefficient. Since there is no dead-zone or capping in 
QRPS NC, it can expect to receive a penalty payment of 0.02M$ from the regulator. 







































































































D1 1.37 0.02 208 287 158 366 445 524 0.02 -1.82 410 -0.03 0 
D2 2.87 0.04 218 297 158 376 455 534 0.08 -5.93 376 0 0 
D3 0.14 0 46 125 158 204 283 362 0.01 -0.85 224 -0.01 0 
D4 1.5 0.02 414 493 158 572 651 730 0.02 -1.5 657 -0.03 -0.03 
D5 2.27 0.03 2457 2536 158 2615 2694 2773 0.03 -2.28 3077 -0.07 -2.28 
D6 1.97 0.02 470 549 158 628 707 786 0.05 -3.88 653 -0.01 0 
D7 1.76 0.02 209 288 158 367 446 525 0.03 -2.75 392 -0.01 0 
D8 0.27 0 285 364 158 443 522 601 0.04 -2.85 460 0 0 
D9 3.88 0.05 1571 1650 158 1729 1808 1887 0.05 -3.88 1954 -0.07 -3.88 
D10 2.79 0.04 307 386 158 465 544 623 0.04 -2.79 518 -0.04 0 
D11 3.27 0.04 234 313 158 392 471 550 0.06 -4.54 426 -0.03 0 
D12 5.35 0.07 697 776 158 855 934 1013 0.1 -7.77 889 -0.01 0 
D13 2.61 0.03 960 1039 158 1118 1197 1276 0.03 -2.61 1267 -0.05 -0.05 
D14 2.35 0.04 743 797 108 851 905 959 0.04 -2.35 986 -0.06 -2.35 
D15 0.97 0.02 399 453 108 507 561 615 0.02 -0.97 551 -0.01 0 
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D16 1.02 0.02 606 659 106 712 765 818 0.02 -1.02 820 -0.02 -1.02 
D17 2.85 0.05 589 643 108 697 751 805 0.06 -2.97 735 -0.01 0 
D18 1.02 0.02 409 462 106 515 568 621 0.04 -2.31 527 0 0 
D19 1.49 0.03 685 738 106 791 844 897 0.03 -1.49 886 -0.02 -0.02 
D20 0.17 0 135 188 106 241 294 347 0.02 -0.91 243 0 0 
D21 0.72 0.01 587 641 108 695 749 803 0.01 -0.72 812 -0.02 -0.72 
D22 0.94 0.02 216 270 108 324 378 432 0.03 -1.42 324 0 0 
D23 1.38 0.03 441 495 108 549 603 657 0.05 -2.52 575 -0.01 0 
D24 1.95 0.04 663 716 106 769 822 875 0.04 -1.95 846 -0.02 -0.02 
D25 0.86 0.02 464 517 106 570 623 676 0.02 -1.32 618 -0.01 0 
D26 0.68 0.01 527 581 108 635 689 743 0.01 -0.68 742 -0.02 -0.02 
D27 2.93 0.05 896 950 108 1004 1058 1112 0.05 -2.93 1078 -0.02 -0.02 
D28 1.68 0.03 451 504 106 557 610 663 0.06 -3.14 557 0 0 
D29 1.08 0.02 959 1012 106 1065 1118 1171 0.02 -1.08 1253 -0.03 -1.08 
D30 1.73 0.03 473 527 108 581 635 689 0.03 -1.73 639 -0.02 -0.02 
D31 1.68 0.05 414 446 64 478 510 542 0.08 -2.68 507 -0.01 0 
D32 0.72 0.02 349 381 64 413 445 477 0.05 -1.71 438 -0.01 0 
D33 0.8 0.02 309 341 64 373 405 437 0.16 -5.17 384 0 0 
D34 1.09 0.03 90 122 64 154 186 218 0.11 -3.55 156 0 0 
D35 1.72 0.05 101 133 64 165 197 229 0.16 -4.98 165 0 0 
D36 0.91 0.03 142 174 64 206 238 270 0.11 -3.36 207 0 0 
D37 1.38 0.04 95 127 64 159 191 223 0.13 -4.19 159 0 0 
D38 1.66 0.05 161 193 64 225 257 289 0.14 -4.38 225 0 0 
D39 3.78 0.12 428 460 64 492 524 556 0.13 -4.28 579 -0.13 -4.28 
D40 0.87 0.03 127 159 64 191 223 255 0.11 -3.53 192 0 0 
D41 0.83 0.03 443 475 64 507 539 571 0.17 -5.51 507 0 0 
D42 1.04 0.03 314 346 64 378 410 442 0.1 -3.29 378 0 0 
 
Consider the case QRPS-C application on the same inefficient power distribution compa-
ny D16 which has an average SAIDI of 712 min. This value (712 min) is defined as the 
target performance reliability level and sets as MDZ in QRPS C structure. The average SD 
of historical reliability index for D16 are 106 min, and the width of the dead zone is equal 
to this value. The penalty and reward points for D16 are 765 and 606 respectively which 
are defined by ‘mean - SD/2’ and ‘mean + SD/2’, respectively. It can  
be seen from Table 3 that current reliability index using SAIDI is found as 820min which 
is higher than the target performance reliability level, as this company is inefficient. 
Since it is greater than the penalty cap point, it can expect to receive a penalty payment 
of 1.02M$, which is set as the maximum penalty cap for D16, from the regulator. 
The simulation results of the QRPS-NC in Table 3 shows that 35.7% of 42 power distri-
bution companies has no penalty, 64.3% has a penalty, the maximum penalty was 0.13 
million dollars, and the minimum penalty was 0.01 million dollars. The simulation of the 
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QRPS-C in Table 3 shows that 66.7% of 42 power distribution companies has no penalty, 
33.3% has a penalty, the maximum penalty was 4.28 million dollars, and the minimum 
penalty was 0.02 million dollars. Generally, when observed, we found that those compa-




Figure 6.6-1 QRPS Structure 
QRPS C 820 -

























Figure 6.6-2 QRPS-NC Structure 
 
 














































In this Chapter, we proposed a Quadratic Reward-Penalty Scheme (termed QRPS) in 
two different ways- without a dead band and cappingand with the dead band and 
capping.  
From the experiments that we conducted, we made the following observations 
• By Using limited variables, we can calculate reward/penalty. 
• Without setting the dead band, the quadratic curve acts similalyr to a dead band 
by providing little incentive near the central target (QRPS-NC) 
• Ensured a reasonable value for reward /penalty by setting the capping(QRPS-C) 
• By setting the dead band, the proposed scheme considered vulnerability in re-
gards to the ideal performance level, and additionally tookinto account certain 
performance variations in light of elements outside of the distribution company’s 
control (QRPS-C) 
• When compared to the existing algorithms, this quadratic algorithm is more 
favourable to power distribution companies. 
6.8 COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS AND DISCUS-
SION 
In this section, the proposed solution is compared with the existing schemes by imple-
menting the same dataset. A comparative study is depicted in the table 6.8-1, which 
shows our algorithm (QRPS) and its comparison with the existing schemes in [25], [24], 
[4], [80], [81], [11]. The parameters for QRPS design implementation largely affect the 
financial risk of electric distribution companies and in this way setting these parameters 
is a basic issue in the reward and penalty payment. It is very reliant on the goal of the 
regulator. There are various elements that ought to be considered which influence the 
reliability and the behavior of individual companies when setting the parameters of 
QRPS. The nature and assortment of customer effects, coming about because of duration 
and recurrence of interruptions, ought to be considered while selecting the distinctive 




The reward–penalty schemes do not have a steady structure in all conditions and change 
as per necessities. Structures of these models rely on upon scope of data, kind of reliabil-
ity index, the objective of system regulators, RPS execution time and so forth. If RPS is 
mainly designed using performance-based reliability, then the type of reliability index 
used in designing RPS has a significant impact on the reward and penalty payment. 
There are distinctive structures of RPS, be that as it may, Dead-Band RPS for reliability is 
the most proficient one since it incorporates the uncertainty about the optimal perfor-
mance level and the performance related components that are outside of the distribution 
company’s control. We implemented two approaches mainly intended for those regula-
tors who concern more to customers that are affected by outage duration factor, the first 
approach is for those regulators who want to apply RPS for the first time, and they can 
apply RPS for money making. In the second method, we designed a dead-band RPS, 
which achieve an effective RPS for enhancing service reliability. The performance of the 
proposed approaches is illustrated by reliability data of various electric distribution 
companies. A comparison between existing algorithms is provided in Table 4. 
 
Mid-Point of Dead-Zone is the point where we set the performance target on an RPS 
curve which determines whether a company gets reward or penalty, so it has a vital im-
portance in designing RPS curve.  Billinton and Pan[24], [25]  utilized both reliability in-
dices SAIDI and SAIFI, with every index is weighted in light of the customer's concern, 
for determining this point. In [4], they utilized an Equivalent Probability Distribution of 
reliability indices for designing the RPS. A mix of cluster analysis and DEA is utilized by 
[80] for ascertaining MDZ while [81] utilized a mix of Historical normal Reliability Index, 
density area, and improvement target.  In [11], MDZ is computed in light of the estima-
tions of Historical Average Reliability Index, DEA efficiency score and the maximum reli-
ability improvement. Even though the results have shown to be better, [4], [11], [24], 
[25], [80], [81] have used too many parameters and takes longer computation time. 
 
 In the proposed QRPS approach, we set MDZ as the average of the last five years’ relia-
bility indices. Since the characteristic of the customers who are more concern towards 
the outage duration is taken into account in the QRPS design, so we applied SAIDI as the 
reliability index for determining the performance target(MDZ). In our design, only one 
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parameter, SAIDI, is used, the results have proven to be fairly robust and take lesser 
computation time. 
 
The parameter width of the dead zone(DZW) is highly subject to parameters of probabil-
ity distribution measures, for example, mode, mean, range, variance, standard deviation, 
and skewness. Picking a bigger dead zone size estimate makes the QRPS design inade-
quate as many data might be situated in this fair-minded zone. Then again, a smaller 
dead zone size estimate brings about a high hazard for a distribution company as little 
change in the reliability index may shift the incentive payment from the reward zone to 
the penalty one or the other way around. Applying a dead zone with the mean of the his-
torical reliability data as the center of the zone was recommended in [24], [25]. In view 
of this strategy, the dead zone size is two times the standard division with the end goal 
that the 'mean + SD' is the reward point and the 'mean - S.D.' is the penalty point. Apply-
ing this strategy may locate many data in the dead zone. A wide dead zone may lose the 
primary idea behind the RPS execution with the end goal that a large number of the in-
formation is situated in this zone and there is no any inspiration for distribution compa-
ny to enhance the reliability. 
 
This paper considers the midpoint of the dead zone(MDZ) as the mean of historical data. 
The penalty and reward points are defined by 'mean - SD/2' and 'mean + SD/2', respec-
tively. This model prompts to a narrower dead zone than the one proposed in [24], [25] 
and normally reduced data are situated in this zone. A regulator can utilize this model 
when the performance-based reliability index is near the average of historical reliability 
data. Additionally, we proposed one standard deviation as DZW when contrasted with 
Billinton and Pan [24], [25], who proposed two standard deviations. This delineates that 
the regulator needs distribution companies to keep up their future performance reliabil-
ity in view of the average values. This procedure presumes that the information has been 
gathered in the past and is promptly accessible furthermore that the historical perfor-
mance was satisfactory. Utilizing these methodologies, the regulator can ensure that ser-
vice reliability has not been weakened after privatization.  
 
The regulator does not always have impeccable and correct data about customer inter-
ruption costs.  Thus, a cap value as a rate of the company’s yearly income ought to be 
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considered by the regulator to legitimize the risk of giving high rewards or penalties for 
improperly high-quality or low-quality reliability levels [62]. In UK and Ireland, maxi-
mum reward and maximum penalty are capped and are set at 3 and 4% of price control 
incomes [62]. In Netherlands, the adjustment in revenues is capped at 5% [62]. The re-
ward and penalty payments are also related to interruption cost. In [5], the maximum 
cap values are set in light of rate of average yearly earnings by each distribution compa-
nies. In [11], CCDF and cap value are utilized to decide the maximum reward. In Norway 
and Italy[62], the consequences of customer interruption cost surveys are utilized as a 
part of setting the capping limits. In this paper, a few rates of aggregate revenue of a dis-
tribution company is fixed as the maximum reward and maximum penalty caps. The 
maximum reward cap is same as maximum penalty cap, and it depends on the regulatory 
goal. Maximum reward and maximum penalty are set as a rate of yearly revenue and is 
controlled by the regulator. In our method for RPS design, we set the maximum reward 
and maximum penalty caps for each company as five percentage of their yearly revenue. 
We conducted lots of experiments for comparing the proposed ranking outcomes with 
the existing outcomes. From the results, we made the following observations which 
shows our proposed scheme does outperforms than others. The inclusion of deadband 
and capping in our RPS design shows that our ranking results are more reasonable. 
• Using limited variables, we can calculate reward/penalty efficiently with less 
computation time than the existing schemes.  
• Without setting the dead band, the quadratic curve acts similarly to a dead band by 
providing little incentive near the central target (QRPS-NC), thus lessen the com-
plexity happened in existing schemes in designing deadband.  
• Ensured a reasonable value for reward-penalty by setting the capping(QRPS-C) 
than other RPS’s. 
• By setting the dead band, the proposed scheme considered vulnerability in regards 
to the ideal performance level, and additionally took into account certain perfor-
mance variations in light of elements outside of the distribution company’s control 
(QRPS-C)  
• The simulation results of QRPS model show that those companies with very low re-
liability received the maximum penalty. 
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• When compared to the existing algorithms, this quadratic algorithm is more 
favorable to power distribution companies.  
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In the first scenario (QRPS-NC) presented from the experiments conducted, we created 
the following advantages and disadvantages: 
Advantages: 
• The quadratic function is designed to provide increasing rewards or penalties as 
performance-based reliability deviates from the target, but the rewards or penal-
ties increase more slowly. 
• While the  linear formula has the advantage of simplicity, this non-linear 
formula(Quadratic formula), provides a strong link between performance and 
reliability.  
• Without providing the dead band, the quadratic curve acts similarly to a dead 
band by providing a littleincentive near the central target. 
• Limited parameters for finding reward/penalty 
• It is more favourable to distribution companies. 
Disadvantages: 
• Does not ensure a reasonable value for reward/penalty 
• Does not take into accountthe uncertainty about the optimal performance level 
and those performance related components that are outside of the distribution 
company’s control. 
In the second case (QRPS-C), from the experiments that we conducted, we observed the 
following advantages and disadvantages: 
 
Advantages: 
• The quadratic function also designed to provide increasing rewards or penalties, 
as performance-based reliability deviates from the target, but the rewards or 
penalties increase more slowly. 
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• While linear formula has the advantage of simplicity, this non-linear 
formula(Quadratic Formula), provides a strong link between performance and 
reliability.  
• In addition to the dead band provided, the quadratic curve acts similarly to a 
dead band by providing no incentive ,near the central target. 
• Limited parameters for finding reward/penalty. 
• Ensures a reasonable magnitude for reward/penalty, by applying maximum re-
ward/penalty capping. 
• By providing dead band, it considered the uncertainty related to those 
performance related component,s that are outside of the distribution company’s 
control  and the optimal performance level. When compared to the existing 
algorithms, it is more favourable to distribution companies. 
• Curve reaches maximum reward/ penalty slowly. I.e., increasing slope demon-
strates that this algorithm provides little reward or penalty around the dead 
band. 
Disadvantages: 
• It is not favorable to regulatory authorities. 
6.9 CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, we introduced and formulated the problem of QRPS. We proposed a 
novel QRPS scheme for power distribution companies. The fundamental advantage of 
our approach, is that it provides little reward or penalty around the dead band, thus en-
sures a reasonable value for reward/penalty and has also removed the vulnerability 
ofthe variations from optimal performance level, caused by those performance related 
factors that are outside of the distribution company’s control. A comparative study of 
our technique, with previously proposed techniques, demonstrates that our technique is 






CUBIC REWARD PENALTY STRUC-
TURE 
This chapter provides: 
 Requirements and the design rationale of the proposed cubic reward penalty 
structure, 
 The theoretical foundation and the prototype implementation 
 Experimental settings 
 Results and observations 
 Validation 
 Comparative analysis and discussion for cubic reward penalty structure 
 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter, we describe how regulators can guide the Power Distribution Compa-
ny’s performance through the use of performance reward penalty mechanisms using 
the cubic function by considering the disadvantages that have been mentioned in the 
previous chapter. We specifically consider the effect of quality regulation on continuity 
of supply (reliability). We present a novel cubic model that is based on a cost of service 
remuneration[11] towards creating an economical way of regulating quality [10]that is 
based on rewards and penalties. It encourages Power Distribution Companies to main-
tain the appropriate reliability levels. The novelty of this reward penalty scheme, lies in 
the use of cubic reward penalty formula where rewards and penalties increase in a 
cubic fashion,that defines by what means the curve reaches the maximum reward or 
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penalty as quickly as the performance-based reliability moves away from the 
benchmark(or the ends of the dead band, in the case of the cubic dead band structure); 
hence this scheme is termed the Cubic Reward-Penalty Scheme (CRPS). The proposed 
CRPS implements rewards and penalties for exceeding or failing to achieve the targeted 
performance levels, respectively. The chapter provides a detailed theoretical foundation 
for the CRPS. By considering all of the requirements laid out in this section, it also clari-
fies the algorithm design. A flowchart is given to bolster the clarification. It clarifies how 
the algorithm is applied for completing the various analyses. It also tests to validate the 
performance-based reliability and contrast the proposal and existing Reward-Penalty 
Schemes [4], [5], [10], [11], [28], [66], [76], [77].We also compare the proposed scheme with 
the other two Reward-Penalty Schemes that have been described in the last two chap-
ters ,in order to demonstrate the power of CRPS, for practical incentive calculations. 
This chapter formerly concludes with a validation of results. Now we sketch the 
fundamental prerequisites and the design rationale for CRPS. 
7.2 PROPOSED CUBIC REWARD PENALTY 
STRUCTURE (CRPS) 
This section gives an overall outline of CRPS and then explains the requirements to ad-
dress the issue of cubic reward penalty structure. It is then followed by the design ra-
tionale, where we examine the vital design decisions for CRPS.  
 
We now provide a general overview of CRPS. 
 
7.2.1 GENERAL OVERVIEW OF CRPS 
Power System Distribution Company Regulators, have utilized reward penalty methods 
for a long time to address traditional performance areas, for example, reliability, energy 
efficiency, interruption duration, and safety. Lately, these methods have gotten greater 
consideration because of regulatory concerns over flexibility and the power distribution 
company’s capability to respond to technological change[78]. Many RPS models previ-
ously proposed, were surveyed in Chapter 2. However, most of the existing RPS mecha-
nisms, cannot simultaneously address the following issues: 
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The proposed CRPS scheme addresses all of these issues 
• By using limited variables, we can calculate reward/penalty. 
• Ensured a reasonable value for reward /penalty  
• Considered the uncertainty concerning the best performance based reliability 
level and the performance inconsistency factors, that are out of the regulator’s 
control.  
• As compared to the linear and quadratic algorithm, described in the previous 
chapters, this cubic algorithm is more favourable to the power distribution 
companies. 
 
The main objective of this proposed scheme is to: 
1. Introduce a set of well-defined goals for the CRPS scheme 
2. Present two novel cubic reward penalty schemes which provide an efficient way 
for improving the performance, based on reliability for Power Distribution Com-
panies. 
3. Demonstrate a cubic RPS scheme, without applying any dead band and without 
capping the maximum reward and the maximum penalty. Demonstrate a cubic 
RPS scheme, with a dead band, to control the normal fluctuations in performance 
and with a capping of maximum reward and maximum penalty. 
4. Provide a comparative study of the strengths and limitations of both the pro-
posed approach, with other existing approaches proposed in the literature. 
 
7.2.2 REQUIREMENTS 
In order to address the issues of reward penalty schemes, the following prerequisites 
are set down for the proposed CRPS algorithm. These requirements are follows: 
1. Define a specific performance metric that measures reliability 
2. Set a realistic target that should be able to support and monitor company’s per-
formance behavior. 
3. The Reward-Penalty formula, which defines the shape and slope of the curve, 
should be simple to understand and administer and as well as consistent with 
the desired outcome. 
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4. The algorithm should be able to control typical performance fluctuations because 
of the external elements which cannot be managed by the power distribution 
company regulator. 
5. The algorithm should ensure a reasonable magnitude for reward/penalty that is 
the magnitude of the reward/penalty should remain in the reasonable bound. 
6. Presentation of financial rewards/penalties- should be administratively simple 
 
7.2.3 DESIGN RATIONALE 
To fulfill the requirements laid out in 7.2.2, the hypothetical foundation for CRPS is pro-
posed and has addressed all of the prerequisites by settling the design decisions. The 
design decisions proposed in this framework, are as follows: 
 
1. To assess the Power Distribution Company’s performance, to indicate the extent 
to which the service is reliable and to measure how fast interruptionsare 
resolved quickly. The parameter performance reliability index, plays a central 
role in enabling regulators. In the proposed approach, the calculated, System Av-
erage Interruption Duration Index (SAIDI)[79], is used for measuring this per-
formance reliability. It indicates the sustained interruptions, experienced by cus-
tomers. The data required for calculating this sum includes the average number 
of customers and the number of sustained interruptions[78]. 
2. The minimum standard (performance target), defined should be made possible 
by a well-managed distribution company. If the performance of the company is 
now acceptable, then the performance target could be fixed to maintain with the 
best performance in the future. On the off chance that they need a higher stand-
ard of performance, a sensible target can be set, in consideration of past record-
ed performance levels. In this proposed model, the minimum standard (perfor-
mance target) , is fixed, taking into account the shifting average of historical per-
formance. Doing so assists in the measurement of the company’s’ performance 
and decides whether the company will be potentially rewarded or receive a 
penalty. 
3. The Reward-Penalty formula which portrays the shape and slope of the curves, 
decides how rapidly the curve achieves the maximum reward or penalty as per-
formance goes off course from the performance target. Here we have introduced 
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a cubic reward penalty formula, that increases rewards and penalties, in a cubic 
fashion as the performance moves away from the normal, on either side of the 
target. Without applying the dead band, due to the nature of the cubic curve, it 
acts as a dead band structure, thus considering the uncertainties that are due to 
external factors and provide very limited amounts of rewards or penalties as 
compared to the quadratic curve, around the central target. 
4. We have introduced a dead band called the neutral zone around the target 
performance level, where the company does not get a reward or penalty. It pre-
sents a vulnerability in regards to the ideal performance level and additionally 
considers certain performance variations, in light of elements outside of the dis-
tribution company’s control. Thus, ensures no reward or penalty within the dead 
band. Also, due to nature of cubic curve, it ensures a little gap around the dead 
band. 
5. We have introduced a capping (thresholding) on the maximum reward and pen-
alties, that allow companies to abstain from paying a critical penalty or getting a 
huge reward. 
6. During the reward-penalty calculation process, it is valuable to display financial 
rewards or penalties in numerous units. Be that as it may, management of these 
rewards/penalties calculations, are in the most part simplest when done as dol-
lars than as different units like pennies per share, basis points of return on equi-
ty(ROE), percent of base incomes, percent of aggregate income, and so on. 
Consequently, here we utilized dollars for demonstrating financial rewards or 
penalties. 
 
The above design decisions should be considered by any RPS scheme, when developing 
a new RPS algorithm. All these design decisions are incorporated in the CRPS approach, 
to improvethe accuracy of the proposed scheme, which in turn significantly regulates 
and improves the performance-based reliability, of power distribution companies. We 






7.3 THEORETICAL FOUNDATION FOR CRPS 
The theoretical foundation for CRPS is proposed in this section. The proposed scheme 
offers performance-based regulation based on reliability. In contrast to the scheme pro-
posed in [25], [24], [4 ], [80], [81], [11]., which favors the power distribution company 
whilst implementing the reward-penalty scheme, our proposed scheme is described af-
ter carefully analyzing the design decisions and is most favorable to power distribution 
companies. A novel feature of our scheme, is the use of the cubic reward/penalty formu-
la, which varies in a cubic fashion based on the behavior of the performance-based reli-
ability. 
Our CRPS scheme comprises two methods: 
• CRPS with no dead band and no reward/penalty capping(CRPS-NC) 
• CRPS with dead band and reward/penalty capping(CRPS-C) 
In this section, we explain the two algorithms of CRPS. 
 
7.3.1 ALGORITHM FOR CRPS NC 
 
Firstly, we explain the algorithm to determine the parameters for CRPS-NC. 
Input: 
Multiyear historical SAIDI values (4 years) 
Current actual SAIDI value 
Output: 
Reward or Penalties in Dollars 
Step 5: Evaluate the reliability index, SAIDI 
To calculate SAIDI, each interruption during the period is multiplied by the duration of 
the interruption, to find the customer minutes of interruption. The customer minutes of 
all interruptions are calculated to determine the total customer minutes. To find the 
SAIDI value, the customer minutes are divided by the total customers.                
SAIDI=∑ (𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖×𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖 ÷ 𝑁𝑁)𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖=1  
Where, ri is the duration of each interruption 
Step 6:   Establish Performance targets 
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In this step, the company’s previous performance reliability index (SAIDI) over a set 
period of time (for example, the past five years) is used to set the target. This process 
presumes that the data has been collected in the past and is readily available and that 
the historical performance was satisfactory.   
Step 7:  Designing the Cubic RPS curve, without dead band and capping for each dis-
tribution companies is based on the SAIDI value 
 
Figure 7.3-1 CRPS C Structure 
Step 4: Evaluate the rewards and penalties for each distribution company based on its 
reliability level as needed. Equation 1 is the functional form of the curve in 
Fig.23. 
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Where x=Reliability Index SAIDI, SD=standard deviation of a set of 4 historical SAIDI 
values, 𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑟𝑟𝑙𝑙/𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑃𝑃(𝑥𝑥,𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑟𝑟𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑜𝑜) is the reward/penalty payment of the distribution 
company for x.  
When x is smaller than the target, a reward payment is awarded to the distribution 
company. Similarly, when x is larger than the target, a penalty payment is charged to the 






7.3.2 ALGORITHM FOR CRPS C 
 
Secondly, we explain the algorithm of CRPS-C. 
Input: 
• Historical (Multi-year) SAIDI values (eg: 4 years) 
• Current actual reliability index based on SAIDI value 
• Annual Revenue 
Output: 
• Reward or Penalties in Dollars 
 
Step 11: Assess the current year SAIDI, i.e., the company’s actual performance score 
Step 12: Establish Performance targets 
In this step, the company’s previous performance reliability index (SAIDI), over a set 
period (for example, the past five years) is used to set the target. This process presumes 
that the data has been collected in the past and is readily available and that the histori-
cal performance was satisfactory.   
Step 13: Establish the Dead Zone 
Step 14: Establish Midpoint of the Dead Zone(MDZ) 
MDZ=Historical Average SAIDI Values for the past seven years 
Step 15: Establish the Dead Zone width 
Standard Deviation(SD) of the past seven years SAIDI values 
Step 16: Establish the Reward Point (RP) and Penalty Point(PP) 
RP=MDZ-SD/2 
PP=MDZ+SD/2 
Step 17: Establish the Reward Cap point (RCP) and the Penalty Cap point (PCP) 
RCP=MDZ-SD 
PCP=MDZ+SD 
Step 18: Establish the Max. Reward (Max. R) cap and the Max. Penalty (Max. P) cap 
Capping is introduced in the proposed scheme, in a manner that the aggregate reward 
or penalty, based on reliability indices, would be lower than fivepercent of the yearly 
income of each distribution company. Here we consider that both the reward cap value 





where Revis the annual revenue of thedistribution company. 
Step 19: Establish Reward Ramp (RR) and Penalty Ramp (PR) 
RR=Max.Reward/ (RP-RCP) 
PR=Max.Penalty/ (PCP-PP) 
Step 10: Designing the Cubic RPS curve with dead band and capping for each distribu-





Figure 7.3-2 C RPS C Structure 
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Equation 24 
The RPS is explained using a flowchart for easier understanding. This is given in the 
next section. 
7.3.3 FLOWCHART FOR CRPS  
In this section, we explain the RPS process using a flowchart. The flowchart is shown in 








Figure 7.3-4 Flow Chart for CRPS C 
7.4 PROTOTYPE IMPLEMENTATION 
To test the feasibility of the proposed algorithm, we implemented the algorithm in sec-







7.5 EXPERIMENTAL SETTINGS 
In the experiments that we conducted, we used the following parameter specification. 
The description of all parameters with values and their results and observations are 
discussed in this sections. 
7.5.1 PARAMETER SPECIFICATION 
All the parameters and their associated specification used for gathering the results from 
the algorithm are listed in Table 7.5-1. 
Table 7.5-1 Parameter Specification 
Parameter Description 
X Actual SAIDI value 
SD Standard Deviation of a set of Historical (Past 5 years) Reliability Indices (SAIDI values) 
Mean, A Average of a set of Historical (Past 5 years) Reliability Indices (SAIDI values) 
MDZ Middle point of Dead Zone 
DZW Width of Dead Zone  
PP Penalty Point 
RP Reward Point 
RCP Reward Cap Point 
PCP Penalty Cap Point 
RR Reward Ramp 
PR Penalty Ramp 
Max.R Maximum Reward Cap 
Max.P Maximum Penalty Cap 
Rev Annual Revenue of Distribution Companies 
 
7.6 RESULTS AND OBSERVATIONS 
In this section, we examine the experiments that we conducted and the outcomes that 
we observed, in the wake of operating our model. Perceptions are made by examining 
the outcomes accumulated from the model. Table 7.6-1 shows the the summary statis-
tics of the 42  Iranian distribution companies’ variables which is available at : www. ta-
vanir.org. Applying these parameters to CRPS NC algorithm and CRPS C algorithm helps 
to identify the inefficient companies that need to improve their service reliability to 
maintain the target performance reliability level. It also contributes to estimate the cor-




For example, consider the case of applying CRPS-NC algorithm on a power distribution 
company D16 which has an average SAIDI of 712 min, which is set as the minimum tar-
get performance reliability level. It can be seen from the Table 7.6.1 that current reliabil-
ity index for D16 using SAIDI is found as 820min, which is higher than the target perfor-
mance reliability level, as this company is inefficient. Since there is no dead-zone or cap-
ping in CRPS NC, it can expect to receive a penalty payment of 0.004M$ from the regula-
tor. Consider the case of applying CRPS-C on the same company D16 which has an aver-
age SAIDI of 712 min. In CRPS C structure, target performance reliability level(712 min)  
is set as MDZ. The average SD of historical reliability index for D16 is 106 min, and so it 
shall be fixed as the width of the dead zone(DZW). The penalty and reward points for 
D16 are set as 765 and 606 respectively which are defined by ‘mean - SD/2’ and ‘mean + 
SD/2’, respectively. It can be seen from Table 7.6.1 that current reliability index  using 
SAIDI is found as 820 min which is higher than the target performance reliability level, 
as this company is inefficient. Since it is greater than the penalty cap point, it can expect 
to receive a penalty payment of 1.021M$, which is set as the maximum penalty cap for 
D16, from the regulator.  
The simulation results of the first CRPS in Table 7.6.1 shows that 47.6% of 42 power dis-
tribution companies has no penalty, 52.4% has a penalty, the maximum penalty was 
0.024 million dollars, and the minimum penalty was 0.001 million dollars. The simula-
tion of the second CRPS in Table 7.6.1 shows that 66.7% of 42 power distribution com-
panies has no penalty, 33.3% has a penalty, the maximum penalty was 4.83 million 
dollars, and the minimum penalty was 0.001 million dollars. Generally, when observed, 














































































































D1 1.37 0.02 208 287 158 366 445 524 0.02 -1.82 410 -0.003 0 
D2 2.87 0.04 218 297 158 376 455 534 0.08 -5.93 376 0 0 
D3 0.14 0 46 125 158 204 283 362 0.01 -0.85 224 -0.001 0 
D4 1.5 0.02 414 493 158 572 651 730 0.02 -1.5 657 -0.005 -
0.005 
D5 2.27 0.03 2457 2536 158 2615 2694 2773 0.03 -2.28 3077 -0.013 -
2.28 
D6 1.97 0.02 470 549 158 628 707 786 0.05 -3.88 653 0 0 
D7 1.76 0.02 209 288 158 367 446 525 0.03 -2.75 392 -0.001 0 
D8 0.27 0 285 364 158 443 522 601 0.04 -2.85 460 0 0 
D9 3.88 0.05 1571 1650 158 1729 1808 1887 0.05 -3.88 1954 -0.009 -
3.88 
D10 2.79 0.04 307 386 158 465 544 623 0.04 -2.79 518 -0.004 0 
D11 3.27 0.04 234 313 158 392 471 550 0.06 -4.54 426 -0.003 0 
D12 5.35 0.07 697 776 158 855 934 1013 0.1 -7.77 889 0 0 
D13 2.61 0.03 960 1039 158 1118 1197 1276 0.03 -2.61 1267 -0.006 -
0.006 
D14 2.35 0.04 743 797 108 851 905 959 0.04 -2.35 986 -0.009 -
2.345 
D15 0.97 0.02 399 453 108 507 561 615 0.02 -0.97 551 -0.001 0 
D16 1.02 0.02 606 659 106 712 765 818 0.02 -1.02 820 -0.004 -
1.021 
D17 2.85 0.05 589 643 108 697 751 805 0.06 -2.97 735 0 0 
D18 1.02 0.02 409 462 106 515 568 621 0.04 -2.31 527 0 0 
D19 1.49 0.03 685 738 106 791 844 897 0.03 -1.49 886 -0.003 -
0.003 
D20 0.17 0 135 188 106 241 294 347 0.02 -0.91 243 0 0 
D21 0.72 0.01 587 641 108 695 749 803 0.01 -0.72 812 -0.003 -
0.718 
D22 0.94 0.02 216 270 108 324 378 432 0.03 -1.42 324 0 0 
D23 1.38 0.03 441 495 108 549 603 657 0.05 -2.52 575 0 0 
D24 1.95 0.04 663 716 106 769 822 875 0.04 -1.95 846 -0.002 -
0.002 
D25 0.86 0.02 464 517 106 570 623 676 0.02 -1.32 618 -0.001 0 
D26 0.68 0.01 527 581 108 635 689 743 0.01 -0.68 742 -0.003 -
0.003 
D27 2.93 0.05 896 950 108 1004 1058 1112 0.05 -2.93 1078 -0.001 -
0.001 
D28 1.68 0.03 451 504 106 557 610 663 0.06 -3.14 557 0 0 
D29 1.08 0.02 959 1012 106 1065 1118 1171 0.02 -1.08 1253 -0.006 -
1.08 
D30 1.73 0.03 473 527 108 581 635 689 0.03 -1.73 639 -0.002 -
0.002 
D31 1.68 0.05 414 446 64 478 510 542 0.08 -2.68 507 -0.001 0 
D32 0.72 0.02 349 381 64 413 445 477 0.05 -1.71 438 0 0 
D33 0.8 0.02 309 341 64 373 405 437 0.16 -5.17 384 0 0 
D34 1.09 0.03 90 122 64 154 186 218 0.11 -3.55 156 0 0 
D35 1.72 0.05 101 133 64 165 197 229 0.16 -4.98 165 0 0 
D36 0.91 0.03 142 174 64 206 238 270 0.11 -3.36 207 0 0 
D37 1.38 0.04 95 127 64 159 191 223 0.13 -4.19 159 0 0 
D38 1.66 0.05 161 193 64 225 257 289 0.14 -4.38 225 0 0 
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D39 3.78 0.12 428 460 64 492 524 556 0.13 -4.28 579 -0.024 -
4.283 
D40 0.87 0.03 127 159 64 191 223 255 0.11 -3.53 192 0 0 
D41 0.83 0.03 443 475 64 507 539 571 0.17 -5.51 507 0 0 
D42 1.04 0.03 314 346 64 378 410 442 0.1 -3.29 378 0 0 
 
 
Figure 7.6-1 CRPS Structure 
 
Figure 7.6-2 CRPS NC Structure 












































Figure 7.6-3 CRPS C Structure 
 
7.7 VALIDATION 
In this Chapter, we proposed a Quadratic Reward-Penalty Scheme term QRPS in two dif-
ferent ways- without a dead band and cappingand with the dead band and capping.  
From the experiments that we conducted, we made the following observations: 
• By using limited variables, we can calculate reward/penalty. 
• Without setting the dead band, the cubic curve acts similarly to a dead band by 
providing a little incentive near the central target (CRPS-NC) 
• Ensured a reasonable value for the reward /penalty after setting the capping 
(CRPS-C) 
• By setting the dead band the proposed scheme considered the vulnerability re-
lated to the ideal performance level, and additionally took into account certain 
performance variations, in light of elements outside of the distribution compa-
ny’s control (CRPS-C) 
• When compared to the existing algorithms, this cubic algorithm is most 
























7.8 COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS AND DISCUS-
SION 
In this section, the proposed solution is compared with the existing schemes. A compara-
tive study is depicted in the table below, which shows our algorithm (CRPS) and its com-
parison with the existing schemes in [25], [24], [4], [80], [81], [11]. The parameters for 
CRPS design implementation largely affect the financial risk of electric distribution com-
panies and in this way setting these parameters is a basic issue in the reward and penal-
ty payment. It is very reliant on the goal of the regulator. There are various elements that 
ought to be considered which influence the reliability and the behavior of individual 
companies when setting the parameters of CRPS. The nature and assortment of customer 
effects, coming about because of duration and recurrence of interruptions, ought to be 
considered while selecting the characteristic parameters for CRPS outline. 
 The reward–penalty schemes do not have a steady structure in all conditions and 
change as per necessities. Structures of these models rely upon the scope of data, kind of 
reliability index, the objective of system regulators, RPS execution time and so forth. If 
RPS is mainly designed using performance-based reliability, then the type of reliability 
index used in designing RPS has a significant impact on the reward and penalty payment. 
There are distinctive structures of RPS, be that as it may, Dead-Band RPS for reliability is 
the most proficient one since it incorporates the uncertainty about the optimal perfor-
mance level and the performance related components that are outside of the distribution 
company’s control. We implemented two approaches mainly intended for those regula-
tors who concern more to customers that are affected by outage duration factor, the first 
approach is for those regulators who want to apply RPS for the first time, and they can 
apply RPS for money making. In the second method, we designed a dead-band RPS, 
which achieve an effective RPS for enhancing service reliability. The performance of the 
proposed approach is illustrated by reliability data of various electric distribution com-
panies. A comparison between existing algorithms is provided in Table 3. 
Mid-Point of Dead-Zone is the point where we set the performance target on an RPS 
curve which determines whether a company gets reward or penalty, so it has a vital im-
portance in designing RPS curve.  Billinton and Pan[24], [25]  utilized both reliability in-
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dices SAIDI and SAIFI, with every index is weighted in light of the customer's concern, 
for determining this point. In [4], they utilized an Equivalent Probability Distribution of 
reliability indices for designing the RPS. A mix of cluster analysis and DEA is utilized 
by[80] for ascertaining MDZ while [81] utilized a mix of Historical Average Reliability 
Index, density area, and improvement target.  In [11], MDZ is computed in light of the 
estimations of Historical Average Reliability Index, DEA efficiency score and the maxi-
mum reliability improvement. Even though the results have demonstrated to be better, it 
used too many parameters and took longer computation time. In the proposed CRPS ap-
proach, we set MDZ as the average of the last five years’ reliability indices. Since the 
characteristic of the customers who are more concern towards the outage duration is 
taken into account in the CRPS design, so we applied SAIDI as the reliability index for de-
termining the performance target (MDZ). In our design, only one parameter, SAIDI, is 
used, the results have proven to be fairly robust and took lesser computation time. 
The parameter width of the dead zone(DZW) is highly subject to parameters of probabil-
ity distribution measures, for example, mode, mean, range, variance, standard deviation, 
and skewness. Picking a bigger dead zone size estimate makes the CRPS design inade-
quate as many data might be situated in this fair-minded zone. Then again, a smaller 
dead zone size estimate brings about a high hazard for a distribution company as little 
change in the reliability index may shift the incentive payment from the reward zone to 
the penalty one or the other way around. Applying a dead zone with the mean of the his-
torical reliability data as the center of the zone was recommended in [25,45]. In view of 
this strategy, the dead zone size is two times the standard division with the end goal that 
the 'mean + SD' is the reward point and the 'mean - S.D.' is the penalty point. Applying 
this strategy may locate many data in the dead zone. A wide dead zone may lose the pri-
mary idea behind the RPS   execution with the end goal that a large number of 
information is situated in this zone and it does not make any inspiration for the 


























































DEA efficiency score, 














- 5% of MDZ 
Average standard 









































































































to the density 
and reliability 
level score 









% of average 
income of 
utilities in each 
cluster 
- - CCDF and Cap value 









% of average 
income of 
utilities in each 
cluster 
- - 
% of average 
earnings of utilities 




This thesis considers the midpoint of the dead zone (MDZ) as the mean of historical data. 
The penalty and reward points are defined by 'mean - SD/2' and 'mean + SD/2', respective-
ly. This model prompts to a narrower dead zone than the one proposed in [24], [25] and 
normally reduced data are situated in this zone. A regulator can utilize this model when the 
performance-based reliability index is near the average of historical reliability data. Addi-
tionally, we proposed one standard deviation as DZW when contrasted with Billinton and 
Pan [24] and [39], who proposed two standard deviations. This delineates that the regulator 
needs distribution companies to keep up their future performance reliability in view of the 
average values. This procedure presumes that the information has been gathered in the past 
and is promptly accessible furthermore that the historical performance was satisfactory. 
Utilizing these methodologies, the regulator can ensure that service reliability has not been 
weakened after privatization.  
The regulator does not always have impeccable and correct data about customer interrup-
tion costs.  Thus, a cap value as a rate of the company’s yearly income ought to be consid-
ered by the regulator to legitimize the risk of giving high rewards or penalties for improper-
ly high-quality or low-quality reliability levels [62]. In the UK and Ireland [62], [82], maxi-
mum reward and maximum penalty are capped and are set at 3 and 4% of price control in-
comes [42]. In Netherlands [42], the adjustment in revenues is capped at 5%. The reward 
and penalty payments are also related to interruption cost. In [4], the cap values are set 
based on the yearly income of power distribution companies. In[11], CCDF and cap value 
are utilized to decide the maximum reward. In Norway and Italy, the consequences of cus-
tomer interruption cost surveys are utilized as a part of setting the capping limits. In this 
paper, a few rate of aggregate revenue of the distribution company shall be fixed as the 
maximum reward and maximum penalty caps [4], [11]. The maximum reward cap is same 
as maximum penalty cap, and it depends on the regulatory goal. Max reward and Max penal-
ty are set as a rate of yearly revenue and is controlled by the regulator. In our method for 
CRPS design, we set the maximum reward and maximum penalty caps for each distribution 
company as 5% of their yearly revenue. 
From the experiments that we conducted on CRPS, we made the following observations: 
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1. Using limited variables, we can calculate reward/penalty efficiently with less 
computation time. 
2. Without setting the dead band, the cubic curve acts similar to a dead band by providing a 
little incentive near the central target (CRPS-NC). 
3. Ensured a reasonable magnitude for reward /penalty after setting the capping(CRPS-C). 
4. By setting the dead band the proposed scheme considered vulnerability in regards to the 
ideal performance level, and additionally taken into account certain performance varia-
tions in light of elements outside of the distribution company’s control (CRPS-C). 
5. The simulation results of CRPS model show that those companies with very low reliabil-
ity received the maximum penalty. 
6. When compared to the existing algorithms, this cubic algorithm favors most to 
distribution companies and regulators than others. 
 
In the first instance(CRPS-NC), from the experiments that we conducted, we observed the 
following advantages and disadvantages: 
Advantages: 
• The cubic function is also designed to provide increasing rewards or penalties as 
performance-based reliability strays away from the target, but the rewards or pen-
alties increase most slowly. 
• While linear formula has the advantage of simplicity, this non-linear formula(cubic 
formula), provides a strong link between performance and reliability.  
• Without providing the dead band, this cubic curve acts similarly to a dead band by 
providing a little incentive near the central target. 
• Limited parameters for finding reward/penalty. 
• It is more favourable to distribution companies. 
Disadvantages: 
• Does not ensure a reasonable value for reward/penalty because of no capping. 





In the second instance (CRPS-C), from the experiments that we conducted, we observed the 
following advantages and disadvantages: 
Advantages: 
• The cubic function is designed to provide increasing rewards or penalties as 
performance-based reliability strays away from the target, but the rewards or pen-
alties increase most slowly. 
• While linear formula has the advantage of simplicity, this non-linear formula (cubic 
Formula), provides the strongest link between performance and reliability.  
• In addition to the dead band provided, the quadratic curve acts similarly to a dead 
band by providing no incentive near the central target. 
• Limited parameters for finding reward/penalty 
• Ensures a reasonable value for reward/penalty by applying maximum re-
ward/penalty capping. 
• By providing dead band, this approach has taken into account the uncertainty 
concerning the optimal performance level and some performance variance factors, 
outside of the regulator’s control. 
• Even though the same value of dead band is applied to linear, quadratic and cubic, 
this structure shows the largest dead band width, as compared to other structures. 
So it is most favourable to distribution companies, by considering that most of the 
uncertainties happened internally and externally, in the distribution companies. 
• Curve reaches the maximum reward/ penalty more   slowly in comparison to the 
quadratic curve and linear curve. I.e., increasingly most of theslope shows this algo-
rithm provides a little reward or penalty around the dead band. 
Disadvantages: 
• It is not simple and is difficult to administer, because of the cubic calculations. 
7.9 CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, we introduced and formulated the problem of CRPS. We proposed a novel 
CRPS scheme most favorable to power distribution companies. The fundamental advantage 
of our approach is that it provides no reward or penalty around the dead band, thus en-
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sures a reasonable value for reward/penalty and has also taken out the vulnerability on the 
variations from the optimal performance levels caused by those performance related 
factors that are outside of the distribution company’s control. A comparative study of our 
technique, with previously proposed techniques, demonstrates that our technique is supe-






DISCUSSION AND RECOMMENDATION 
This chapter provides the discussion and recommendations on 
 Regulatory Index selection 
 Factors affecting regulatory indices calculation 
 Target Determination 
 Tariff regulation methods 
8.1 INTRODUCTION 
A critical significance of deregulation in the power industry is the arrival of service quality 
regulation, in the distribution network. The Reward/Penalty Scheme (RPS) is managed to 
guarantee the service reliability. RPS is a financial strategy developed by the regulator to 
avoid the service reliability deterioration. RPS rewards the utility which is giving great reli-
ability and penalizes the utility, which is giving poor reliability. This paper explores the 
principle necessities for the development and implementation of an efficient RPS. It dis-
cusses the national conditions for RPS implementations such as the choice of regulatory 
index, external and internal factors affecting regulatory indices calculation, target determi-
nation, tariff regulation methods, and other different aspects that drive the regulator to set 
an exclusive strategy for RPS. The objective of this chapter is to broadly discuss the principal 
aspects that should be considered for developing an RPS. This chapter also providesrec-
ommendations based on the discussions that are relevant  for implementing an effective 




This section discusses four principal aspects of implementing RPS.  
8.2.1 REGULATORY INDEX SELECTION 
The first aspect is gathering and verifying data for calculating reliability, efficiency, and in-
terruption cost indices. This process consumes a lot of time and money [48]. Regulators can 
apply just one regulatory index to improve performance but selecting two or more indices 
can satisfy industrial and rural customers concerns’. 
8.2.1.1 RELIABILITY INDICES 
Reliability indices such asSAIDI and SAIFI are more generally used in Australia [46]and in-
ternationally. In fact, SAIDI is more popular than SAIFI (Table 6.8-1 ). Results in [10] show 
that the number of interruptions (SAIFI) is less important than the duration of interruption 
(SAIDI). For example, customers residing in the rural areas, may live with frequent outages 
but may be concerned with the duration of the outage[6][47]. Similarly, for industrial cus-
tomers frequent outages are a big concern because each interruption, may result in expen-
sive start-up costs (e.g. restarting machines), furthermore, losing production time resulting 
in significant losses [6]. When applying multiple reliability indices, weighting individual 
indexes based on the customer’s type is very important to closely follows customers’ inter-
est [4]. According to Canadian Energy Research Institute (CERI)[51], CAIDI is typically 
preferable to SAIDI, because it shows the duration of single (average) customer interrup-
tions. It usually proves most intuitive and useful to evaluate the cost effectiveness of resto-
ration and automation functions[51]. However, as CAIDI is the ratio of SAIDI/SAIFI, a dis-
proportionate improvement in one measure, may lead to a misleading CAIDI result.  
8.2.1.2 LOAD INDICES 
Load indices have a relatively weak relationship to the economic value of reliability, be-
cause they measure the durations of interruptions, and do not capture the scale of the 
interruption. EENS measures are specifically designed for capacity planning, because of 
this, they inherently provide a statistical measure of reliability that customers can use. 
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However, many stakeholders prefer actual reliability measurement (SAIFI/SAIDI) over 
EENS for reasons such as capacity planning. Thus, we can state that SAIDI and SAIFI are the 
most commonly used reliability indices, that can be used as parameters for RPS implemen-
tation.  
8.2.1.3 INTERRUPTION COST INDICES 
This index is difficult for regulators to estimate, because of the uncertainties with the cus-
tomer survey method, frequency, and type of power quality events, experienced by cus-
tomers, as well as on the vulnerability of customers’ equipment to these events.  Another 
challenge is the limited information available, so, not all regulators want to use customer 
interruption costs as an input, when designing an RPS [19]. However, many regulators have 
still used customer interruption costs, while developing RPS[1], [4], [8], [15], [5], [9], [35], 
[27]. 
8.2.1.4 DEA ANALYSIS 
This process can also be used by regulators to improve the service reliability by creating 
competition amongst different distribution companies, thereby improving the efficiency of 
inefficient companies.  
8.2.2 FACTORS AFFECTING REGULATORY INDICES CALCULA-
TION 
Interruption (either internal or external) is a significant aspect that should be considered 
while calculating regulatory indices. Examples of internal interruptions are distribution 
equipment’s failure, human failures, equipment maintenance and external interruptions 
such as generation and transmission failures, due to weather conditions, etc. Some coun-
tries do not consider interruptions in the process of indices calculation, because they want 
to take it as an important long-term reliability improvement task (i.e. long-term restoration 
time), whilst others consider it in indices calculation to perform the short time mainte-
nance actions [6] (i.e. short term restoration time). Even though restoration time (long-
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term and short-term) is extremely dependent on the distribution company’s disaster man-
agement, it also depends upon the indirect indices calculation. 
 
8.2.3 TARGET DETERMINATION 
The Target indicates the point at which the reward or penalty will start. Regulators can use 
three methods to determine the target [4], [14]. The Historical performance method, aver-
ages historic performance of the past three years [4], to determine the target, this ensures 
distribution companies can maintain the same level of performance. Initially, targeted value 
method fixes the target based on an initial value followed with yearly improvement [14]. 
Competition method fixes the target based on the average performance of distribution com-
panies, grouped in one cluster, and the reliability is compared to companies within the 
same cluster. 
8.2.4 TARIFF REGULATION METHODS 
Five methods can be used. In the distribution company’s tariff regulation method, the elec-
tricity rate varies for each distribution company based on their performance reliability. 
With the country tariff regulation method, all distribution companies apply the same tariff. 
However, with the direct reward and penalty tariff method, well-performing companies are 
rewarded from the regulator's fund and weak companies receive a penalty. Using the bal-
anced reward and penalty tariff method, the regulator sets a balance amongst the rewards 
granted, and the penalty received, such that the net difference tends to be zero [15]. With 
the budget,regulated tariff method, government sets a fixed budget for RPS. 
8.3 RECOMMENDATIONS 
This section provides recommendations for implementing RPS.  
• When selecting regulatory indicators, we recommend selecting factors that 
are quantifiable, independent and consider the customer type (industrial or residential), so 
that it can easily be managed by the regulators[48]. Multiple indicators (e.g. SAIFI and 
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SAIDI) can be used together, but it can give varying outputs where one index may penalize 
a company, but another index may reward the same company. For example, if each 
customer experiences two interruptions (1min & 20 mins), then from SAIFI’s perspective, 
each customer is interrupted twice a year, but from SAIDI’s perspective, customers are 
affected 20 times more in the second interruption. Hence we recommend assigning weights 
when using a combination of SAIDI and SAIFI. Regulators can decide the weights for each 
index, based on the customer type. It is suggested to include energy based reliability indi-
ces such as EENS, only if capacity planning is concerned, while designing RPS. Even though 
Interruption Cost Indices, are difficult to estimate and only limited information is available, 
it is still used widely used [1], [4], [8], [15], [5], [9], [35], [27]for developing RPS. Thus, it is 
recommended that the Interruption cost index be taken into consideration. We also rec-
ommend using the  DEA score to compare the efficiencies of different distribution compa-
nies, to create competition between distribution systems to improve the service reliability. 
Furthermore, when defining a model of DEA, we recommend input-oriented DEA, where 
the outputs are fixed and the efficiency scores depend upon input.  
• It is recommended that more consideration should be given to interruptions 
in the calculation of indices, so as to take maintenance actions within a short period (to 
avoid long-term restoration time).  
• Depending on the scenario, one of these methods can be used. If performance 
should be consistent, we recommended using a combination of historical performance 
methods and competition methods, thus ensuring the maintenance of the same level of per-
formance-based methods within the cluster. 
• To consider a relationship between income and performance; to guarantee a 
better network reliability, it is recommended to consider the balanced reward and penalty 
tariff method, since it can establish a balance between reward and penalty, such that the net 
difference turns to zero within a specified period. Thus, it can avoid the doubt amongst dis-




8.4 COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE PROPOSED 
SCHEMES 
The comparative analyses of the proposed schemes in terms of advantages and disad-
vantages are discussed in chapter 5, 6 and 7. Even though the pros and cons are inherited 
from each scheme, applicability of each scheme depends on the requirement of the user. A 
comprehensive numerical study is accomplished in chapter 5, 6 and 7 to examine the ap-
plicability of the proposed schemes. This numerical study shows that when compared to 
the results of Linear Reward-Penalty Scheme, Quadratic Reward-Penalty Scheme is more 
favorable to power distribution companies, by considering the performance inconsistency 
factors that are out of the regulator’s control. By providing dead band, each scheme has 
taken into account the uncertainty concerning the optimal performance level and some 
performance variance factors, outside of the regulator’s control. Even though the same 
value of dead band is applied to linear, quadratic and cubic, cubic structure shows the 
largest dead band width, as compared to other structures. Also, cubic curve reaches the 
maximum reward/ penalty more slowly in comparison to the quadratic curve and linear 
curve. by considering most of the uncertainties happened internally and externally in the 
distribution companies, cubic algorithm provides little penalty around the dead band. 
Hence, financially, cubic reward penalty scheme is the most favourable scheme for 
distribution companies.  
In some cases, regulator can make money by adopting linear RPS inorder to improve the 
reliability of inefficient power distribution companies. In linear RPS, curve reaches the 
maximum reward/penalty more quickly in comparison to the quadratic curve and cubic. 
Because of this linear nature, reward or penalty values of Linear RPS a more around the 
dead band. Thus, Linear Reward-Penalty schemes helps the regulators financially. 
Since the proposed schemes(linear, quadratic and cubic) have increased power exponenti-
ation, we have done their comparative analysis in terms of accuracy, flexibility, complexity 
and scalability.  The running time of the proposed Linear RPS is directly proportional to 
number of parameters, N, involved. When N doubles, so does the running time cost and 
complexity of computation. The proposed Quadratic RPS running time is proportional to 
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the square of number of parameters involved. When N doubles, the running time increases 
by N * N. Thus complexity and cost of computation of the proposed quadratic function is 
more than the linear function. Also, the running time of the proposed Cubic RPS is propor-
tional to the triple the number of parameters involved. When N doubles, the running time 
increases by N * N * N. Thus time complexity of Linear RPS, Quadratic RPS and Cubic RPS 
are O(n), O(n2), O(n3) respectively. Even though time complexity of nonlinear functions are 
more than linear as the parameters vary, lots of performance enhancing techniques are 
there in MATLAB which can compute nonlinear functions very efficiently in less complexity 
and running time. So, high computational cost (running time) of nonlinear schemes does 
not affect the efficiency of RPS evaluation.  
The complexity as well as accuracy of the proposed nonlinear functions can be controlled 
by setting the required number of iterations in evaluating the reward/penalty values. The 
proposed non-linear schemes, Quadratic RPS and Cubic RPS, provides the most flexible 
curve-fitting functionality because of their nonlinear nature of curve. Even though the 
scalability of linear RPS would have linear growth, we can achieve linear scalability in non-
linear RPS by naturally setting the iterations to a limit. 
It should be noted that in the proposed RPS schemes, RPS parameters must be recalculated 
each year. This may result in a small increase in the operational cost of regulator. However, 
the cost of updating RPS parameters, which can be easily calculated using a computer-
based program, can be ignored compared to the other cost of implementing RPS such as 
data gathering, data auditing and supervision of companies. On the one hand, the recalcula-
tion of RPS parameters may increase the company in risk, since regulation can change from 
year to year. On the other hand, the method proposed also intends to simulate the competi-
tion between distribution companies. Competition may naturally increase the risk but in-
sures the improvement of the service quality. 
8.5 CONCLUSION 
This chapter explained most of the principal aspects that should be considered while de-
signing RPS. Based on the generic RPS framework developed in Chapter 4, we identified the 
relevant parameters used for computing the reward and penalty. This chapter also 
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provided guidelines that should be considered, based on the parameters that are relevant 






FUTUREWORKS AND CONCLUSION 
  
This chapter provides: 
 An introduction to current issues and problems with managing power distri-
bution companies in the form of RPS 
 Solutions proposed by this dissertation to address the problems 
 Future works 
 Conclusion 
9.1 INTRODUCTION 
In the literature, the notion of performance-based regulation and reliable power distribu-
tion has been widely discussed and various methods have been d eveloped to address 
different challenges associated with it. At the same time, the notion of managing power dis-
tribution companies has not been comprehensively investigated; moreover, only a scant 
amount of research studies are available on developing RPS to manage power distribution 
companies. Although managing power distribution companies, in the form of RPS, has been 
acknowledged as an important factor to be considered in recent literature, comprehensive 
approaches to address the issues associated with it, have not been proposed and devel-
oped. 
To overcome this disadvantage,and to improve the reliability of power distribution, in this 
thesis, we identified different key issues in developing RPS, to manage power distribution 
companies and address them. 
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In the next section, we will recapitulate the different issues that we have identified and 
discussed in this thesis. In Section10.3, we highlight the contributions, which have been 
made by the thesis to the literature, as a result of addressing the different   issues. In Sec-
tion10.4, we identify some areas for future work and in Section 10.5 we conclude the chap-
ter. 
9.2 PROBLEMS ADDRESSED BY THIS THESIS 
Although there are approaches proposed by different researchers in the literature made, to 
investigate the concepts of performance-based regulation through reliability, we noted that 
none of them have developed comprehensive frameworks to address the research prob-
lems that we address in this thesis. In this dissertation, the main problems, associated with 
developing RPS to manage power distribution companies, have been addressed. As men-
tioned in Chapter 3, the common issues in RPS implementation areas are as follows: 
1. How to define and characterize most vital parameters for designing and implement-
ing RPS? 
2. How to set a realistic target that should be able to support and monitor the compa-
ny’s performance behavior? 
3. How to ensure a reasonable value for reward or penalty? 
4. How to reduce the complexity of adopting reward penalty formulas? 
5. How to maintain the consistency of the reward penalty formula with the desired 
outcome? 
6. How to include certain external factors in RPS implementation, that affect the per-
formance of power distribution companies, that cannot be controlled by the regula-
tors? 
7. How to motivate the efficient and inefficient power distribution companies within 
the  power market? 
8. How to improve the power distribution company’s reliability of power supply? 
9. How to develop an effective RPS scheme, that is more favorable to the regulatory 
agency than the power distribution companies? 
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10. How to develop an effective RPS scheme, that is more favorable to power distribu-
tion companies than regulatory agencies? 
11. How to develop an effective RPS scheme, that is most favorable to power distribu-
tion companies? 
12. How to present financial rewards/penalties that are administratively simple? 
 
These problems are solved by finding solutions to the specific problems that this thesis 
focuses on. The specific problems associated with managing performance based on reliabil-
ity, in the form of RPS are: 
1. Problems with identifying the most vital parameters for designing and implementing 
RPS, focusing on PBR that is based on reliability. 
2. Problems with developing an effective RPS scheme that is simple and easy to under-
stand and administer; that increases rewards and penalties, in a linear fashion, as 
the performance fluctuates from the normal; and should considers certain 
performance variations, in light of elements outside of the distribution company’s 
control.  
3. Problems with developing an effective RPS scheme that reaches the maximum re-
ward/ penalty slowly, that providesvery little incentive near the central target and 
should consider the uncertainty related to those performance related components, 
that are outside of the distribution company’s control.   
4. Problems with developing an effective RPS scheme that should acts like a dead band 
RPS structure but considers the uncertainties which are due to external factors and 
provide no reward or penalty around the central target.  
 
For each of these issues, the discussion is carried out from two alternate perspectives: the 
existing solutions and the technical problems innate in these solutions. The specialized 
concerns connected with the issues that will frame the research issues for the development 
of the new solution. 
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As discussed in Chapter 2, it is clear that current research studies on RPS are still suscepti-
ble to the issues above. Thus, these issues are the drivers for this research and the subse-
quent development of innovative algorithms. 
9.3 DISSERTATION CONTRIBUTIONS 
General problems for RPS implementation are namely: 
• Problems with defining and characterizing the RPSs, 
• setting.a realistic target that should be able to support and monitor the company’s 
performance behavior,  
• ensuring a reasonable value for reward or penalty,  
• reducing the complexity in adopting reward penalty formulas,  
• maintaining the consistency of reward penalty formula with the desired outcome,  
• inclusion of certain external factors in RPS implementation that affect the 
performance of power distribution companies that cannot be controlled by the 
regulators,  
• motivation of inefficient power distribution companies in power market,  
• improvingthe power distribution companiesreliability in power supply,  
• developing an effectiveRPS scheme,  
• presenting financial rewards/penalties administratively simple. 
These problems are solved by finding solutions to the specific problems that this thesis 
focuses on. The solution to the specific research problemsare associated with managing 
performance based reliability in the form of RPS implementation, from the dissertation 
contributions. The research problems are: 
1. How to Identify the most vital parameters for designing and implementing RPS, 
focusing on PBR based on reliability? 
In Chapter2, we discussed the survey of existing approaches for PBR based reliability and 
problem definitions along with the characterization of the most vital parameters for design-
ing and implementing RPS. Based on thissurve, it is clear that the concepts of defining and 
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characterizing the most vital parameters, are not well understood. Moreover, the literature 
contains no approaches, that particularly address the vital parameter definitions and char-
acterizations.  Additionally, the approaches discussed in other contexts, such as the PBR 
based on data envelopment analysis and the PBR based on customer interruption cost, are 
difficult to adapt to RPSs and may require major revision. To address this problem with de-
fining and characterizing, the most vital parameters, we design a framework, which is 
extensively presented in Chapter 5. 
2. How to develop an effective RPS scheme that is simple and easy to understand 
and administer, that increases rewards and penalties as the performance fluc-
tuates from the normal and should considers certain performance variations, in 
light of elements outside of the distribution company’s control? 
 
According to the survey in Chapter 2, the literature has heavily overlooked the aspects of 
setting a target to analyze the company’s behavior. In Chapter 3, the problem definitions for 
setting a realistic target and the associated technical issues, are discussed. Those technical 
problems result in  some research questions which include: 
• How to implement an RPS  scheme, without any dead band and capping of the  
maximum reward and the maximum penalty ,for the improvement of the 
performance, based on reliability, for Power Distribution Companies?,  
• How to implement an RPS  scheme with a dead band, to control the normal 
fluctuations in performance, whilst also capping the maximum reward and the 
maximum penalty?”. 
To overcome the s e c o n d  r e s e a r c h  problem, the following research questions need to 
be answered. The answer to these questions has been well presented in Chapter 5, with 
the development of a linear reward-penalty structure. 
 
3. How to develop an effective RPS scheme, that reaches maximum reward/ penalty 
slowly, providing very little incentive near the central target and considers the 
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uncertainty related to those performance related components, that are outside 
of the distribution companys’ control. 
 
As mentioned in Research Problem 3,the existing literature has not focused on managing 
diverse performance goals, based on reliability in the power distribution market, thus 
defining an effective RPS scheme that reaches maximum reward/ penalty slowly, that 
provides very little incentive, near the central target and has considered the uncertainty 
related to those performance related components, that are outside of the distribution 
company’s control, to achieve the performance goals based on reliability.To address this 
problem of managing  performance goals, based on reliability within thepower distribution 
market, the following research questions needed to be answered:  
How to calculate the reward/penalty by using limited variables? How to ensure a 
resealable value for reward/penalty? How can we efficiently achieve performance goals 
based on reliability, within the power distribution market? What are the factors affecting 
the performance reliability of power distribution companies? How can we develop an 
approach  that is more favorable to power distribution companies, by considering the 
performance inconsistency factors that are out of the regulator’s control?  
How can we accommodate the uncertainty factors that deviate the distribution companies 
performance-based reliability levels, in achieving the defined performance goal? We 
comprehensively illustrated a solution to all of these questions by the an algorithm pro-
posed in Chapter 6, which implemented a new RPS, called the Quadratic Reward-Penalty 
Scheme.  
 
4.   How to develop an effective RPS scheme that will act as a dead band RPS struc-
ture, by considering the uncertainties due to external factors and provide no re-
ward or penalty around the central target? 
 
The Reward-Penalty formula which portrays the shape and slope of the curves, decides 
how rapidly the curve achieves the maximum reward or penalty, as performance strays 
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from the performance target. To address this issue, the following research questions 
needed to be answered: 
• How to define an RPS that increases rewards and penalties in a fashion that the 
performance shifts away from the norm, without applying the dead band;  that acts 
as a dead band structure, by considering the uncertainties due to external factors?  
• How to introduce a capping (thresholding) on the maximum reward and penalties 
that allow companies to abstain from paying a critically significant penalty or 
getting a huge reward? 
• How can we evaluate the reward/ penalty based on performance-based reliability, 
by including a neutral zone around the target, which represents the vulnerability, in 
regards to the ideal performance level?  
In order to answer theses questions, we developed a new structure for RPS, called Cubic 
reward-penalty scheme, which was discussed in Chapter 7. 
 
9.4 FUTURE WORKS 
Although a significant amount of effort has been invested in this research, there is still 
scope for future work, which is illustrated in this section. Initial work on demand response 
programs [64], utilization of capital and non-capital resources to meet regulatory tar-
gets[63] and distribution network reconfigurations[20], has been carried out recently 
within the power distribution system operations field. Integration of such potential works, 
into the present RPS framework, can improve the characteristics of the load profile, the 
customer satisfactionand the customer behavior simulation, for different prices, incentives, 
and penalties. This extension could be a striking idea to be considered shortly by distribu-
tion companies and regulatory authorities, in the electric power sector. We discuss each of 





9.4.1 DEMAND RESPONSE PROGRAMS 
Demand response programs[64], [4]–[9]forpower distribution system operations, have 
risen.  This situation has created a vital  chance for customers to show an important part in 
the functioning of the smart grid, by lessening or changing their power use to within peak 
periods or different types of monetary incentives. It is used, for adjusting supply and de-
mand and could bring down the expense of power in wholesale markets, and thus, prompt 
lower retail rates. Strategies for drawing in customer’s demand response programs, incor-
porate offering time-based rates.  
The electric power industry contemplates demand response programs(DSP)[83]as an in-
exorably great asset alternative, whose capacities and potential effects, are extended by 
grid modernization efforts. demand response Management programs use rates, 
motivations, and different techniques aimed to improve the management of power use dur-
ing times of peak customer request[64], [4]–[9]. Those Demand Side Management activi-
ties, including direct cooperation from the customer side, can cut critical reductions in 
electricpower costs, as demand driven movements of interest during peaks, could lessen 
marginal costs [1], [4]–[9]. There is a scope for future work that can offer a reward-penalty 
mechanism, for the customers, by encouraging DSP programs. The goal of this future work, 
can be implemented as an RPS, in a manner that relatively penalizes non-active customers.  
9.4.2       UTILIZATION OF INPUT AND OUTPUT (CAPITAL AND 
NON-CAPITAL) RESOURCES 
Incentive regulation in electricity distribution, is relied upon to grow its extension, from an 
input oriented instrument, to one that incorporates output based motivating forces. This 
createsa potential clash with more conventional concerns regarding productive efficiency. 
In this thesis, we implemented an output based reward penalty incentive scheme. Applying 
an output based quality indicator for reward penalty scheme implementation,. Iit is found 
that there is no indication of a contention between cost effectiveness and social cost 
productivity. So as a future extension of this research, it will be more efficient in measuring 
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distribution companies performance, if we apply both input and output based quality 
indicators, in our developed reward penalty scheme,in order to use social costs.  
 
9.4.3 DISTRIBUTION NETWORK RECONFIGURATION 
It has been assessed that the greater part of the interruptions to the power supply to cus-
tomers is because of distribution network systems failures[89]. Subsequently, in resource 
supervision of a distribution system, expanding consideration is being made to enhance the 
customer service reliability[90]. Besides, most of the distribution network systems have 
the major problem of power failure, due to interruptions. A standout amongst the best 
strategies for reducing interferences in power supply, is to consider distribution network 
reconfiguration [91]–[96]. The majority of the research papers based on reducing the pow-
er system failures used network reconfiguration concepts but give less consideration on 
their system reliability. Some researchers have who have used reliability as a goal as a part 
of the network reconfiguration issue, simply attempt to maximize the reliability index or 
minimize the interruption cost. Because of the presentation of the reward and penalty 
scheme (RPS), within the distribution network system, the significance of quality level has 
improved, but has severely affected network reconfiguration. As a future expansion to our 
research, it will be beneficial for power distribution companies, to implement a distribution 
network reconfiguration in the presence of RPS, with the objective of considering both reli-
ability and power system loss reduction, as an important problem. 
The extension of RPS, based on demand response programs, utilization of capital and non-
capital resources to meet regulatory target and distribution network reconfiguration, will 
be a striking idea for distribution companies and regulatory authorities in the electric pow-
er sector.  
9.4.4 DYNAMIC GAME MODEL 
The power distribution systems conservative political environment conceivably empowers 
better distribution quality over higher profit and added savings, nonetheless it causes en-
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ergy loss. In order to analyze their relationship with the political environment, , it is neces-
sary to develop a model that includes both features. Our work recommends an interesting 
future direction of developing the dynamic game model, a direct expansion of this research 
is to evaluate time irregularity and political philosophy, in imposing monopoly regulation 
of electricity distribution, to catch the interactions amongst customers and the electric 
power suppliers, over a specific timeframe. 
 
9.4.5 PROSPECT HYPOTHESIS 
Other exciting future work based on our research, is to apply a behavioral economic theory, 
such as a prospect hypothesis, on our implemented RPS models. Thus, it could be able to 
assess the subjectivebehavior amongst the electric power supplier and the customers.  
Thus, this will assist in the development of power distribution company’s’ new strategies, 
based on customer behavior psychology, the individual customer becoming the central fo-
cus. Application of a prospect hypothesis on RPS, helps power distribution companies to 
acquire the perfect knowledge of each customer requirements, requests, and favorites, thus  
providing reliable power supply. Additionally, they could plan to improve the customer 
service loyalty levels, through prospect theory.  
9.4.6        INTEGRATING MORE HETEROGENEITY IN BOTH   DE-
MAND AND SUPPLY 
Requirement variations for the electric power supply system on the supply and demand 
side, have brought about a critical moment in its development. The enhancing  of 
conventional general quality of service in the modern age, adds burdens that might be su-
perfluously expensive. The demand side changes, resulting from our apparently voracious 
hunger for electric power in a rising computerized age, has tightened our performance-
based reliability requirements.  However, on the supply-side of the market, limitations on 
framework development, and the vulnerabilities of power markets, has encouraged us to 
stick to current standards. The administration of such electric power distribution, turns out 
to be difficult and will require the modernization of the control and distribution of power 
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systems based upon the demand requisites of the cost-effective ,high-qualit and reliable 
power supply. The trends rising in the electric power framewor,k recommend that the 
centralized model that has ruled electric power systems, needs to be changed, by an option 
in which control is more scattered, and in which the general nature of the quality of service 
needs to be replaced by a heterogeneous service, based on end user requirements. Based 
on our research, we suggest an intriguing future direction, that could enhance our RPS 
model, by including more heterogeneity in the supply of power on the demand side, with a 
mixture of power stations, and small renewable energy sources. The objective of this ap-
proach, is to consider the heterogeneity of the reliability advantages over geographic con-
ditions, by separating industrial and residential customers. 
9.4.7 IMPLEMENTATION OF OUR MODEL IN OTHER LARGE 
SECTOR DOMAINS REGULATED  BY POLITICAL AGENTS 
As indicated by the standard economic hypothesis, higher financial incentives will prompt 
higher performance and improved effort without depending on work, connection, or peo-
ple. In numerous large sectors under different domains of regulations, this standard mone-
tary theory is executed. The financial incentives are, for instance, used to improve perfor-
mance in the work environment or to expand wellbeing related behavior. The expansion of 
our developed RPS structure to different domains of regulation, such as renewable energy 
distribution sectors, financial sectors, health insurance and all other large sectors that are 
subject to control by regulatory agents, could provide an exciting future  for this kind of re-
search. 
This research could expand into other  directions in the future, including the expansion of 
our RPS models in the context of the changing operating and technical framework of the 
electricity supply industry.  Our models could be  applied for use within a smart grid; for 
increasing the digitalization of the grid and for increasing the greater adoption of smart 
grids, to facilitate renewable energy integrations and also for reducing the risks of high 
impact and low frequency interruption events, that the smart grids are exposed to, due to 




Distribution company’s’ performance evaluation, based on reliability, efficiency, and inter-
ruption costs have a greater significance with the arrival of deregulation. Maintaining the 
operational strength of their assets, while improving their performance, has become 
essential to keep customer loyal, lower costs of operation and improve the durability of the 
distribution company. The reward penalty scheme, is one of the global financial tools, that 
have been used by regulators, to revise the distribution company’s revenues, according to 
their performance. It rewards those who are perform well and penalizes those who 
perform poorly, in order to maintain their appropriate performance levels. 
 
 In this chapter, we have summarized the work that we have undertaken and documented 
it, in this dissertation. We first discussed the issues that, we have addressed in the litera-
ture that prompted the research study done in this dissertation. We then highlighted the 
different contributions of this thesis and briefly described the future research work on RPS 
structure, for loss reduction and reliability improvement, based on demand response pro-
grams on power distribution system operations, utilization of capital and non-capital re-
sources to meet regulatory target and distribution network reconfigurations. These future 
approaches can be used to improve load profile features and customer satisfaction. They 
can also be used by the regulatory agencies to develop applications that can simulate the 
customer behavior for different prices, incentives, and penalties. The distribution network 
reconfiguration method, allows the distribution companies to consider financial risk in the 
reconfiguration issues and helps to select the best configuration, based on acceptable risk. 
Thus these forthcoming methods that, we intend to carry out in the future, can 
contribute to extend the further development of the RPS approaches, developed in this 
thesis. Most importantly, the thesis concludes on how RPS schemes are future proof of the 
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1. PSEUDO CODE FOR LRPS 
Algorithm 1: Pseudo code for LRPS, with no dead band and no maximum reward/penalty 
capping, for power distribution companies  
Require: Parameter D, such that D= {D1, D2, …} is a collection of all distribution compa-
nies, with their current SAIDI values represented by parameter S, such that S= 
{S1, S2, …...,}. 
Parameter X, such that X= {X1, X2, ….}, represents a collection of a set of histor-
ical SAIDI values for all distribution companies, where X1= {x1, x2, x3, x4} 
shows a set of the last 4 years SAIDI values, for each distribution company D1. 
Output: Estimating the Reward or Penalty for all distribution companies, based on their 
performance score (current actual SAIDI value) 
1: for all D1 ϵ D do 
2: for all X1 ∈X do 
3: Target ← avg(X1)  
4: SD1←sd(X1)  
5: end for; 
6: end for; 
7: for all D1 ϵ D do 
8: for all R1 ϵ R do 
9: for all value S1 ϵ S do 
10: for all X1 ϵ X do 
11: RwPn ← rwpn (Target, S, X)  
12: end for;  
13: end for;  
14:   end for;  





ASSERTION:  To find the average of a set of 4 historical SAIDI values 
ALGOROTHM 
1: declare the variables 
2: for each X1 ϵ X from 1 to 4 do 
3:  sum = sum of all values in X1 
4:  return sum / 4 
5:  end for; 
SUBMODLE: sd(X1)   
ASSERTION:  To find the standard deviation of a set of 4 historical SAIDI values. 
ALGOROTHM 
1: declare the variables 
2: define the expression and the constraints 
3: for each X1 ϵ X from 1 to 4 do 
4: A ← avg (X1) 
5: sumsq = sumsq + power(x,2) 
6: return sqrt (sumsq / 4 - A * A) 
7: end for; 
SUBMODLE: rwpn (Target, S, X) 
ASSERTION:  To estimate the reward or penalty of all distribution companies according to 
their performance based on reliability. 
ALGOROTHM 
1: for each D1 ϵ D do 
2: for each R1 ϵ R do 
3: for each value S1 ϵ S do 
4: for each X1 ϵ X do 
5: if 0 < S1 < D1. Target then 
6: set RwPn ← (D1. Target - S1)/D1. sd(X1) 
7: else if S1 > D1. Target then 
8: set RwPn ← -(D1. Target - S1)/D1. sd(X1)   
9: else if S1 = D1. Target then 
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10: set RwPn ← 0 
11: end for;  
12: end for;  
13: end for;  
Algorithm 2: Pseudo code for LRPS with the dead band and maximum reward capping and 
maximum penalty capping, for power distribution companies. 
Require: Parameter D, such that D= {D1, D2, ….}, is a collection of all power distribu-
tion companies with their current SAIDI values represented by a parameter 
S, such that S= {S1, S2, …} and their annual revenue is represented by a pa-
rameter R, such that R= {R1, R2, …} 
Parameter X, such that X= {X1, X2, ….} represents a collection of a set of his-
torical SAIDI values for all distribution companies, where X1= {x1, x2, x3, 
x4} shows a set of the last 4 years SAIDI values, for each distribution com-
pany D1. 
Output: Estimating the Reward or Penalty for all distribution companies, based on their 
performance score (current actual SAIDI value) for all D1 ϵ D do 
1: for all X1 ∈X do 
2: A1← avg(X1)  
3: SD1←sd(X1)  
4: end for; 
5: for all R1 ϵ R do 
6: MaxR ← mxrw(R1) 
7: MaxP ← mxpn(R1) 
8: end for;  
9: end for;  
10: for all D1 ϵ D do 
11: for all X1 ∈X do 
12: DZW ← ddzw (X1) 
13: MDZ ← mpdz(X1)  
14: end for;  
15: end for;  
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16: for all D1 ϵ D do 
17: for all X1 ∈ X do 
18: RP ← rwpt(X1)  
19: RCP ← rwcpt(X1)  
20: end for;  
21: end for;  
22: for all D1 ϵ D do 
23: for all X1 ∈X do  
24: PP ← pnpt(X1)   
25: PCP ← pncpt(X1)   
26: end for;  
27: end for; 
28: for all D1 ϵ D do 
29: for all R1 ϵ R do 
30: for all X1 ∈X do 
31: RR ← rwrmp(X1)  
32: PR ← pnrmp(X1)  
33: end for;  
34: end for;  
35: end for; 
36: for all D1 ϵ D do 
37: for all R1 ϵ R do 
38: for all value S1 ϵ S do 
39: for all X1 ϵ X do 
40: RwPn ← rwpn (R, S, X)  
41: end for;  
42: end for;  
43: end for;  
44: end for; 
 
SUBMODLE: avg (X1) 
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ASSERTION:  To find the average of a set of 4 historical SAIDI values. 
ALGOROTHM 
1: declare the variables 
2: for each X1 ϵ X from 1 to 4 do 
3: sum = sum of all values in X1 
4: return sum / 4 
5: end for; 
SUBMODLE: sd(X1)   
ASSERTION:  To find the standard deviation of a set of 4 historical SAIDI values. 
ALGOROTHM 
1: declare the variables 
2: define the expression and the constraints 
3: for each X1 ϵ X from 1 to 4 do 
4: A ← avg (X1) 
5: sumsq = sumsq + power(x,2) 
6: return sqrt (sumsq / 4 - A * A) 
7: end for; 
SUBMODLE: mxrw(R1) 
ASSERTION:  To find the Maximum Reward cap for each of the distribution companies 
ALGOROTHM 
1: for each revenue R1 ϵ R do 
2: MaxR ← 0.05*R 
3: end for;  
SUBMODLE: mxpn(R1) 
ASSERTION:  To find the Maximum Penalty cap for each of the distribution companies 
ALGOROTHM 
1. for each revenue R1 ϵ R do 
2. MaxP ← 0.05*R 
3. end for; 
SUBMODLE: ddzw (X1) 




1: for each D1 ϵ D do 
2: for each X1∈X do 
3: DZW ← D1.sd (X1,4)   
4: end for; 
5: end for;  
SUBMODLE: mpdz (X1) 
ASSERTION:  To find the mid-point of dead zone for each of the distribution companies 
ALGOROTHM 
1: for each D1 ϵ D do 
2: for each X1∈X do 
3: MDZ ← D1. avg (X1, 4) 
4: end for; 
5: end for;  
SUBMODLE: rwpt (X1) 
ASSERTION:  To find the reward point for each of the distribution companies 
ALGOROTHM 
1: for each D1 ϵ D do 
2: for each X1∈X do 
3: RP ← D1. mpdz(X1) - (D1. ddzw(X1,4) / 2)  
4: end for; 
5: end for;  
SUBMODLE: rwcpt (X1) 
ASSERTION:  To find the reward cap point for each of the distribution companies 
ALGOROTHM 
1: for each D1 ϵ D do 
2: for each X1∈X do 
3: RCP ← D1. mpdz(X1) + D1. ddzw(X1,4)  
4: end for; 
5: end for;  
SUBMODLE: pnpt (X1) 
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ASSERTION:  To find the penalty point for each of the distribution companies 
ALGOROTHM 
1: for each D1 ϵ D do 
2: for each X1∈X do 
3: PP ← D1. mpdz(X1) + D1. ddzw(X1,4)  
4: end for; 
5: end for;  
SUBMODLE: pncpt (X1) 
ASSERTION:  To find the penalty cap point for each of the distribution companies 
ALGOROTHM 
1: for each D1 ϵ D do 
2: for each X1∈X do 
3: PCP ← D1. mpdz(X1) + D1. ddzw(X1,4)  
4: end for; 
5: end for;  
SUBMODLE: rwrmp (X1) 
ASSERTION:  To find the reward ramp  
ALGOROTHM 
1: for each D1 ϵ D do 
2: for each X1∈X do 
3: RR ← D1.Max.rew(X1) / (D1. rwpt (X1)-D1. rwcpt (X1))  
4: end for; 
5: end for;  
SUBMODLE: pnrmp (X1) 
ASSERTION:  To find the penalty ramp for each of the distribution companies 
ALGOROTHM 
1: for each D1 ϵ D do 
2: for each X1∈X do 
3: PR ← D1.Max.pen(X1) / (D1. pncpt (X1)-D1. pnpt (X1)) 
4:    end for; 
5: end for;  
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SUBMODLE: rwpn (R, S, X) 
ASSERTION:  To estimate the reward or penalty of each distribution company  
ALGOROTHM 
1: for each D1 ϵ D do 
2: for all R1 ϵ R do 
3: for all value S1 ϵ S do 
4: for all X1 ϵ X do 
5: if S1 <= D1. rwcpt(X1) then 
6: return RwPn ← D1. mxrw(R1) 
7: else if D1. rwcpt(X1) < S1< D1. rwpt(X1) then 
8: return RwPn ← [D1. mxrw(R1)/ (D1. rwpt(X1)-D1. 
rwcpt(X1))] × (D1. mpdz(X1)-S1) 
9: else if D1. rwpt(X1) ≤ S1 ≤ D1. pnpt(X1) then 
10: return RwPn ← 0 
11: else if D1. pnpt(X1) < S1< D1. pncpt(X1) then 
12: return RwPn ← [D1. mxpn(R1)/ (D1. pncpt(X1)-D1. 
pnpt(X1))] × (S1-D1. mpdz(X1)) 
13: else if D1. pncpt(X1) <= S1 then 
14: return RwPn ← D1. mxpn(R1) 
15: end for;  
16: end for;  
17: end for;  
18:   end for; 
 
2. PSEUDO CODE FOR QRPS 
Algorithm 1: Pseudocode for QRPS with no dead band and no maximum reward/penalty 
capping for all distribution companies  
Require: Parameter D, such that D= {D1, D2, …}, is a collection of all distribution compa-
nies with their current SAIDI values, represented by a parameter S, such that 
S= {S1, S2, ….} and their annual revenue represented by a parameter R, such 
that R= {R1, R2, …} 
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Parameter X, such that X= {X1, X2, ….} represents a collection of a set of histor-
ical SAIDI values for alldistribution companies, where X1= {x1, x2, x3, x4} 
shows a set of the last 4 years SAIDI values for each distribution company D1. 
Output: Estimating the Reward or Penalty for all distribution companies based on their 
performance score (current actual SAIDI value) 
1. for all D1 ϵ D do 
2. for all X1 ∈X do 
3. Target← avg(X1)  
4. SD1←sd(X1)  
5. end for; 
6. end for; 
7. for all D1 ϵ D do 
8. for all R1 ϵ R do 
9. for all value S1 ϵ S do 
10. for all X1 ϵ X do 
11. RwPn ← rwpn (Target, S, X)  
12. end for;  
13. end for;  
14. end for;  
15. end for; 
 
SUBMODLE:     avg(X1) 
ASSERTION:  To find the average of a set of 4 historical SAIDI values 
ALGOROTHM 
1. declare the variables 
2. foreach X1 ϵ X from 1 to 4 do 
3. sum = sum of all values in X1 
4. return sum / 4 
5. end for; 
SUBMODLE: sd(X1)   




1. declare the variables 
2. define the expression and the constraints 
3. foreach X1 ϵ X from 1 to 4 do 
4. A ← avg (X1) 
5. sumsq = sumsq + power(x,2) 
6. return sqrt (sumsq / 4 - A * A) 
7. end for; 
SUBMODLE: rwpn (Target, S, X) 
ASSERTION: To estimate the reward or penalty of each distribution company  
ALGOROTHM 
1. for each D1 ϵ D do 
2. for each R1 ϵ R do 
3. for each value S1 ϵ S do 
4. for each X1 ϵ X do 
5. if 0 < S1 < D1. Target then 
6. set RwPn ← power ((D1. Target - S1)/D1. sd(X1), 2) 
7. else if S1 > D1. Target then 
8. set RwPn ← -power ((D1. Target - S1)/D1. sd(X1),2) 
9. else if S1 = D1. Target then 
10. set RwPn ← 0 
11. end for;  
12. end for;  
13. end for;  
14. end for; 
 
Algorithm 2: Pseudocode for QRPS with dead band and maximum reward capping and 
maximum penalty capping for all distribution companies. 
Require: Parameter D, such that D= {D1, D2, …} is a collection of 43 distribution compa-
nies with their currentSAIDI values represented by a parameter S, such that S= 
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{S1, S2, …...} and their annual revenue represented by a parameter R, such that 
R={R1, R2, …}. 
Parameter X, such that X= {X1, X2, …} represents a collection of a set of histori-
cal SAIDI values for alldistribution companies, where X1= {x1, x2, x3, x4} 
shows a set of last 4 years SAIDI values, for each distribution company D1. 
Output: Reward or Penalty values of all distribution companies according to their perfor-
mance based on reliability 
1. for all D1 ϵ D do 
2. for all X1 ∈X do 
3. A1← avg(X1)  
4. SD1←sd(X1)  
5. end for; 
6. end for;  
7. for all D1 ϵ D do 
8. for all R1 ϵ R 
9. MaxR ← mxrw(R1) 
10. MaxP ← mxpn(R1) 
11. end for;  
12. end for;  
13. for all D1 ϵ D do 
14. for all X1 ∈X do 
15. DZW ← ddzw (X1) 
16. MDZ ← mpdz(X1)  
17. end for;  
18. end for;  
19. for all D1 ϵ D do 
20. for all X1 ∈ X do 
21. RP ← rwpt(X1)  
22. RCP ← rwcpt(X1)  
23. end for;  
24. end for;  
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25. for all D1 ϵ D do 
26. for all X1 ∈X do  
27. PP ← pnpt(X1)   
28. PCP ← pncpt(X1)   
29. end for;  
30. end for; 
31. for all D1 ϵ D do 
32. for all R1 ϵ R do 
33. for all X1 ∈X do 
34. RR ← rwrmp(X1)  
35. PR ← pnrmp(X1)  
36. end for;  
37. end for;  
38. end for; 
39. for all D1 ϵ D do 
40. for all R1 ϵ R do 
41. for all value S1 ϵ S do 
42. for all X1 ϵ X do 
43. RwPn ← rwpn (R, S, X)  
44. end for;  
45. end for;  
46. end for;  
47. end for; 
 
SUBMODLE: avg(X1) 
ASSERTION:  Finding the average of all historical SAIDI values for all distribution companies 
ALGOROTHM 
1. declare the variables 
2. for each X1 ϵ X from 1 to 4 do 
3. sum = sum of all values in X1 
4. return sum / 4 
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5. end for 
SUBMODLE: sd(X1)   
ASSERTION:  Finding the standard deviation of all historical SAIDI values for all distribu-
tion companies 
ALGOROTHM 
8. declare the variables 
9. define the expression and the constraints 
10. for each X1 ϵ X from 1 to 4 do 
11. A ← avg (X1) 
12. sumsq = sumsq + power(x,2) 
13. return sqrt (sumsq / 4 - A * A) 
14. end for 
SUBMODLE: mxrw(R1) 
ASSERTION:  To find the Maximum Reward cap for all distribution companies 
ALGOROTHM 
1. for each revenue R1 ϵ R do 
2. MaxR ← 0.05*R 
3. end for;  
SUBMODLE: mxpn(R1) 
ASSERTION:  To find the Maximum Penalty cap for all distribution companies 
ALGOROTHM 
1. for each revenue R1 ϵ R do 
2. MaxP ← 0.05*R 
3. end for; 
SUBMODLE: ddzw (X1) 
ASSERTION:  To find the dead zone width for all distribution companies 
ALGOROTHM 
1. for each D1 ϵ D do 
2. for each X1∈X do 
3. DZW ← D1.sd (X1)   
4. end for; 
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5. end for;  
SUBMODLE: mpdz (X1) 
ASSERTION:  To find the mid-point of dead zone for all distribution companies 
ALGOROTHM 
1. for each D1 ϵ D do 
2. for each X1∈X do 
3. MDZ ← D1.avg (X1) 
4. end for; 
5. end for;  
SUBMODLE: rwpt (X1) 
ASSERTION:  To find the reward point for all distribution companies 
ALGOROTHM 
1. for each D1 ϵ D do 
2. for each X1∈X do 
3. RP ← D1. mpdz(X1) - (D1. ddzw(X1,4) / 2)  
4. end for; 
5. end for;  
SUBMODLE: rwcpt (X1) 
ASSERTION:  To find the reward cap point for all distribution companies 
ALGOROTHM 
1. for each D1 ϵ D do 
2. for each X1∈X do 
3. RCP ← D1. mpdz(X1) + D1. ddzw(X1,4)  
4. end for; 
5. end for;  
SUBMODLE: pnpt (X1) 
ASSERTION:  To find the penalty point for all distribution companies 
ALGOROTHM 
1. for each D1 ϵ D do 
2. for each X1∈X do 
3. PP ← D1. mpdz(X1) + D1. ddzw(X1,4)  
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4. end for; 
5. end for;  
SUBMODLE: pncpt (X1) 
ASSERTION:  To find the penalty cap point for all distribution companies 
ALGOROTHM 
1. for each D1 ϵ D do 
2. for each X1∈X do 
3. PCP ← D1. mpdz(X1) + D1. ddzw(X1,4)  
4. end for; 
5. end for;  
SUBMODLE: rwrmp (X1) 
ASSERTION:  To find the reward ramp for all distribution companies 
ALGOROTHM 
1. for each D1 ϵ D do 
2. for each X1∈X do 
3. RR ← D1.Max.rew(X1) / (D1. rwpt (X1)-D1. rwcpt (X1))  
4. end for; 
5. end for;  
SUBMODLE: pnrmp (X1) 
ASSERTION:  To find the penalty ramp for all distribution companies 
ALGOROTHM 
1. for each D1 ϵ D do 
2. for each X1∈X do 
3. PR ← D1.Max.pen(X1) / (D1. pncpt (X1)-D1. pnpt (X1)) 
4. end for; 
5. end for;  
SUBMODLE: rwpn (R, S, X) 
ASSERTION: Estimating the Reward or Penalty for all distribution companies according to 
their performance, based on reliability 
ALGOROTHM 
1. for each D1 ϵ D do 
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2. for all R1 ϵ R do 
3. for all value S1 ϵ S do 
4. for all X1 ϵ X do 
5. if S1 <= D1. rwcpt(X1) then 
6. return RwPn ← D1. mxrw(R1) 
7. else if D1. rwcpt(X1) < S1< D1. rwpt(X1) then 
8. return RwPn ← (D1. mxrw(R1)/power (D1. mpdz(X1),2)) 
×power (S1-D1. mpdz(X1),2) 
9. else if D1. rwpt(X1) ≤ S1 ≤ D1. pnpt(X1) then 
10. return RwPn ← 0 
11. else if D1. pnpt(X1) < S1< D1. pncpt(X1) then 
12. return RwPn ← (D1. mxpn(R1)/power (D1. mpdz(X1),2)) ×power 
(S1-D1. mpdz(X1),2) 
13. else if D1. pncpt(X1) <= S1 then 
14. return RwPn ← D1. mxpn(R1) 
15. end for;  
16. end for;  
17. end for;  
18. end for; 
 
3. PSEUDO CODE FOR CRPS 
 
Algorithm 1: Pseudocode for CRPS with no dead band and no maximum reward/penalty 
capping for all distribution companies  
Require: Parameter D, such that D= {D1, D2, …} is a collection of all distribution compa-
nies with their current SAIDI values, represented by a parameter S, such that 
S= {S1, S2, …...} and their annual revenue represented by a parameter R, such 
that R= {R1, R2, ……}  
Parameter X, such that X= {X1, X2, …} represents a collection of a set of histori-
cal SAIDI values for all distribution company, where X1= {x1, x2, x3, x4} shows 
a set of last 4 years SAIDI values for each distribution company D1. 
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Output:      Reward or Penalty for all distribution companies according to their perfor-
mance based reliability (current actual SAIDI value) 
1. for all D1 ϵ D do 
2. for all X1 ∈X do 
3. Target← avg(X1)  
4. SD1←sd(X1)  
5. end for; 
6. end for; 
7. for all D1 ϵ D do 
8. for all R1 ϵ R do 
9. for all value S1 ϵ S do 
10. for all X1 ϵ X do 
11. RwPn ← rwpn (Target, S, X)  
12. end for;  
13. end for;  
14. end for;  
15. end for; 
 
SUBMODLE: avg(X1) 
ASSERTION:  Finding average and standard deviation of all historical SAIDI values, for all 
distribution companies. 
ALGOROTHM 
1. declare the variables 
2. foreach X1 ϵ X from 1 to 4 do 
3. sum = sum of all values in X1 
4. return sum / 4 
5. end for; 
SUBMODLE: sd(X1)   





1. declare the variables 
2. define the expression and the constraints 
3. foreach X1 ϵ X from 1 to 4 do 
4. A ← avg (X1) 
5. sumsq = sumsq + power(x,2) 
6. return sqrt (sumsq / 4 - A * A) 
7. end for 
SUBMODLE: rwpn (Target, S, X) 
ASSERTION:  Finding Reward or Penalty for all distribution companies  
ALGOROTHM 
1. for each D1 ϵ D do 
2. for each R1 ϵ R do 
3. for each value S1 ϵ S do 
4. for each X1 ϵ X do 
5. if 0 < S1 < D1. Targetthen 
6. set RwPn ← power ((D1. Target - S1)/D1. sd(X1), 3) 
7. else if S1 > D1. Targetthen 
8. set RwPn ← -power (((D1. Target - S1)/D1. sd(X1)), 3) 
9. else if S1 = D1. Targetthen 
10. set RwPn ← 0 
11. end for;  
12. end for;  
13. end for;  
14. end for; 
 
Algorithm 2: Pseudocode for CRPS with dead band and maximum reward capping and 
maximum penalty capping of 43 distribution companies  
Require: Parameter D, such that D= {D1, D2, …D43} is a collection of all distribution 
companies with their current SAIDI values represented by a parameter S, such 
that S= {S1, S2, …...} and their annual revenue represented by a parameter R, 
such that R= {R1, R2, …} 
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Parameter X, such that X= {X1, X2, …} represents a collection of a set of histori-
cal SAIDI values for all distribution company, where X1={x1, x2,x3,x4} shows a 
set of the last 4 years SAIDI values, for each distribution company D1. 
Output:   Reward or Penalty for all distribution companies according to their perfor-
mance based on their reliability 
1. for all D1 ϵ D do 
2. for all X1 ∈X do 
3. A1← avg(X1)  
4. SD1←sd(X1)  
5. end for; 
6. end for;  
7. for all D1 ϵ D do 
8. for all R1 ϵ R 
9. MaxR ← mxrw(R1) 
10. MaxP ← mxpn(R1) 
11. end for;  
12. end for;  
13. for all D1 ϵ D do 
14. for all X1 ∈X do 
15. DZW ← ddzw (X1) 
16. MDZ ← mpdz(X1)  
17. end for;  
18. end for;  
19. for all D1 ϵ D do 
20. for all X1 ∈ X do 
21. RP ← rwpt(X1)  
22. RCP ← rwcpt(X1)  
23. end for;  
24. end for;  
25. for all D1 ϵ D do 
26. for all X1 ∈X do  
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27. PP ← pnpt(X1)   
28. PCP ← pncpt(X1)   
29. end for;  
30. end for; 
31. for all D1 ϵ D do 
32. for all R1 ϵ R do 
33. for all X1 ∈X do 
34. RR ← rwrmp(X1)  
35. PR ← pnrmp(X1)  
36. end for;  
37. end for;  
38. end for; 
39. for all D1 ϵ D do 
40. for all R1 ϵ R do 
41. for all value S1 ϵ S do 
42. for all X1 ϵ X do 
43. RwPn ← rwpn (R, S, X)  
44. end for;  
45. end for;  
46. end for;  
47. end for; 
 
SUBMODLE: avg(X1) 
ASSERTION:  To find the average of a set of 4 historical SAIDI valuesfor all distribution 
companies 
ALGOROTHM 
1. declare the variables 
2. for each X1 ϵ X from 1 to 4 do 
3. sum = sum of all values in X1 
4. return sum / 4 
5. end for; 
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SUBMODLE: sd(X1,4)   
ASSERTION:  To find the standard deviation of a set of 4 historical SAIDI valuesfor all dis-
tribution companies 
ALGOROTHM 
1. declare the variables 
2. define the expression and the constraints 
3. for each X1 ϵ X from 1 to 4 do 
4. A ← avg (X1) 
5. sumsq = sumsq + power(x,2) 
6. return sqrt (sumsq / 4 - A * A) 
7. end for; 
SUBMODLE: mxrw(R1) 
ASSERTION:  To find the Maximum Reward cap for all distribution companies 
ALGOROTHM 
1. for each revenue R1 ϵ R do 
2. MaxR ← 0.05*R 
3. end for;  
SUBMODLE: mxpn(R1) 
ASSERTION:  To find the Maximum Penalty cap for all distribution companies 
ALGOROTHM 
1. for each revenue R1 ϵ R do 
2. MaxP ← 0.05*R 
3. end for; 
SUBMODLE: ddzw (X1) 
ASSERTION:  To find the dead zone widthfor all distribution companies 
ALGOROTHM 
1. for each D1 ϵ D do 
2. for each X1∈X do 
3. DZW ← D1.sd (X1,4)   
4. end for; 
5. end for;  
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SUBMODLE: mpdz (X1) 
ASSERTION:  To find the mid-point of dead zone for all distribution companies 
ALGOROTHM 
1. for each D1 ϵ D do 
2. for each X1∈X do 
3. MDZ ← D1. avg (X1, 4) 
4. end for; 
5. end for;  
SUBMODLE: rwpt (X1) 
ASSERTION:  To find the reward point for all distribution companies 
ALGOROTHM 
1. for each D1 ϵ D do 
2. for each X1∈X do 
3. RP ← D1. mpdz(X1) - (D1. ddzw(X1,4) / 2)  
4. end for; 
5. end for;  
SUBMODLE: rwcpt (X1) 
ASSERTION:  To find the reward cap point for all distribution companies 
ALGOROTHM 
1. for each D1 ϵ D do 
2. for each X1∈X do 
3. RCP ← D1. mpdz(X1) + D1. ddzw(X1,4)  
4. end for; 
5. end for;  
SUBMODLE: pnpt (X1) 
ASSERTION:  To find the penalty point for all distribution companies 
ALGOROTHM 
1. for each D1 ϵ D do 
2. for each X1∈X do 
3. PP ← D1. mpdz(X1) + D1. ddzw(X1,4)  
4. end for; 
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5. end for;  
SUBMODLE: pncpt (X1) 
ASSERTION:  To find the penalty cap point for all distribution companies 
ALGOROTHM 
1. for each D1 ϵ D do 
2. for each X1∈X do 
3. PCP ← D1. mpdz(X1) + D1. ddzw(X1,4)  
4. end for; 
5. end for;  
SUBMODLE: rwrmp (X1) 
ASSERTION:  To find the reward ramp for all distribution companies 
ALGOROTHM 
1. for each D1 ϵ D do 
2. for each X1∈X do 
3. RR ← D1.Max.rew(X1) / (D1. rwpt (X1)-D1. rwcpt (X1))  
4. end for; 
5. end for;  
 
SUBMODLE: pnrmp (X1) 
ASSERTION:  To find the penalty ramp for all distribution companies 
ALGOROTHM 
1. for each D1 ϵ D do 
2. for each X1∈X do 
3. PR ← D1.Max.pen(X1) / (D1. pncpt (X1)-D1. pnpt (X1)) 
4. end for; 
5. end for;  
SUBMODLE: rwpn (R, S, X) 
ASSERTION:  To estimate the reward or penalty for all distribution companies, according 
to their performance based on reliability 
ALGOROTHM 
1. for each D1 ϵ D do 
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2. for all R1 ϵ R do 
3. for all value S1 ϵ S do 
4. for all X1 ϵ X do 
5. if S1 <= D1. rwcpt(X1) then 
6. return RwPn ← D1. mxrw(R1) 
7. else if D1. rwcpt(X1) < S1< D1. rwpt(X1) then 
8. return RwPn ← (D1. mxrw(R1)/power(D1.mpdz(X1),3)) 
×power (S1-D1.mpdz(X1),3) 
9. else if D1. rwpt(X1) ≤ S1 ≤ D1. pnpt(X1) then 
10. return RwPn ← 0 
11. else if D1. pnpt(X1) < S1< D1. pncpt(X1) then 
12. return RwPn ← (D1. mxpn(R1)/ power (D1.  mpdz(X1),3)) 
×power (S1-D1. mpdz(X1),3) 
13. else if D1. pncpt(X1) <= S1 then 
14. return RwPn ← D1. mxpn(R1) 
15. end for;  
16. end for;  
17. end for;  
18. end for; 
 
